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ABSTRACT 
 
 
My work focuses on army officers’ efforts to both conquer American Indians and 
answer to competing visions of political authorities and citizens who were divided over 
the “Indian question.”  Although army officers served as representatives of federal power 
on the frontier, they were often limited both in their perceptions of Indians and the 
restrictions placed on them by federal, state, and territorial governments.  The officer 
corps was able to use its authority and resources to advance the national goal of western 
settlement.  However, its efforts to replace a native West with a white West were neither 
unified nor bereft of tension.   
Indians, recognizing imbalances in power among American authorities, sought to 
maintain their own hegemony.  With their sophisticated use of political alliances and 
rhetoric, they took advantage of Anglo-American misunderstandings about native people.  
In my work, I treat Indians as competitors against a rival Anglo-American empire that 
sought to control the West.  Rather than see native people as marginalized figures, I argue 
that the army was marginalized within the dominant civilian state.  This marginalization, 
combined with their difficulty in responding to native sovereignty and the disunity posed 
by their individual interpretations of federal Indian policy, had a lasting effect on the way 
in which the army pursued its mission on the frontier.  Territorial officials, entrepreneurs 
who promoted western settlement, and civilians themselves often acted in ways which 
hampered the army’s efforts.   
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PREFACE 
 
This project focuses on army officers’ efforts both to conquer American Indians 
and answer to competing visions of political authorities and citizens who were divided 
over the “Indian question.”  Although army officers served as representatives of federal 
power on the frontier, they were often limited both in their perceptions of Indians and the 
restrictions placed on them by federal, state, and territorial governments.  The officer 
corps was able to use its authority and resources to advance the national goal of western 
settlement.  However, its efforts to replace a native West with a white West were neither 
unified nor bereft of tension.   
Indians, recognizing imbalances in power among American authorities, sought to 
maintain their own hegemony.  With their sophisticated use of political alliances and 
rhetoric, they took advantage of Anglo-American misunderstandings about native people.  
In my work, I treat Indians as competitors against a rival Anglo-American empire that 
sought to control the West.  Rather than see native people as marginalized figures, I argue 
that the army was marginalized within the dominant civilian state.  This marginalization, 
combined with their difficulty in responding to native sovereignty and the disunity posed 
by their individual interpretations of federal Indian policy, had a lasting effect on the way 
in which the army pursued its mission on the frontier.  Territorial officials, entrepreneurs 
who promoted western settlement, and civilians themselves often acted in ways which 
hampered the army’s efforts.   
American civilians in the mid-nineteenth century viewed their attempts to conquer 
the West through a lens which we now know was distorted by their own ethnocentric 
2 
 
myopia.  Many American civilians infused their personal narratives, newspapers, and 
state histories with, as historian Gary Anderson puts it, “the hallowed, nationalistic 
rhetoric of nation building.”1
Civilians and territorial officials hampered effective Indian fighting that was 
already ill-affected by the army’s lack of background in fighting difficult unconventional 
missions, as well as post-war reductions in the numbers of troops.  Territorial and state 
interests held sway.  Governors and legislatures focused on increasing the current state 
populations, seizing native land, exploiting natural resources, encouraging investments 
such as the railroad, land speculation, and other businesses.  These interests were often 
tied to the need for territorial security, in order to promote stable settlements that could 
thrive without fear of Indian attack.  Although the army was posed to assist these nascent 
states and territories in achieving stability, army officers often found themselves at odds 
  They would have their contemporaries believe that they 
represented an island of civility and harmony in a sea of savagery and discord—that as 
people of the land, they cultivated sustainable communities and trade and transport 
networks out of a beautiful wilderness that was scorned and spoiled by ignorant 
indigenous people.  In small towns that surrounded the Red River on the Oklahoma-
Texas border or the Missouri River in the Dakotas, Anglo-Americans strove to assert 
their dominance over native people.  These same small towns clamored for protection 
from the army at the first sign of an Indian presence, yet it was their own presence that 
served as the impetus for native-white violence.  They justified this violence on the basis 
of imagined cultural superiority, their intention to cultivate the trans-Mississippi west, 
and native refusal to conform to Anglo-American social norms.   
                                                 
1 Gary Clayton Anderson, The Conquest of Texas: Ethnic Cleansing in the Promised Land, 1820-
1875 (Norman: University of Oklahoma, 2005), 13. 
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with local and regional authorities.  Paradoxically, this conflict occurred at the same time 
that other officers’ efforts were being championed by the public elsewhere.  The United 
States Army dominated native people but it itself was dominated by a civilian society 
which viewed the military institution as fundamentally a public servant.  In principle 
civilian control is essential to the army’s function, but civilian domination manifested 
itself in a myriad of ways that jeopardized the army’s ability to succeed in completing its 
mission.   
 Three historians have offered significant assessments of the military’s role during 
this period: Robert Utley, Paul Hutton, and Robert Wooster.  Utley argued that the army 
failed to find a creative approach to unconventional Plains warfare; instead, it relied on 
traditional modes established by the Civil War.  Most important, Utley ably fulfilled his 
intention to strike “a truthful balance between the two stereotypes” that characterized the 
frontier military in absolute terms of heroism or villainy.  Hutton’s 1985 biography of 
Phillip Sheridan argued that the general often compromised military effectiveness 
because of his prejudices.  In his 1988 study of federal Indian policy, Wooster concluded 
that the army, pressured by conflicting interests, never developed a consistent strategic 
doctrine for dealing with Indians.  I build on their work by emphasizing Indians’ dynamic 
responses to the military.  In addition, my work explores individual officers’ 
interpretations of federal Indian policy in the context of national and institutional trends.2
                                                 
2 Robert M. Utley, Frontier Regulars: The United States Army and the Indian, 1866-1891 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1973), xii.  Paul Hutton,  Phil Sheridan and His Army, (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1985; reprint, Norman: University of Oklahoma, 2003).  Robert Wooster, 
The Military and United States Indian Policy, 1865-1903 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988; 
reprint, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995). 
  
Most important, I hope this project will make a significant contribution to revisiting 
historical scholarship, like Utley’s, which seems intent on absolving the army of its sins 
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without exploring the complexities that affected officers, their native foes, and the ways 
in which both groups approached conflict in the West. 
Much recent scholarship on the frontier military still focuses on the traditional 
(and popular) approaches of battlefield analysis and biography.  Recently, scholars have 
written about influential commanders like William Harney, George Crook, Nelson Miles, 
and William Hazen.3
More comparative analysis of these officers, as well as more emphasis on native 
people, would give historians greater insight into the dynamics of power between Anglo-
Americans and Indians.  I seek to answer several broad questions that are crucial to 
understanding those dynamics.  Was commanders’ understanding of Indian behavior 
solely based on existing templates about race in American society, or their personal 
education on the frontier?  (Sherry Smith argues for a combination of both in The View 
from Officers’ Row, a landmark study that informs this manuscript to a great degree).  
Did leaders attempt to influence their subordinates with a particular view of federal 
  These studies tell us a great deal about individual military leaders’ 
perceptions of Indians, but most of them are confined to one individual, region, or brief 
time span, and are limited in their contributions to a larger understanding of the frontier 
army.  Other problems in recent texts include a tendency to overlook the role played by 
civilians and territorial leaders and how those people created problems for the army.  
Moreover, little attention is paid to the government’s use of the army to advance national 
agendas of imperialism and the colonization of native people. 
                                                 
3 Examples include George Rollie Adams, General William S. Harney: Prince of Dragoons 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2001); Charles M. Robinson, III, General Crook and the Western 
Frontier (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2001), Robert Wooster, Nelson A. Miles and the 
Twilight of the Frontier Army (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1993), Edward S. Cooper, William 
Babcock Hazen: The Best Hated Man (Madison, N.J.: Farleigh Dickinson University Press, 2005). R. Eli 
Paul, Blue Water Creek and the First Sioux War, 1854-1856 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 
2004) is an exception, given its careful integration of Lakota oral histories with army records. 
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Indian policy, and how did they react to opinions that differed from their own?  What 
were the character of relationships between civilians, particularly state and territorial 
leaders, and members of the army?  What of the effect played by public opinion and 
perception via print media?  Finally, did Indians and army officers do more than merely 
fight one another?  These questions have been less well studied.  Continued research, 
therefore, will illustrate the ways in which institutional policy affected officers’ execution 
of their missions.   
While Robert Utley’s work is highly regarded in the field, his work presents a 
score of limitations and problems that deserve reassessment.  Some of those issues, 
therefore, are explored in this manuscript.  Utley’s two-volume history of the frontier 
army is considered the authoritative work on the subject, and for good reason.  Yet Utley, 
by his own admission, characterized native people in outdated ways that lacked the 
ethnohistorical insight prevalent in recent years.  He cast native people in a dismissive 
light; for instance, he claimed that native people most likely did not understand or intend 
to adhere to federal treaties—a characterization that could not be further from the truth.4  
Frontier military histories almost always regard native people as reactive rather than 
actively shaping interactions on the frontier, giving the impression that the army was, 
even at its weakest, the dominant force in the West.  Even respectable older histories, like 
George Hyde’s study of Spotted Tail, refer to native people as “plaguy” and “bitter and 
mystical” people who “sulked.”5
                                                 
4 Utley, Frontiersmen in Blue: The United States Army and the Indian, 1848-1865 (New York: 
Macmillan, 1967; reprint, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1981), 69; Utley, Frontier Regulars, 95. 
  Few frontier army histories offer a sense of the 
continuity and change in the army’s mission, much less those same dynamic elements 
5 George E. Hyde, Spotted Tail’s Folk: A History of the Brulé Sioux, vol. 57 of The Civilization of 
the American Indian Series, 2nd ed. (Norman: University of Oklahoma, 1974),  83, 195, 197. 
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among native groups.  The Lakota had the right to be suspicious, resistant, angry, and 
resentful of Anglo-Americans, but their behavior must be placed within the context of 
consistent marginalization.  No wonder that critics find overtones of anti-Indianism in 
some contemporary military histories—there is often little or no discussion of 
sovereignty, diplomacy, negotiation with Anglo-Americans, or the ways in which native 
people were able to control whites, especially outside of the context of combat.  Studies 
that combine balanced analysis of both Anglo-American and native perspectives are far 
and few between, even today. 
Sherry Smith’s The View from Officer’s Row is an important exception to the 
battlefield-biography trend because it analyzes officers’ perspectives through the lens of 
social and intellectual history.  However, the book’s major limitation, admitted by the 
author, was its lack of engagement with Indian voice.  Smith also argued that officers did 
not question federal policy itself, only its implementation, and that they “emphasized the 
necessity of force more than fairness in their public statements.”6  Yet it is more accurate 
to say that many officers’ constant interrogation of federal policy also contained extended 
and well-reasoned critiques of that policy.  Officers generally sought to achieve the 
objectives of their missions despite their opposition to doctrine, yet they did make 
sustained and notable attempts to meet with Indians at councils, and sometimes even took 
up the Indians’ perspective.  Yet assumptions and inaccuracies still exist.  For instance, 
some historians have asserted that the army “deliberately looked the other way, hoping 
that miners of the ground would force the Sioux into agreeing to sell the Black Hills.”7
                                                 
6 Sherry L. Smith, The View from Officers’ Row: Army Perceptions of Western Indians (Tucson: 
University of Arizona Press, 1990), 160. 
 
7 Robert V. Hine and John Mack Faragher, eds., The American West: A New Interpretive Hitsory 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000), 252. 
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This is generally false.  In fact, many army officers stationed in the Black Hills were 
angry at the influx of illegal prospectors, sometimes on behalf of Indians, and were 
determined to chase the miners out.     
This work distinguishes itself from other military histories in another way.  While 
I look at well-known senior leaders like George Armstrong Custer, Alfred Sully, 
Benjamin Grierson, and Alfred Howe Terry, I want to draw more attention to officers 
who have often remained on the periphery, including Oliver Otis Howard, David Sloane 
Stanley, and lesser known junior officers who were assigned the tremendous 
responsibility of practicing federal policy at small and isolated outposts.  While Sully and 
Grierson have remained popular figures in frontier military history, I investigate their 
activities in ways that have not been previously explored.  As a result, I hope that this 
work will set itself apart by considering a cross-section of leaders who worked in 
different regions and across borderlands over nearly two decades.8
All of these officers responded to native people in different ways.  Still, they 
strove to accomplish multifold goals— ensuring territorial expansion, Anglo-American 
  Notably absent from 
this text are the Little Big Horn, Sitting Bull and Crazy Horse, Santana, Red River War, 
the Apache and Comanche fight for the Southwest, and Wounded Knee—all events and 
individuals that have received a great deal of scholarly attention in the last fifty years.  I 
gravitated towards sources on the Great Plains at the outset of this project and have 
decided to keep my focus on the northern tier, as well as the Red River area of Canada.  
As a result, this project is neither a comprehensive history of Plains Indian nations nor a 
synthesis of thirty years of U.S. Army history.   
                                                 
8 There are some limitations to the biographical coverage of these officers in this manuscript; for 
instance, David Sloane Stanley has no extant post-Civil War papers, and his memoirs discuss little of his 
postwar career.   
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safety, and control of Indians.  By focusing on individual officers’ execution of specific 
missions, I follow the development of their ideas as well as their interactions with 
territorial and federal authorities, and native people.  Robert Wooster proved that 
“officers repeatedly interpreted their instructions as they saw fit.”9
Pressure to conform, however, had its limitations.  Howard and Grierson 
questioned the moral value of Indian policy and the efficacy of the army’s larger drive.  
Sully and Custer, on the other hand, prioritized force, but neither of them was above 
displaying empathy for native perspectives.  Sully joined a native woman in winter 
marriage and provided for both his wife and his mixed-blood daughter.  Sully’s grandson 
(his erstwhile biographer) made a conspicuous omission of that union, given that Sully’s 
direct descendants are renowned native historian Vine Deloria Jr. and his son, Philip J. 
Deloria, a professor of history and Native American Studies at the University of 
Michigan.  Army officers, like their civilian contemporaries, had complicated, even 
paradoxical relationships with all aspects of the American West (and the frontier) in its 
many guises—as a place and as a process.   
  This work builds on 
that assertion.  It also illustrates that relationships between officers, their social beliefs 
and expectations about Indian policy, and even pressure to conform to the so-called ‘total 
war’ concept created disunity within the officer corps. Both Howard and Grierson were 
removed from their assignments within months after their failures with the Nez Perces 
and the Kiowas and Comanches, but these professional moves did not adversely affect 
their positive, and even close friendships with General Sherman.  It was Sheridan, rather 
than Sherman, who more often advocated a ‘total war’ strategy, and Howard and 
Grierson’s failures both earned them Sheridan’s ire.  
                                                 
 9 Wooster, The Military and United States Indian Policy, 211.  
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While Sheridan’s use of winter warfare could be devastatingly effective at the 
places like the Washita, it also failed on an impressive scale, such as during the winter of 
1875-76 against the Lakota and their Cheyenne allies.  Although the ‘total war’ strategy 
is most often associated with Sherman and his career in the War of Rebellion, his 
colleague relied on it to a greater degree.  Charles Royster’s term, “destructive warfare” 
is far more accurate to describe the approach that Sherman and Sheridan favored and 
even came to expect from many of their senior leaders.  Sheridan applied destructive 
warfare to the Plains earlier and with much more force than Sherman had advocated in 
the immediate postwar period through 1868.10
 The issue of genocide and Native American history is unavoidable.  Some 
scholars, including those with a native heritage, like Tom Holm and Elizabeth Cook-
Lynn, argue that the United States Army committed genocide in the nineteenth century.  
These are the most violent byproducts of what Cook-Lynn has termed “Anti-Indianism,” 
a fundamental concept that informs this book.
  Exaggeration characterized Sherman’s 
threats toward the Confederacy and the South, and to a large degree this also holds true 
for his attitudes towards native people.  In both cases he used the word “extermination,” 
but it is clear that he never engaged, or advocated soldiers’ engagement, in mass murder.  
Federal authorities held out assimilation to native people as an alternative to certain 
conflict with the army.   
11
                                                 
10 See Charles Royster, The Destructive War: William Tecumseh Sherman, Stonewall Jackson, and 
the Americans (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991).  Wooster, The Military and United States Indian 
Policy, 141. 
  Still, lumping the actions of the army as 
a whole under the label of genocide obscures the ability of native people to not only resist 
but challenge and even negate American imperialism.  It is clear that some army officers 
11 Elizabeth Cook-Lynn, Anti-Indianism in Modern America: A Voice from Tatekeya’s Earth 
(Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2001), ix-xii, 3-5. 
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sometimes supported and engaged in a policy of ethnic cleansing.  These qualifications 
are important.  Many army officers, whether they were lieutenants or captains or 
brigadier generals, behaved honorably and fairly toward native people.  These men often 
despaired of the government’s treatment of Indians and criticized their fellow soldiers for 
not doing more to protect the rights of native people.  Nineteenth-century ethnocentric 
views were characteristic of many of these men; it is crucial that we not confuse their 
ethnocentricism and racism with murderous intent.  Furthermore, unlike the German 
example, the army’s most senior leaders did not create, endorse, or put into action a 
concerted policy of genocide.12
Nevertheless, regards of where one stands on this new debate, paying attention to 
native history is important.  Too often native people are painted with too narrow a brush 
and too flat an ink – only in the last twenty five years have historians of Native America 
and the West sought to explore the ways in which native people applied agency.  The 
Lakota and the Dakota serve as the primary example of a native empire in this 
manuscript.  Their use of diplomacy on Indian terms reflects their understanding of the 
power of negotiation, their recognition of the dynamics of power on the frontier, and their 
ability to shape the struggle for dominance in the West.   
  
                                                 
12 This debate has begun to receive attention in journals and other venues, and it deserves a book-
length project to do it justice.  Consequently, this study does not enter into that debate at length, but it does 
engage the contention of genocide several times.  Overall, I conclude that the United States Army did not 
commit genocide against native people.  The army was not blameless when it came to killing native people.  
Dakota Indians at Killdeer and Whitestone Mountains, the Cheyennes at the Washita, the Piegans on the 
Milk River, and other individuals were killed during battles or forced removals like the Navajo at Bosque 
Redondo or the Apache from Avaipai.  There are several incidents of officers inciting their enlisted men to 
hack at unarmed men, women, and children with knives and axes, as was done by Lieutenant Gustavus 
Cheney Doane, a participant in the Milk River massacre of 1870. But these remarks did not characterize 
their correspondence as a whole, as evidence of a genocidal policy might suggest.  Sherman in particular is 
singled out, but remarks he made in the 1860s and 1870s are very similar to those he made during the Civil 
War, such as his assertion that hundreds of thousands of Southerners would have to be killed in order to 
win the war.  Men like Doane, however, did not kill Indians because they were ordered to do so—they 
killed them because they wanted to. 
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The popularity of frontier military history persists today in literature and film, 
which perhaps is the most influential factor in shaping scholarly and public perceptions 
of this subject.  The reality of the army’s experience in the West lies somewhere between 
the interpretations proposed by John Wayne and Kevin Costner.  The army did not 
always charge in to battle to the tune of “Garryowen” with guidons fluttering in the wind.  
Nor did its officers generally develop lasting relationships with native communities, 
much less to the extent that they became fictive kin, and native communities were never 
idyllic places devoid of internal conflict.  Nevertheless, if one cinematic visual image 
comes close to describing the relationship between army officers and Indians that is 
explored in this text, it is the moment in Dances with Wolves when Lieutenant Dunbar 
first encounters the Lakota community.  Overlooking a steep bluff, Dunbar sees first the 
river that fronts the village, then the huge horse herd, and finally the dozens of lodges 
arrayed in the camp circle.  It is at this point that the power wielded by Lakota first 
impresses itself upon the film’s protagonist, an army officer who comes to the frontier 
with preconceived notions that change as a result of his interaction with native people.  
How should we see the army?  It arrived in the wilderness with assumptions about 
Indianness and Anglo-American exceptionalism, and in the three decades that the army 
attempted to control indigenous people, assumptions led it astray.  Indians were the 
human part of a Western environment, both natural and cultural, that army officers 
struggled, and often failed, to understand.     
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CHAPTER ONE:  The Oyate and the Borderlands 
 
 
In the spring of 1863, the people of Minnesota greeted General Alfred Sully’s 
arrival with alacrity.  They had cheered the execution of thirty-eight Dakota Indians one 
day after Christmas, 1862; now they looked forward to driving the rest of those thieves, 
beggars, and murderers from their lands.  A book co-written by Gary Clayton Anderson, 
a historian, has offered this summary of the Dakotas’ revolt: “Frustrated and provoked by 
a series of broken promises and by reservation policies that forced cultural change, 
Dakota Indian warriors began killing white traders and settlers in August 1862.  The 
fighting lasted nearly six weeks and took the lives of nearly five hundred whites, mostly 
civilians, and an unknown but substantial number of Indians.  As a result, twenty-three 
southwestern Minnesota counties were virtually depopulated.”  The violence in 
Minnesota can be most properly understood as a revolt and a rare instance where the 
indignation and anxiety of native people led them to revenge themselves on their Anglo-
American neighbors.  The shout of a Dakota warrior as he killed the revolt’s first Anglo-
American victim, a general store clerk, lays bare the Dakota perspective: “Now I will kill 
the dog who wouldn’t give me credit!”  Variously called a war, an uprising, or a conflict, 
the events of 1862 proved that the fight for the Great Plains began in earnest long before 
the Civil War ended.1
                                                 
1 Gary Clayton Anderson and Alan Roland Woolworth, eds., Through Dakota Eyes: Narrative 
Accounts of the Minnesota Indian War of 1862 (St. Paul: Minnesota Historical Society Press, 1988), 1. The 
Congressional Act of February 16, 1863 (12 Stat. 652) forfeited all Dakota rights to occupancy in 
Minnesota.  All Dakota lands were sold by the Congressional Act of March 3, 1863 (12 Stat. 891).  None of 
these acts involved any kind of Dakota assent; thus, the “Indian uprising” of wronged Dakotas became a 
convenient justification for Anglo-Americans to seize native land.  Henry Hastings Sibley, the first 
governor of Minnesota, led the state militia in the initial phases of the conflict.  For the “dog” quote, see 
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Minnesotans believed that Sully’s Northwest Indian Expedition, which traveled 
up the Missouri River to join forces with another unit commanded by Henry Hastings 
Sibley, would push the Dakotas west of the Missouri.  Sully, a career officer in the 
United States Army, was given a clear objective: locate the Dakota resistance and force 
them out of the state.  After the revolt, the Dakota people would be forced to go to Crow 
Creek and other reservations.  The Minnesotans would gain uncontested access to the 
Dakota lands that the state had seized with the Traverse des Sioux treaty of 1851, as well 
as their rather substantial reservation.  Settlers in the northwest had great confidence in 
the ability of American fighting men to dispense with the Dakotas once and for all, yet 
many of them were fairly ignorant of the circumstances which had both plunged 
Minnesota into war and continued to prolong native-white violence.   
 Both Sully and his commanding officer, General John Pope, found themselves in 
a precarious position in the aftermath of the Dakota revolt.  At the same time that federal 
authorities tasked them with stopping Dakota resistance, state officials expected them to 
protect Minnesota residents.  When the Dakotas eluded and confounded the army by 
crossing the boundary line into Canada, Minnesotans characterized the army’s inability to 
pursue the enemy as an operational failure.  Minnesota would later praise Edwin Hatch, 
commander of an independent cavalry battalion, for breaching international law.  Sully 
and Pope were not able to satisfy these contrary demands consistently, but their 
opponents’ complaints began to fade after the Dakotas sought refuge in the Canadian-
American borderlands.  
 The execution of the Dakotas in December 1862 signaled a great achievement to 
                                                                                                                                                 
Isaac V.D. Heard and Benjamin Whipple, History of the Sioux War and Massacres of 1862 and 1863 (New 
York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1865), 62.  
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the residents of Mankato, the southern Minnesota town in which the gallows stood.  The 
staff of the Department of the Northwest, however, did not share their enthusiasm.  Pope 
and Sully, however, realized early on that failure would dog every expedition unless the 
Dakotas’ movements in the borderlands could be somehow controlled.2
 The encroachment of Anglo-American culture disrupted the Plains regions of 
Canada and the United States.  In the case of the Minnesota war, American and Canadian 
  Pope argued that 
white settlers from the Red River Colony of Canada, motivated by profit, had sold arms 
and provisions to the Dakotas.  He asserted that Canadian authorities and commercial 
interests like the Hudson’s Bay Company were equally interested in controlling the 
Dakotas.  The Indians would “renew their attacks upon defenseless settlements” if they 
were not pursued in the north.  Pope also worried about the fact that the Dakotas had 
supposedly learned of the army’s operations from a white trader a.  This unidentified man 
had invited Dakotas to move across the line and promised arms and ammunition to them.  
Early on, Pope and other army officers realized that the Indians would avail themselves 
of the protection offered by the Canadian-American borderlands.  But the department 
staff could not guess as to how much aid the British would offer the Sioux.   
                                                 
 2 John Pope to J.C. Kelton, 4 April 1863, The War of the Rebellion: A compilation of the Official 
Records of the War of the Union and Confederate Armies (Washington: GPO, 1880-1901), ser. 1, vol. 22, 
pt. 2, 198-99. (Hereafter cited as OR with accompanying volume and subsequent information.  If more than 
one letter is cited, as in fn. 5, the letters will appear in the order in which they are referenced in the text, 
along with their respective page numbers).  The Department of the Northwest covered Minnesota, Dakota 
and Nebraska Territories, Iowa, and Wisconsin.  This command was replaced by the Department of the 
Dakota in 1866.  The Red River Colony, also known as the Selkirk Settlement, included portions of 
southern Manitoba and northern North Dakota; the Hudson’s Bay Company financed the settlement.  
Scottish and Irish settlers founded Pembina, which lay three miles south of the 49th parallel— the 
contemporary Canadian-American border.  The Red River Colony was a site for HBC operations in the 
early 19th century; from the 1820s to the 1870s, Metis traders traveled with furs and other goods by oxcart 
from Pembina to St. Paul.  The colony’s inhabitants were French, Scottish, Irish, Métis, and native people.   
Through the late 1860s, the boundary line had little formal meaning, which meant that the Red River 
Colony was in and of itself a borderlands community.   See Rhoda R. Gilman, et al., The Red River Trails: 
Oxcart Routes between St. Paul and the Selkirk Settlement, 1820-1870 (Minneapolis: Minnesota Historical 
Society, 1979).   
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authorities imagined that their sovereignty could eliminate conflict with native people, 
whether through violence or accommodation.  In some ways, the authorities were wrong.  
The Dakotas were not bound to international law.  In fact, they used Canadian and 
American borderlands to their advantage, maneuvering between both nations to prolong 
their independence.  The shifting interests and intentions of native people were mistaken 
for deceptions by Anglo-Americans, for they failed to understand or refused to accept 
that the border—an Anglo-American construct— did not exert itself over native people 
who had lived in the borderlands region for centuries.  From a Dakota perspective, their 
own reactions to the conflict in Minnesota were more complex than most Anglo-
Americans realized.  Native people did not intend to ‘escape’ to Canada, for the 
borderlands were a “common and contested ground” that varying peoples shared.  Much 
like the northwestern plains region studied by historian Theodore Binnema, the 
Canadian-American borderlands included native communities which “continually 
cooperated and competed” for resources.  Anglo-Americans and the French, both of 
whom traded with native people, failed to dominate them.  Yet rifles, metal goods, wolf 
skins, horses, and other goods passed between whites and natives with regularity, making 
the Europeans’ presence increasingly essential to native trade networks, alliances, and 
fighting capacities.  The Hudson’s Bay Company in particular provided arms and 
ammunition; this British company had been active in Plains trade since the late 
seventeenth century.   After the 1862 revolt, the HBC would not readily trade with the 
Dakotas at the cost of public opinion.  While the Dakotas expected continued reciprocity 
as participants in Euro-Indian trade networks, the company served as the governing body 
of the Rupert’s Land region and valued control of its territory far more than continued 
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trade with native people, particularly those who could pull the company into conflict with 
the United States.3
  Given their alliance with Britain during the War of 1812, the Dakotas had hoped 
that Canadians would offer them sanctuary, if not material aid.  Little Crow, spokesman 
for the Mdewakantons, the most active Dakota band in the war, had retreated with his 
people into Canada in the late spring of 1863.  He petitioned Canadian officials, recalling 
British promises made to the Dakotas fifty years before.  The Canadians, however, lacked 
the long memories of the Dakotas and were not eager to provide shelter to a people who 
had been declared enemies of the American government.  Thus, the Dakotas turned to the 
mixed-blood people and the Red River Métis as they had done in the past.  These groups 
focused on retaining their economic autonomy.  They were eager to secure an 
understanding with the Dakotas, who controlled access to buffalo-rich lands.  The 
Dakotas needed more than armaments; they sought native allies and intermediaries who 
would strengthen their own position.  Neither group saw themselves as distinctly 
American or Canadian entities at all.   
  Thus, because of the political concerns of Canadian officials, the 
Dakotas would find it difficult to secure real sanctuary in the borderlands.   
 The Dakotas were an indigenous nation of the borderlands who with their 
northern neighbors shared a history of responding to colonial agendas in ever-shifting 
ways that accommodated their changing interests.  Migration to and from Canada was a 
                                                 
 3 For interaction on the Plains, see Theodore Binnema, Common and Contested Ground: A 
Human and Environmental History of the Northwestern Plains (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
2003).  For borderlands activity, see David McCrady, Living with Strangers: The Nineteenth-Century Sioux 
and the Canadian-American Borderlands (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2006) 19, 99-100.  F.F. 
Gerard to Alfred Sully, 26 December 1863, Alfred Sully Papers, Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript 
Library, Yale University, New Haven.  F.F. Gerard was a trader fluent in the Arikara language. Myron 
Eells, “Aboriginal Geographic Names in the State of Washington,” American Anthropologist 5, no. 1 
(January 1892): 36. Gary Clayton Anderson, Little Crow: Spokesman for the Sioux (St. Paul: Minnesota 
Historical Society Press, 1986), 163, 174-76. 
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common response to American pressure among many Plains people, including the 
Blackfeet and Piegan Indians, as well as the Métis.  The Métis’ winter camps, in fact, lay 
on both sides of the boundary line and covered a broad geographical range that included 
the Sweetgrass and Cypress Hills in Montana and the Alberta/Saskatchewan region, and 
Devils Lake, Turtle Mountain, and St. Joseph in the Minnesota/Dakota region.  Although 
scholars have disagreed about the depth of Dakota-Métis alliances, it is clear that the 
Dakota fight for autonomy relied on borderlands opportunities with mixed-heritage 
communities.  Borderlands occupancy meant a number of advantages for native people.  
Greater access to quality goods ultimately enhanced Dakota status, just as access to 
hunting grounds aided the Métis.  While it would be false to suggest that both Métis and 
Dakotas were in complete agreement on matters of trade or Anglo-American interference, 
they did have mutual interests.  Even if these interactions lacked benevolence, the 
borderlands contained a variety of communities, many of which recognized that the 
border was “a meaningful entity . . .  a ‘white’ or ‘English’ construct to be manipulated” 
for indigenous gain.  Kinship connections also gave the Dakotas an advantage; these 
connections made the Dakota occasional allies to the Yanktonais and Blackfeet, as well 
Lakota bands and Métis groups.   
 But Anglo-Americans were at a loss to explain the logic of, for instance, 
Yanktonais who camped with Lakotas and then warred against them.  Their actions 
evaded categorization because they did not fit with established Anglo-American ideas 
about Indian conduct.4
                                                 
4 See Gerhard J. Ens, “The Border, the Buffalo, and the Métis of Montana,” in Sterling Evans, ed., 
The Borderlands of the Canadian and American Wests: Essays on Regional History of the Forty-Ninth 
Parallel (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2006).  See also McCrady, Living with Strangers, 11-15.  
  American army officers were not unaware of this fact; they 
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realized that the Dakotas did not respect the boundary line, and they also knew that the 
Dakotas might be able to find shelter in Canada.  As early as the spring of 1863, General 
Pope sought authority for his commanders to ignore boundary lines in pursuing Indians.  
President Lincoln, however, rebuffed this request.  Relations between the British 
Dominion and the United States were delicate.  Under no circumstances would American 
troops enter Canada.  Pope insisted that any expedition would be a failure as long as the 
Dakotas received shelter in the north.  Once Sibley was in the field, however, Pope wrote 
confidently to Secretary of War Edwin Stanton.  “I do not suppose,” he said, “that there 
are now ten hostile Sioux Indians east of the Missouri River.  [They] will not be able to 
return to Minnesota, if ever, in a body.”5
 In June 1863, Sully received orders to move up the Missouri River with two 
thousand cavalrymen.  After Sibley completed operations on the James River, he and 
Sully would meet at Devils Lake and stop the Dakotas from retreating to the Missouri 
River.  The low depth of the river and the melting snow, however, delayed Sully for days.  
Pope reacted to Sully’s failure with anger and disappointment, but these concerns quickly 
subsided as Pope realized that the Department of the Northwest faced greater problems, 
especially the question of civilian militias.    
  Pope’s prediction would prove to be correct—
after the 1862 revolt, the Dakotas would never return to Minnesota in significant 
numbers.   
 Writing to Edwin Stanton, the Secretary of War, Pope suggested that “in 
deference to the natural anxiety of the people after the atrocities of last autumn, and to 
                                                                                                                                                 
Thomas F. Meagher to Hon. D.N. Cooley, 14 December 1865, Annual Report of the Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs to the Secretary of the Interior for the Year 1865 (Washington: GPO, 1866), 196. 
 5 Henry Halleck to Pope, 11 April 1863; Pope to Halleck, 19 May 1863; Pope to J.C. Kelton, 1 
June 1863, OR, ser. 1, vol. 22, pt. 2, 211, 289, 304-5, 493.  
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give them the confidence necessary to induce them to remain on their farms,” one 
regiment each of cavalry and infantry should remain in the state.  However, some 
prominent representatives wanted to keep all the troops in the state, to benefit from 
appropriations bills.  Pope and his staff argued that defensive operations took more troops 
and funds than the offensive operations that could do the real work of pushing the Dakota 
Indians out of Minnesota.  Experience with Indian warfare also demonstrated to the army 
that defensive postures led to alarm among settlers.  Pope went so far as to send a letter to 
the governor of Minnesota, reassuring him that troops would stay in the state through the 
winter of 1863.  The Department of the Northwest faced a dilemma—if senior leaders 
sent men to the field, “timid and spiritless” settlers would jump to the conclusion that 
local Indian attacks were at hand and would abandon their homes.  If troops stayed in 
Minnesota towns, they would not be able to achieve the larger objective of defeating the 
Dakotas.6
 At the same time that Minnesota’s leaders demanded protection from the army, 
they were also desperate to demonstrate the ability of the state to persist.  Potential 
investors and emigrants would stay away from a place wracked by Indian violence, and 
the exodus of settlers offered clear evidence of Minnesota’s instability.  When Sibley had 
set out on his expedition in the summer of 1863, he positioned his troops between white 
settlements and Dakota villages.  Yet Pope pointed out that civilians launched “a terrible 
outcry . . . through the newspapers that they were being abandoned, that Sibley was 
marching away, and the Indians would attack the settlements.”  Minnesotans were 
 
                                                 
6 Pope to Edwin M. Stanton, 29 August 1863, OR, ser.1, vol. 22, pt. 2, 493-495. Pope to Stanton, 
29 August 1863, Department of the Northwest, Letters Sent, Records of United States Army Continental 
Commands, Record Group 393, National Archives Building, Washington, DC.  (Hereafter cited as DoNW, 
LS, RG 393, and LR for Letters Received).   
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“ridiculing the movement one moment” and protesting for more protection the next.  
Sully wrote critically about the “stampedes” in Minnesota and neighboring areas.  “A 
great deal of the Indian cry is to benefit rich individuals.  Still it has the effect of 
frightening… timid men, causing them to depopulate the country.”  Sully at one point 
was forced to detail over ten percent of his forces for a frontier guard.  Civilian militia 
members fought to get officers’ commissions, leaving Sully to lament that he had made 
“promises which I know can’t be fulfilled.”7
 Pope expressed his feelings toward Minnesota civilians in blunt terms that other 
commanders in the region would later echo.  While his comments were glazed with a 
layer of sardonic humor, Pope made it clear that, in his view, Minnesota’s leaders used 
the threat of Indian attacks for the state’s financial gain.  A military failure meant that 
troops would be retained in the state, and the promoters of civilian militias might gain 
more influence.  He intimated, too, that there was a reason behind the local newspapers’ 
attacks on his department.   
   
The truth is, in plain words, that there are in this State many people, who are determined  
that the troops shall not be taken out of it—that they are clearly entitled to some of the  
[government] expeditions which they can only get in this way.  As long as the apprehensions 
 of the people can be kept up, the troops will be kept in the state.  Of course no expedition  
must be successful enough to destroy all danger from Indians.  Hence Sibley’s  
expedition must fail.8
 
 
 Such militias encouraged Minnesota’s citizens to think that they were better 
equipped than the Army to deal with the Indian problem.  Advocates of militias believed 
that citizens who were unchecked by hierarchy and bureaucracy could do more than 
regular troops.  They argued that citizens’ hostility toward Indians was based in personal 
                                                 
7 Sully to Pope, 31 May 1864, DoNW, LR, RG 393. 
8 Pope to Halleck, 27 July 1863, DoNW, LS, RG 393.  Assistant Adjutant General to Pope, 1 June 
1863, DoNW, LS, RG 393.   
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experience, so their motivation to subjugate the Dakotas would be greater than that of 
regular troops.  To this end, Oscar Malmros, the State Adjutant General, authorized an 
award of $75.00 for Dakota scalps in July 1863; in early August, two hundred men were 
recruited for ranger companies.  The Mankato Record reported a great deal of local 
support for Minnesota soldiers, who were treated with commemorative poems, 
ceremonies, and public suppers.  In the interests of defending the frontier, the paper 
publicized a fund to purchase bloodhounds who could do the “work of one regiment.”  
The fund was not the work of humorists, as one might suspect.  Malmros was entirely 
serious when he advanced the idea in a letter to his predecessor, John B. Sanborn: “We 
think the employment of bloodhounds would materially increase the efficiency of our 
troops and contribute more than anything else to rid us of the savages.”  While Malmros’s 
sincerity might seem silly in hindsight, the whole episode points to the lengths to which 
civilians would go to marginalize the army’s Indian-fighting abilities.9
 By mid-August, Sully failed to make the progress that Pope had expected.  Pope 
criticized him, saying, “I feel bound to tell you frankly that your movements have 
disappointed me, and I can find no satisfactory explanation of them.”  Restoring public 
confidence in the state of Minnesota depended on a successful campaign against the 
Dakotas who lived west of Anglo-American dominated areas.  Sully avoided an ugly 
censure by both the public and his superiors by destroying a Yanktonai camp at 
Whitestone Hill in September 1863.  Thousands of pounds of buffalo meat were burned 
along with three hundred lodges, robes, and winter provisions, meaning that the 
remaining Dakota resistance would be ill-prepared for the winter, and might more 
   
                                                 
9 Mankato Record, 25 July, 1863; 1 August, 1863; 27 May 1864; 8 July 1864.  Oscar Malmros to 
John B. Sanborn, 31 July 1863, Sanborn Papers, Minnesota Historical Society, St. Paul. 
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quickly surrender.  One hundred twenty four women and children were taken captive; 
they were forced to go to Crow Creek.  Samuel J. Brown, an interpreter of partial Dakota 
heritage who worked there, later wrote that he did not think Sully “aught to brag of it at 
all,” given that, according to Brown’s Yankton sources, over two hundred women and 
children died.  The Nebraska Second Cavalry attacked without orders, and in their 
recklessness wounded a number of their own men and members of the Iowa Sixth 
Cavalry.  An honest appraisal of the campaign does not appear in Sully’s report.  In the 
case of the village near Killdeer Mountain, which Sully attacked in following July, some 
evidence suggests that he exaggerated Indian losses.  Sully may have done so in the 
hopes that these reports would bolster local trust in his failing campaigns, especially 
given that public opinion was already set against him.10
 The killing of women and children was not an official military policy, but it met 
with tacit approval from senior army officials, and was often applauded by frontier 
residents.  Nothing suggests that Sully hated Indians with any particular intensity; in his 
private and personal correspondence he did not refer to them as “scum,” like Sibley.  
Still, like some of his colleagues, his condescending view of native people appears 
alongside extended critiques of federal Indian policy.  The kind of violence seen at 
Whitestone Hill satisfied the frontier settlements that demanded revenge for property 
raids and civilian casualties.  Destroying the Yanktonai camp earned Sully praise and a 
       
                                                 
 10 Sully to J.F. Meline, 11 September 1863, OR, ser. 1, vol. 22, pt. 1, 559-61.  Here the deaths of 
non-combatants are omitted almost entirely.  For information on casualties at the Battle of Whitestone Hill, 
see Doane Robinson, A History of the Dakota or Sioux Indians (Minneapolis: Ross and Haines, Inc., 1904), 
328; Kenneth Carley, The SiouxUprising of 1862 (St. Paul: Minnesota Historical Society Press, 1976), 89-
91.  Brown’s remarks were colored by the fact that he was sent to Crow Creek rather than being chosen to 
serve as a scout.  For more on exaggerated reports of Indian deaths, see Jeffrey Ostler, The Plains Sioux 
and U.S. Colonialism from Lewis and Clark to Wounded Knee (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2004 ), 44 fn. 14, and also  Micheal Clodfelter, The Dakota War: The United States Army versus the Sioux, 
1862-1865 (Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 1998), 187. 
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reminder of his previous failure from Pope: “The results are entirely satisfactory, and I 
doubt not that the effect upon the Northwestern Indians will be, as you report, of the 
highest consequence.  Whilst I regret that difficulties and obstacles of a serious character 
prevented your co-operation with General Sibley . . . I bear willing testimony    . . .  to the 
important service you have rendered to the Government.”11
 Through military force, American authorities aimed to reduce the power of the 
Dakota Indians in the summer and early autumn of 1863.  Pope and Sully both assumed 
that the army’s warfighting capabilities far exceeded those of their Indian foes, which in 
turn influenced their doubts that the Dakotas could suffer losses without eventually 
submitting to American control.  In mid-August, Pope insisted to Halleck that the 
outcome of Sully’s expedition had been misrepresented—although he did not say so 
explicitly, it is probable that he meant local newspapers, which had already excoriated the 
army’s efforts.  All Sully had to do was follow Sibley’s success “with any ordinary 
energy” and the Indian resistance in the area would collapse.  Had Sully met Sibley’s 
forces in time, the two commanders “would have probably ended Indian troubles.”
 
12
 At some point in that same year, a Hunkpapa Lakota band on the Missouri sent a 
message to the local Indian agent through Pierre Garreau, a French-Arikara interpreter.  
They directed their ire at not only the agent, but Charles E. Galpin, a veteran fur trader of 
the upper Missouri and the head intermediary for the First United States Volunteer 
Infantry, which garrisoned Fort Rice on the Missouri River.  The Hunkpapas demanded 
that Anglo-Americans, including Galpin and his associates, stop traveling on the river.  
   
                                                 
11 “There are a few Indians lurking about the frontier, and I learn from the scouts that about 400 
lodges, embracing the very scum of the Isanti Sioux. . . ” Henry Sibley to Pope, 9 June 1864, OR, ser. 1, 
vol. 34, pt. 4, 289.   
12 Pope to Halleck, 20 August 1863 and 21 August 1863, DoNW, LS, RG 393. 
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They issued a sharp warning to the whites.    
 We for the last time beg of you to bring us no more presents, as we will not receive them, as 
 yet we have never accepted your goods. . . . We notified the Bear’s Ribs yearly not 
 to receive your goods, he had no Ears and we gave him Ears by Killing him, we now say to  
you bring us no more, if any of our people receive any more from you, we will give them Ears 
 as we did to the Bear’s Ribs . . . [W]e wish you to stop the whites from traveling through our  
country and if you do not stop them, we will. . . . the whites in the country have been threatening 
 us with soldiers, all we ask of you is to bring men and not women dressed in Soldier clothes,  
we do not ask for soldiers to fight [if] you refuse to comply with what we ask.13
 
 
 Anglo-American authorities on both sides of the border often assumed that 
indigenous loyalty could be earned with a combination of violence and the promise of 
annuities.  
 Pope, for instance, argued later in the conflict that Indian agents’ reliance on 
annuity-giving contributed to native-white conflict.  “The Indians naturally understand 
that these are given them as bribes to keep the peace and because the whites are afraid of 
them; and, of course, they observe such treaties only as long as they find it convenient.”  
In exchange for the services of scouts who were Dakota enemies, Sully would eventually 
request “the authority to give them a blanket a piece, some calico, something more gaudy 
than the Quartermaster Department furnish, some tobacco, powder, and lead, and in the 
way of rations, a little flour, pork, coffee, sugar, nothing more.”14
 The message of Bad Eagle and his kin, however, demonstrates that native people 
were aware of the dangers of dependency; to retain their autonomy, some strove to avoid 
contact with whites.  Here the Indians levied a sophisticated threat against their Anglo-
American foes while simultaneously insulting the army’s ability to wage war against 
   
                                                 
 13 W. Raymond Wood, “Integrating Ethnohistory and Archaeology at Fort Clark State Historic 
Site, North Dakota,” American Antiquity 58, no. 3 (July 1993): 551; Bad Eagle et al. to unidentified agent, 
Report of Sully Expedition, [n.d.] 1863, DoNW, LS, RG 393.  Ostler, The Plains Sioux, 42-43.  Two 
militant Hunkpapa killed Bear’s Rib, for taking annuity goods at Fort Pierre. Michele T. Butts, “Trading 
Gray for Blue: Ex-Confederates Hold the Upper Missouri for the Union,” Prologue 37, no. 4 (Winter 
2005): 14-21. 
14 Pope to Halleck, 6 October 1864, OR, ser. 1, vol. 41, pt. 1, 139. Sully to Pope, 21 March 1864, 
Alfred Sully Papers. 
25 
 
native people.  Raymond DeMallie points to the importance of this particular message: 
“As a symbol, ears figured prominently in Lakota rhetorical discourse. . .  opening, or 
mere acknowledgment of possessing ears expressed a willingness to listen and to accept a 
significant message” that was based in truth.  At the Little Big Horn battlefield in 1876, 
Cheyenne women had pushed sewing awls into George Armstrong Custer’s ears, turning 
metaphor into physical actuality.  By forcibly “giving ears” to the whites, the Hunkpapa 
would make the American aggressors listen to native demands.15
 The political structure imposed on the borderlands by Anglo people also created 
difficulty for native people.  The borderlands lay within Rupert’s Land, a territory that 
stretched from the 49th parallel to Hudson Bay and encompassed all of Manitoba, parts of 
neighboring provinces, and parts of Minnesota and North Dakota.  This land had been 
claimed by the Hudson’s Bay Company since 1670.  Within this area lay the Red River 
colony (also known as the Selkirk concession, named after its founder, the fifth earl of 
Selkirk), which abutted the forty-ninth parallel and was located within the British district 
of Assiniboia.  Native-white relationships in this region were dominated by a long history 
of violence.  For instance, the Scottish immigrants who arrived in the area at the turn of 
the nineteenth-century had immediately clashed with local Métis people whose loyalties 
rested with the Northwest Company, the HBC’s primary rival.  Fifty years later, this 
animosity still ran rampant.   
  On both sides of the 
Canadian-American border, Dakota freedom was stymied by people who failed to “have 
ears” for Indian needs.   
 Immediately following the outbreak of violence in Minnesota in 1862, the 
                                                 
 15 Raymond J. DeMallie, “‘These Have No Ears’: Narrative and the Ethnohistorical Method,” 
Ethnohistory 40, no. 4 (Fall 1993): 520-21. 
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governor of Rupert’s Land, Alexander Grant Dallas, petitioned the queen for military aid.  
When the crown failed to provide help, Dallas turned to the HBC, but its officers denied 
him too.  Like authorities in Britain, the company refused to become involved in a 
dispute for which they bore little or no responsibility.  Although the HBC proved largely 
successful in denying the Dakotas access to weapons and ammunition, it could not keep 
them from seeking refuge in the Red River Colony, nor prevent them from moving in the 
borderlands.16  Métis hunters and traders had been doing the same thing for years.  In 
fact, at the exact same time that the Dakotas sought refuge in the Red River Colony, 
Métis people were traveling across the borderlands in search of buffalo and trade 
opportunities.  While native people’s presence in the borderlands was no novelty, the 
Dakotas were singled out by both Britons and Americans as criminals.  Yet other forces–
those focused on negotiation and the fair treatment of native people, if not their autonomy 
too–were at work elsewhere.17
  The Dakotas found an advocate in Father Alexis André, a French Roman Catholic 
priest who served in the borderlands of the Red River settlement and the Dakota 
Territory.  André had been assigned to the St. Joseph (Walhalla) mission during the 
Dakota conflict and its aftermath.  St. Joseph lay just inside the American border, due 
west from Pembina, North Dakota, the base for an independent militia unit, named for its 
commander Edwin C. Hatch.  Minnesota leaders had lobbied for the use of an 
independent Minnesota battalion against the Dakotas, but the regular Army officers had 
little respect for Hatch or his unit.  Hatch had served as the agent to the Blackfeet at Fort 
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17 Rhoda R. Gilman, Henry Hastings Sibley: Divided Heart (St. Paul: Minnesota Historical 
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Benton in 1856 and his connection to the Indian Department did not endear him to Pope 
and Sully.  Hatch had “no authority” to announce that he commanded troops in the 
service of the federal government, or “to make campaigns at his pleasure, independent of 
the proper military authorities.”  In Pope’s opinion, the battalion would be a “source of 
great and unnecessary expense to the Government,” for “whilst Indian agents” and their 
supporters became rich, Indians became “poor, dissatisfied, and hostile.”18
 Father André was determined to find peace for the Dakotas; he had corresponded 
with Major Hatch throughout the year, offering his services as an intermediary to the 
Dakotas several times.  But Hatch and his unit had little real authority because they did 
not fall under the command structure of the Department of the Northwest.  The 
department staff largely ignored the major until he made critical mistakes in January 
1863—mistakes that not only threatened the outcome of the army’s operations, but also 
jeopardized American relations with Great Britain.
 
19
 André got his chance to act on the Dakotas’ behalf in September and December of 
1863, as well as the following March.  The priest hoped to send word to Hatch that the 
Sisseton and Yanktonai would submit to the American government by the spring.  After 
the initial councils in September and December, André forwarded Hatch the discourse of 
Standing Buffalo, one of the major chiefs of the Sissetons.  Standing Buffalo’s band lived 
on the periphery of the 1862 uprising.  Their distance from the center of native-white 
 
                                                 
 18 Pope to Kelton, 13 July 1863, OR, ser. 1, vol. 22, pt. 2, 371-72.  Also, Pope told Secretary of 
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 19 McCrady, Living with Strangers, 17, 24.  Alexis André to Edwin C. Hatch, n.d. 1863, DoNW, 
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violence may have encouraged them to avoid conflict; they had attempted to negotiate 
with the British as well, sending envoys to Fort Garry, near modern Winnipeg, Manitoba 
in December 1862.  In February, André had asked the governor of Rupert’s Land, 
Alexander Grant Dallas, to intercede with Sibley in the hopes of slowing American 
military movements against the Dakotas.  When André approached the Sissetons, they 
spoke to him but refused to give him a decisive answer without knowing where their 
Yankton allies stood.20
 In his statement to Andre, Standing Buffalo declared that he was eager to seek 
peace.  “I feared not to brave the cold the most vigorous to come and listen to your 
words,” he told the priest.  “I did not want to animate the fire that was lit on my lands and 
I withdrew towards the north.”  André informed Hatch, “Standing Buffalo and Little 
Wheat [his brother-in-law] declared to me in secret that they would give themselves up in 
the spring that they would not declare openly their sentiments so as not to expose 
themselves to be massacred by some of the murderers.”  The Indians were troubled by the 
news that Sully’s army had attacked the Yankton, “who lived tranquil without ever 
having done any harm to the whites.”  Sibley and Hatch thought little of the Sissetons’ 
request for peace.  André, however, was deeply disturbed by the events of the 
negotiations held in March, which yielded a “fatal and frightful accident.”
   
21
 Two Dakota intermediaries, possibly bound for St. Joseph, had been killed by 
   
                                                 
 20 Anderson, Little Crow, 172. André to Hatch, 31 March 1864, DoNW, LR, RG 393.  “Discourse 
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American soldiers.  Although André did not identify them, the soldiers were probably 
members of Hatch’s battalion, since the Department of the Northwest had few troops 
stationed so far north.  The priest averred, “This news will spread among the Sioux with 
the rapidity of lightening and will choke all their good dispositions for peace . . .  for in 
their ignorance they will attribute this act of barbarism to the American authorities 
without thinking that it is only the doings of some brutal soldiers being in direct 
opposition with the orders they had received.”22
 André demonstrated his apparent willingness to trust Hatch’s judgment by 
disconnecting the major from the soldiers.  Hatch, however, was not innocent.  In mid-
December 1863, a detachment of twenty men from the Independent Battalion ambushed a 
Dakota camp near St. Joseph at three in the morning.  The troops killed several Indians 
and took the rest as captives.  Standing Buffalo referred to this incident in his discourse to 
André, saying, “The news that Americans had massacred women and children has very 
much troubled our minds.”  Under his own initiative, Hatch had earlier asked the Council 
of Assiniboia for permission to pursue Dakota refugees across the border, but apparently 
he did not move on his request at that time.  The only obstacle between Hatch and the 
Dakotas was the boundary line; the governor of Red River had given him permission to 
cross, but Hatch had to defer to the diplomatic cautions of American federal authorities.
   
23
 In early January, the army learned that a small group of Mdewankantons were 
harassing settlers near Fort Garry; when threatened with Hatch’s Battalion, the Indians 
proposed to surrender one of their leaders, Little Six, to Hatch.  Little over a week later, 
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Little Six and another leader, Medicine Bottle were suddenly in Hatch’s custody.  Instead 
of going into Canada, Hatch had arranged for the two Dakotas to be plied with alcohol, 
chloroformed, bound to dog sleds and spirited across the border.  Although Canadian and 
American authorities were critical of Hatch’s behavior, Little Six and Medicine Bottle 
were considered two of the primary Mdewankanton aggressors.  No one would stop their 
hanging in November 1865.24
 In addition to the two Dakota leaders, Hatch captured twenty one warriors and 
their families – including Little Crow’s wife, sister, brother-in-law, and several of their 
children – thirty six Dakotas in all.  With abundant disdain, Hatch wrote to his wife that 
the Anglo-Americans— “frail mortals”— were awed by the “royal” Dakota families. 
Hatch believed that he could force the surrender of over five hundred Dakotas at Red 
River Colony.  A few weeks later, he told his wife that his men had killed at least two 
Sioux about forty or fifty miles from Pembina, but that the main body was beyond the 
troops.  That night, some Dakotas were traveling back toward Pembina and Hatch sent 
out a detachment (ultimately unsuccessful) to track them. The settlers had not been able 
to “rid” themselves of the Dakotas “as easily as they hoped to.”  Little Six’s son and two 
other warriors had been killed during an argument among the Dakotas, causing the band 
to go on the move again and ask for ammunition from mixed-blood neighbors.  Hatch, 
having few horses, made little effort to ascertain the Dakotas’ whereabouts; he hoped that 
his wife would not think less of him for returning to Minnesota “with no more scalps.”
 
25
                                                 
24 Sibley to Pope, 3 January 1864, OR, ser. 1, vol. 22, pt. 2, 768. Joseph James Hargrave, Red 
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25 Hatch to Charlotte Hatch, 11 January 1864, 18 January 1864; 29 March 1864, 30 March 1864, 
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 Hatch imagined himself a fighter of Indians, but his treachery had far-reaching 
implications for Canadian-American relations.  Long before the Dakota revolt, in the late 
1840s, the Canadian-American relationship had suffered because of the native presence 
on the boundary line.  In an address to William Gladstone, then Britain’s Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, representatives for the Aborigines Protection Society pointed to 
the role of Anglo-American civilians in provoking intertribal war and native-white 
violence.  The society also attributed conflict to the opposing land claims of the 
American federal government and the Hudson’s Bay Company, each of which asserted 
dominance over Indian territory that lay on either side of the boundary line.  By 1860, the 
American counsel at Winnipeg, James Taylor, averred that both Minnesota and the Red 
River Colony settlement were “anxious for the utmost facilities of trade and intercourse.”  
Enmity grew between the two regions as a result of the Dakota conflict.  The Canadian 
people once praised by Taylor for their industrious and moral habits were subject to harsh 
criticism for allowing Indians to live in their midst.        
 Trying to escape Sully’s and Sibley’s forces, a sizeable number of Dakotas had 
fled to Canada in 1863; they arrived in the Red River Colony two weeks before 
Christmas.  Numbering more than six hundred, they were in a state of “positive 
starvation.”  Governor Dallas informed the Hudson’s Bay Company offices in London 
that the Indians would “live or die with us, in preference to perishing amidst the snow 
drifts of the prairies.”  Drought and poor hunting meant that the area’s Anglo inhabitants 
were hungry themselves.  When Hatch’s battalion arrived in Pembina, the prices of 
wheat, barley, and dried meat had nearly doubled.  Dallas realized that American 
authorities would hear exaggerated reports of the British supplying ammunition and arms 
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to the Indians, and would probably “make a complaint against us.”  Dallas argued that 
authorities on the Canadian side could not ignore the Dakotas’ suffering. “Our poverty, of 
food and weakness, and not our will, consent to an unavoidable alternative.  So great is 
the [Indians’] distress, that they are offering their children for sale to the settlers—a very 
unprecedented occurrence, as they will generally rather see them starve than give them up 
to white people.”26
 Despite their suffering, however, Dallas believed that the British government 
could not “afford either to quarrel with or to maintain the Sioux, and there is no middle 
course to adopt, short of allowing them to perish.”  The Dakotas were also at risk from 
attack of the Saulteaux (Ojibwe) who dominated the Winnipeg area.  As a result, the 
Dakotas left the Red River area on Christmas morning, headed for Turtle Mountain in 
present-day North Dakota.  The Dakotas’ success in reaching Turtle Mountain was 
dashed by American troops who drove them back over the boundary line into British 
possessions.  In mid-January 1864, Governor Dallas reported to the HBC that the 
Dakotas were still in Red River Colony.  Canadian settlers demanded that American 
troops be allowed to pursue the Dakotas within British boundaries, and some Canadians 
even went to talk to Hatch at Pembina.  Hudson’s Bay officials backed Dallas’s decision, 
however, believing that “nothing short of actual and imminent peril” to Canadians’ lives 
would justify American intervention.
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 The conflict between American and British authorities over the Dakota Indians 
laid bare the attempts of both nations to assert their own political sovereignty and 
establish control over an indigenous people for whom the boundary remained a shifting 
construct.  Canadian and American newspapers’ coverage of the kidnapping and their 
divergent perspectives illustrate the ways in which either nation perceived the other and 
their responses to the ‘Indian question.’  The Canadian account given by the News cast 
the Dakota conflict in subjective terms of unprovoked massacre.  They also criticized the 
American reaction to the conflict with resounding force; the paper described the Dakotas 
as having come to the “Settlement as starving refugees and beggars; they received no 
ammunition, and not enough food to prevent some of them from dying of hunger and 
cold combined.”  Yet the Canadian perspective contained its own hypocrisy, for it failed 
to condemn other Canadians for failing to react to Dakota suffering: “Surely these 
people—the bulk of them women and children—could not be allowed to die of absolute 
starvation in a Christian country.”28
American editors felt differently about Hatch’s actions; they believed that his 
maneuver had saved the federal government millions of dollars, and they argued that 
most of the Dakotas would surrender upon hearing about the quick executions of Little 
Six and Medicine Bottle.  The St. Paul Press lied about the British position, claiming that 
“Johnny Bull” supplied the Dakotas with arms and ammunition and then instructed the 
Indians to return to the American side of the border.  Complicating the heated debate was 
Governor Dallas himself.  Over the course of the winter of 1863, his opinions of the 
Dakotas changed dramatically.  At first objects of pity, by the spring of 1864, they had 
become a source of great annoyance to him.  At the same time that Dallas made attempts 
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(ultimately unsuccessful) to negotiate with Sioux leaders in the United States, he hoped 
that the Dakota refugees could be scared out of Manitoba by “the appearance of even a 
few American soldiers.”  Dallas said nothing about the Dakotas’ presumed fate inside the 
American border, thus conveniently omitting the fact that Dakotas and their neighbors 
suffered through forced removal in the immediate aftermath of the 1862 revolt.29
 Most Minnesotans, however, would have been aware that in November 1862, 
over two thousand Dakotas were forcibly moved from their own homes to Fort Snelling 
and Mankato. These people were the members of two hundred families, including almost 
three dozen mixed-blood families.  Oral histories affirm that some white civilians 
attacked the Dakotas as they traveled through the towns of New Ulm and Henderson.  A 
local Minnesota unit served as the Dakotas’ escort, but they were largely indifferent in 
their efforts to protect them, allowing white women to attack the defenseless women and 
children.  Some sixteen hundred people were imprisoned at Fort Snelling over the winter.  
By the spring, almost three hundred people had died, and those who survived traveled by 
boat to the newly-established Crow Creek Reservation in South Dakota, on the Missouri 
River.
 
30
 The Dakotas suffered terribly both at Fort Snelling and Crow Creek.  At the latter, 
Pope reported that they relied on condemned stores that would not last long.  He argued 
that “it would be inhuman for the military forces to compel these Indians to remain on the 
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reservation to starve to death.”  The Indian Department had exhausted its stores as well 
and there was no game for miles.  Pope maintained the misguided hope that charitable 
citizens might feed the Indians and “preserve their lives” like some Red River residents 
had done in Canada, but this never happened.  Pope wrote to Halleck again at the end of 
December 1863, reiterating his concerns about the conditions on the reservation.  The 
reply, which came months later, was brief – the boats could land at Fort Thompson on the 
Crow Creek reservation, but Halleck’s office said nothing about getting food to the 
hungry.31
 This sad dénouement illustrates that army officers in the Department of the 
Northwest once again faced conflicting outcomes.  The government tasked them with 
killing and containing the Dakotas and the frontier public congratulated them only when 
they crippled Indian communities.  Conversely, Pope’s efforts to save Dakota lives at 
Crow Creek were ignored.  Local residents and state officials fomented native-white 
conflict but left the army to solve civilian-created problems.  It is little wonder that Sully 
and Pope expressed aggravation with the general state of affairs in Minnesota.  Pope’s 
irritated remark— “Of course no expedition must be successful enough to destroy all 
danger from Indians”— suggests that not all army officers viewed the military institution 
as a repository for Anglo-American progress.  Rather, some officers saw themselves as 
an instrument of state and national policy—a characterization that they did not 
appreciate.  
 
                                                 
31 Pope to Halleck, 30 December 1863 and 25 March 1864, DoNW, LS, RG 393. In her landmark 
study of army officers’ attitudes, The View from Officers’ Row, Sherry L. Smith asserts that officers “wrote 
about Indians as if they were impersonal subjects in a social experiment rather than human beings,” yet 
Pope’s concerns seem to counter this view. The View from Officers’ Row: Army Perceptions of Western 
Indians (Tucson: University of Arizona Press,  
1990), 111. 
36 
 
 Clearly, Alfred Sully and his fellow soldiers viewed native people as an obstacle 
to national expansion, and viewed the confining and killing of Indians as an integral part 
of their mission.  Their perspectives, however, should be couched in nineteenth-century 
terms.  Even Bishop Henry B. Whipple, the Episcopal diocese of Minnesota, who was 
generally considered an advocate for Indian rights, expressed the prevailing 
ethnocentrism of the age when he wrote to President Lincoln about the Dakota Indians in 
March 1862.  “I ask only justice for a wronged and neglected race. . . . The United States 
has virtually left the Indian without protection. . . . The first thing needed is honesty. . . . 
The second . . . is to frame instructions so that the Indian shall be the ward of the 
Government.”32
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  Sully and Pope, as well as most of the Anglo-American people involved 
in the Dakota conflict, would have agreed with Whipple’s conclusion.  Modern readers 
ought not to excuse their willingness to marginalize Indians, whether by condemning 
them to starvation and disease on reservations, or by killing them outright.  Still, it is 
important to remember that army officers recognized and sometimes bristled at the fact 
that the government and the frontier public often used the army to advance anti-Indian 
agendas that the army supported, at times reluctantly. 
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CHAPTER TWO: Alfred Sully and John Pope in the Northwest 
 
 
Alfred Sully and his commander, General John Pope, had encountered a host of 
unique problems when they were tasked to defeat the Dakotas in 1863.  Both officers 
grappled with negative newspaper reports and the storm of public opinion that ensued 
after they started their first campaign against the Dakotas, at the same time that state and 
local officials assailed them with conflicting demands.  Towards the end of their 
campaign, the army’s problems with emigrants illustrated that the mission to stop frontier 
violence was complicated and undermined by Anglo-American greed.  Similarly, Pope 
and Sully found themselves clashing with Walter A. Burleigh, a corrupt Congressman 
and former Indian agent whose crimes against native people were largely ignored by 
Minnesota residents and federal officials.  This was no apparent reversal of their roles as 
“Indian fighters.”  Both officers continued to express frustration with the Dakotas, 
civilian emigrants, and government authorities after their campaign.  Their conflicted 
attitudes can be connected to the larger failure of the officer corps and the federal 
government to understand and react pragmatically to native-white violence in the West.   
 As the campaign against the Dakotas drew to a close in the autumn of 1864, Pope 
and Sully became more vociferous in their critique of Indian policy.  They insisted that 
the Department of the Interior failed to provide for Indians as it had promised.  Because 
of this fraudulent treatment, the government encouraged more native-white conflict.  
Sully had no patience for representatives of the Indian Department.  He used the 
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testimony of native people themselves to reinforce his conclusions about the deceptive 
nature of federal policy.  A Blackfeet warrior had asked him, “If you are a brave man 
why don’t you begin and hang all the agents here on this ground in presence of the 
Indians?  It is they who get us into trouble by telling us lies.”  Sully responded, “I wish I 
could have the Congressional committee present here to listen to these Indians.  They 
would learn some wholesome truths.”  By critiquing the Indian Department’s 
bureaucracy, Army officers like Sully who often relied on violence rather than 
negotiation could justify their actions as the inevitable outcome of poor federal 
management.  They cast blame elsewhere to detract from their own failure to control their 
men in the field.  Sully, however, would learn that he himself was not immune from 
criticism, particularly from those same Indian agents whom he opposed.1
 Sully’s attitudes about Indians as truth-tellers seem contradictory in light of the 
violence applied by his troops at Whitestone Hill and Killdeer Mountain.  However, he 
reflected a dominant feeling of his nineteenth-century contemporaries: Indians who asked 
for councils and peace could be granted a modicum of consideration and even mild 
respect; Indians who were deemed hostile by Anglo-Americans were of little or no 
importance.  The latter were fit to be killed without much compunction, yet one might 
argue that Sully and his colleagues, veterans of the Civil War, viewed their adversarial 
relationship with native people as one not too different than their relationship with their 
southern foes.  In contrast to Anglo-American enemies, however, Sully felt that the 
apparent ambiguity of native people’s intentions made “the red man  . . .  a hard animal to 
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deal with, and very uncertain.”2
 This frequent failure to understand native people and their motivations also 
caused Sully and Pope to solicit the help of non-Dakota tribes in fighting the Dakota.  For 
instance, Sully encouraged the use of “friendly” Indians as scouts as much as possible, 
hoping to turn bands against one another.   Pope and Sully, like their contemporaries in 
the government and the civilian sphere, regarded Indian relationships and alliances as 
inflexible, uncooperative, and essentially selfish acts.  Pope at one point proposed using 
Shawnee, Delaware, Arikara, and Mandan scouts and warriors against the Dakotas, for he 
assumed that these less-powerful groups would be eager to fight against the Dakotas in 
exchange for the “spoils” of the campaign.
  
3
 Sully predicted that there would be little violence on the eastern side of the 
Missouri River in the summer of 1864.  “Indians are selfish,” he wrote, for the western 
bands would probably not take the risk of crossing the high river to help their allies in the 
east.  Yet paradoxically he believed that the Yanktonais, Blackfeet, Sans Arcs, and other 
Sioux bands allied against the Anglo-Americans to keep settlers from traveling up river.  
While blocking white encroachment would have been a goal common to most native 
people in the region, they would not necessarily have acted as concerted allies.  These 
groups competed for hunting territory and access to trade networks as discrete bands and 
nations and did so out of their own interests, not because they took stock in wide-ranging 
native alliances.  Power dynamics among Plains people were far more complicated than 
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army officers made them out to be; these dynamics were reciprocal and not static, for 
warfare made constant engagement with one’s neighbors a necessity.  The native system 
of attacking and then sometimes yielding to one’s neighbors allowed bands to expand, 
acquire resources, and then chance losing those gains to other groups.4
Sully and Pope failed to understand Indian behavior, but they were correct in 
locating sources of conflict between whites and Indians.  Both men argued that conflict 
between native people, as well as clashes with Anglo-Americans, could be kept at a 
minimum as long as Indian agents and speculators were kept out of the Dakotas.  At the 
same time, Pope once again warned civilians about the dangers precipitated by the 
conflict.  Anglo-Americans could not expect to travel through Indian country without 
angering its residents, for in Pope’s view, “if they neglect the advice… they surely cannot 
complain.”  The lack of government support for native people held prisoner on 
reservations, combined with enthusiastic government support for western settlement, 
made it possible for Anglo-Americans to aggressively pursue their goal of taking Indian 
land.  In turn, civilian emigration made the army’s task of protecting both Indians and 
whites doubly vexing.
   
5
 The Mankato Record attested to the “rush” and “tide” of emigration that moved in 
and out of Minnesota.  Simultaneously, advertisements for lands that had once belonged 
to Winnebagoes and Dakotas ran nearly every week in 1863.  The paper featured “some 
of the very best farming lands” in the state, sold for two and a half to five dollars an acre.  
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Likewise, records of lots bought and sold, as well as the funding process for a rail route 
to Idaho, occupied a prominent position in the Record.  Organizing an expedition for the 
overland route to Idaho in the late spring of 1864, Minnesotans asked Edwin Stanton to 
appropriate ten thousand dollars for their protection.  At the same time, they decried the 
Dakotas who roamed anxiously to and from the borderlands.   They were unable or 
unwilling to see that Anglo-American greed had precipitated the havoc at the Redwood 
Agency.  Despite that Sully still had to organize and command multiple reconnaissance 
and assault missions in the region, civilians ratcheted up the tenor of native anxiety by 
continuing to press across Indian land.              
 When he discussed his plans for 1864’s summer expedition with Pope, Sully 
spoke frankly of the risks posed by emigrants.  Many of these men flocked to Idaho to 
pan for gold in the gravel beds of the Salmon River; Sully outlined their avarice and 
selfishness rather boldly.  “I fear I shall be too late then, to afford much protection to the 
emigrants from Laramie, for already they have commenced their line of march, every 
individual striving to be the first to reach the gold, of course . . . you cannot expect they 
will help one another, and it is to be expected some of them will be murdered by the 
Indians.”  He argued that Idaho-bound settlers, particularly those led from Mankato by a 
young volunteer captain named James Liberty Fisk, had complicated his chances to 
negotiate peace with some three to four hundred lodges of Yanktonais and Dakotas.6
 In his ambitions, Fisk differed little from the adventure seekers whom he led; he 
saw himself as part of the Anglo-American vanguard that would settle the frontier and 
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acquire wealth in the process.  Fisk would lead four expeditions from Minnesota to 
western mining regions between 1862 and 1865.  He had served less than a year as a 
private with the Third Minnesota Volunteer Infantry; his career seems to have been 
distinguished only by his irresponsibility and lack of discipline.  Then, quite suddenly, at 
the age of twenty-seven, he found himself commissioned as a captain and in charge of a 
large government-funded expedition to Idaho.  Fisk had secured a choice appointment as 
a result of the influence of several Minnesota congressmen.  These politicians, as well as 
his own connections at the Dakota Land Company, helped him use his position to gain 
prestige, attention, and government funds that would benefit the state of Minnesota. But 
Fisk had little experience on the frontier; he had no experience leading others; and, due to 
his direct appointment, no one supervised him.  These factors were the recipe for a 
disaster.7
 The Department of the Northwest would not be created until the autumn of 1862, 
in response to the Dakota uprising; thus, Fisk had the run of the land, and this put him in 
a position to do harm to native-white relations in the Dakotas.  His expedition became a 
part of “the tide of fortune seekers on their way to the Cariboo mines” described by the 
St. Cloud Democrat in May 1862.
   
8
                                                                                                                                                 
6 Sully to Pope, 28 March 1864, DoNW, LR, RG 393. Sully to Pope, 9 September 1864, OR, ser. 
1, vol. 41, pt. 1, 151-52.  
  Along the way, Fisk and the 130 members of the 
expedition encountered a large community of Blackfeet, Piegan, and Bloods that had 
stayed close to Fort Union to trade on the Teton River.  The emigrants reported that there 
were no Indians to bother them “except for a few loafers, who hang around the post 
7 Helen McCann White, “Captain Fisk Goes to Washington,” Minnesota History 38 (March 1963): 
217-218. 
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rather than hunt with their tribes.”  They also encountered Gros Ventre and Crow who 
were interested in trading.  The emigrants obtained horses, robes, and clothes in exchange 
for annuity goods, and then set off, likely to the relief of the local native people.9
The Fisk party was gullible on one hand and vicious on the other, making them as 
“uncertain” as native people, at least in Sully’s eyes.  At one point, Fisk’s expedition 
encountered Assiniboine warriors who were part of a 400-lodge community.  The native 
men “wanted to know what right we had to go through their country without their 
permission.”  The Minnesotans ignored this logical inquiry, so the warriors asked them 
what the whites would do if attacked.  Satisfied by their answer—that the Indians “would 
learn when the time came”—the Assiniboine men promptly convinced the emigrants to 
fell a dozen buffalo for them.  They got to enjoy the sport of watching the white men hunt 
and took the buffalo back to their camp.
   
10
On September 5, 1862, expedition members returned to one of their abandoned 
campsites and found the bodies of Indian men, their limbs twisted from convulsions and 
atataxia that accompany strychnine poisoning.  Fisk described the “strychnine affair” in 
casual terms, openly admitting that “several of the cavalry escort and of the emigrants 
suggested . . . that on account of the loss of ammunition, [and] the furious and merciless 
character of the enemy, it might be well . . . to resort to poison.”  Some expedition 
  More ominously, the appearance of white men 
would have meant more stress between Indian communities, for the trade they would 
have viewed as harmless would have the potential to create conflict between Indians.  In 
one case, Fisk’s group made Indians the direct target of murderous intentions.   
                                                                                                                                                 
8 St. Cloud Democrat, 15 May 1862. 
9 St. Paul Pioneer, 19 October 1862 and 28 September 1862. 
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members then scattered their campsite with strychnine-laced hardtack and left.  To the 
travelers’ delight, the hardtack was “was pounced upon by the Indians the moment we 
left . . . and eaten with avidity.”  Fisk claimed he had nothing to do with the plan, but then 
wrote, “I have no apologies . . . I cannot say but that the use of [poison] may have been 
the salvation of my weak and beleaguered party, and finding after it was done that it was 
done, I was glad twas well done!”11  His remarks were published in the St. Paul Pioneer 
newspaper to much acclaim.12
Not all expedition members viewed the Fisk expedition as a success.  One 
emigrant, J.R. Tysen, would later write about the Fisk expedition, “The Government part 
of this expedition I look upon as a lamentable farce.”  The army escort, unwilling to do 
all the menial work, let the civilians carry water and stand guard.  Federal authorities had 
not given the expedition annuities for the Indians who they would encounter; when native 
leaders demanded something in return for the trains rumbling across their territory, Fisk 
grossly overstepped the bounds of his authority, telling them that the government would 
make a treaty with them the next year.  As early as the summer of 1862, Anglo-
Americans were not unaware of the dangers of trespassing on native land – while many 
men were able to make $25 a day at the Salmon River mines, their horses were stolen and 
they risked being killed.  The fluidity of Indian relationships worked to the Fisk party’s 
advantage, however; hunters from the Red River had driven other Indians, probably 
Blackfeet, from the area, in their search for game.  By November, Fisk had reached 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
10 Ibid. 
11 “Report on 1864 expedition,” James Liberty Fisk, 13 January 1865, James Liberty Fisk and 
family papers, Minnesota Historical Society, St. Paul. 
12 White, “Captain Fisk Goes to Washington,” 228. 
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Portland, Oregon.  His success would only encourage other civilians to attempt daring 
crossings of the Plains. One Minnesota man wrote to a friend that “the pioneer gold 
hunters of Red Wing” had “arrived safely in the promised land.  The mines here are no 
humbug, and the almost fabulous accounts we read in the papers last spring were true and 
more than true.”  The writer duly noted that thousands who never prospered were never 
mentioned in the papers, but this observation did not dampen his enthusiasm.13
Fisk’s actions proved so irritating to the regular army officers that Sully could be 
heard complaining about him a year after his 1863 expedition.  “A great deal of the 
Indian cry,” he told Pope, “is to benefit rich individuals.  Still it has the effect of 
frightening… timid men, causing them to depopulate the country.”  Such fears meant 
that, in one instance, territorial leaders forced Sully to detail over 100 of his force of 1200 
to 1300 men for a frontier guard.  Militia men fought over officers’ commissions, leaving 
Sully to lament that he was left “with only promises which… can’t be fulfilled.”  From 
Sully’s perspective, the emigrant trains were escorted by civilians and soldiers who 
escaped the draft or the real task of fighting in the Civil War.  Fisk had insulted Sully and 
the expedition’s aims and had endangered the lives of the emigrants as well as the 
soldiers and animals.  Yet once his train was pinned down by Indians, Fisk called on the 
army for help.  Sully was not amused.  “Why must our Government continue to act so 
foolish sending out emigrant trains at a great expense?” he wrote.
   
14
 As Sully’s second expedition drew to a close in the autumn of 1864, he reiterated 
   
                                                 
13 S.B. Foote to W. W. Sweeney, dated 2 November 1862, published 31 December 1862 in The 
Goodhue Volunteer (Red Wing, Minn.) 
14 Sully to Pope, 31 May 1864, DoNW, LR, RG 393; 9 September 1864, DoNW, Unentered 
Letters Sent, RG 393. 
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his foremost concern in his reports to Pope.  He believed that Yanktonais headed north, 
probably to the borderlands, “for all the Indians well know we are not authorized to cross 
the line.”  Surmising that “the half breeds of the North keep them well-posted in these 
matters,” Sully also argued that Métis and Canadian traders ensured continued trade by 
fomenting hostilities.  The Yanktonais, for instance, “deserted their Teton allies” and 
went across the boundary line; from there they sent runners to ask for peace, and held 
councils with the British as well.   
 Pope picked up this assertion and repeated it through the winter of 1864.  In a 
qualification that was new to his reports, he implicated the British government directly: 
either they should prevent Indians from seeking refuge in the Dominion, secure their side 
of the boundary, or allow the Army to extend operations into Canada.  “One of these 
three demands is certainly reasonable,” he concluded.  Similarly, Henry Sibley argued 
that the Dakotas were directly “aided and abetted by her Majesty’s subjects” as well as 
the Métis, for the Métis wanted to maintain their own edge in trading with the British and 
Americans.  In fact, Sibley claimed that the Métis discouraged the Dakota from 
submitting to the United States by warning them that they would be “taken from their 
own country and placed upon an island in the ocean.” (While this statement seems 
outlandish, it is worth considering that the Crow Creek Reservation was itself an “island” 
in an “ocean” of barren terrain).  Newton Edmunds, governor of the Dakota Territory, 
made even more powerful assertions about the fate of the Dakotas.15
 In a council with Two Lances, a leading Two-Kettle man, Edmunds declared that 
          
                                                 
 15 Sibley to Pope, 25 January 1864, OR, ser. 1, vol. 34, pt. 2, 152-153.  Sully to Pope, 6 October 
1864, DoNW, LS, RG 393.  Pope to Halleck, 3 November 1864, OR ser. 1, vol. 41, pt. 1, 137. 
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the road to Idaho must be built.  “We want the road,” he said, “not to harm you, but to go 
through your country to the gold mines.  We don’t want to take possession of your lands, 
but . . . the whites are bound to have this road . . . very soon your Buffalo will all be gone 
and you will have nothing to eat for your children, and you will starve to death if you 
don’t do so.”  According to Lieutenant Colonel Thornton, who reported on the 
proceedings for General Sully, Edmund’s rude manner startled the interpreter, Louis 
Benoist.  “The Interpreter exclaimed, ‘My God, Governor, you will frighten them all to 
death.’  I at once cautioned the Interpreter to proceed without remark.  The Governor then 
said to me, ‘Colonel, they are evidently sensitive about these points, but the fact is, they 
might as well understand these things first as last.’”16
 Edmunds’ dismissive use of the threat of starvation might have struck his 
contemporaries as shocking, but the fact remains that native people could and did starve 
in the wake of the government’s failures to provide for them.  In the autumn of 1864, for 
instance, the Indian Department had asked the Department of the Northwest for an escort 
to safeguard the annuities being shipped upriver to the agencies on the Upper Missouri.  
Why, the Department’s staff wondered, had they asked for an escort in late autumn when 
they could have asked for one months ago?  The year before, the Indian Department had 
made the same mistake—instead of accounting for the likelihood of crop failures in the 
early autumn, they had sent supplies to the agencies in the dead of winter, in weather so 
cold that it proved dangerous for the troops and teamsters.  The dire circumstances faced 
by reservation-dwelling Indians, particularly during the winter, disturbed and even 
 
                                                 
 16 Charles Thornton to Sully, 5 October 1865, DoNW, LR, RG 393. 
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angered army officers in the Department of the Northwest.17
 While officers’ criticism of civilian mismanagement of Indian affairs was 
widespread, it was not misplaced. Furthermore, officers were not immune from being 
criticized by Indian agents, many of whom mistreated Indians themselves.  Sully, for 
instance, became the target of Walter Atwood Burleigh, the agent to the Yankton.  
During the course of Sully’s campaigns against the Dakota Indians, Burleigh gained 
support for his political ambitions and became a powerful and influential force in Dakota 
Territory.  In fact, he wielded such power that he would help oust the governor of Dakota 
Territory in the summer of 1866.    
   
Burleigh’s own corruption was both particularly potent and emblematic of the 
clash between territorial officials and the army.  Posted to the Yankton agency near 
Greenwood in 1861, Burleigh surrounded himself from the outset with equally power-
hungry men (his father-in-law, Andrew Jackson Faulk, served as his chief clerk and later 
the governor of Dakota Territory).  Burleigh’s four-year tenure at Yankton meant that 
Indians went hungry while the agent grafted thousands of dollars.  He succeeded in part 
because he got the Yankton leaders’ authority to retain their annuity goods until he 
deemed them suitable for their use.  Burleigh’s accounts showed that he seized goods that 
were meant for the Yanktons and re-sold them to Minnesotans at a profit.  He deducted 
his own property from the account books, reporting that his horses and even his pen knife 
were for Yankton use.  Between the summer of 1861 and the autumn of 1862, he bought 
four hundred dollars worth of goods with annuity money;  he bought grain and meat from 
agency employees, which was against the Bureau’s regulations; he bought dozens of 
                                                 
17  Pope to Halleck, 10 October 1864, DoNW, LS, RG 393.  
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oxen, milk cows, beef cattle, hogs, and several horses, but few of these animals were ever 
used by the Yanktons. 18
There was a school for white children at the agency, but not one for the Indians; 
there was no miller for them either, even though one was on the books.  Norwegian 
contractors testified that they hauled goods to the agency for six hundred dollars; 
Burleigh deducted twice that amount from the Yanktons’ annuity payments.  The 
Yanktons’ workshops were used “for the accommodation and convenience of white 
people” who had either stopped at the agency to see if they could make money, or 
passing through the reservation on their own business.  The agency’s blacksmith and 
chief farmer both assisted local whites instead of the Indians who relied on them to fix 
tools and assist with planting.  Finally, one of the more egregious ruses involved 
Burleigh’s own son.  For most of the agent’s term, a man named Timothy B. Burleigh 
was paid forty dollars a month for general labor.  But Timothy was only thirteen years 
old; he went to the aforementioned school and spent the rest of his free time playing 
outdoors.  He had never worked a day for his father. 
     
19
  Burleigh had been under investigation for fraud in the past, but it seems that he 
spared no effort in tricking the government agent sent to investigate him.   
 
 
[Burleigh] at once dispatched a trusted henchman to intercept the examiner on the road. … In 
conversation it soon developed that the examiner needed an interpreter and he was delighted to 
find a man who thoroughly understood the Indian language, who was remote from the influence of 
the suspected agent, and who reluctantly consented to accompany him to the agency. … Strike the 
Ree and his head men poured out a tale of wrongs and woes which the ingenious interpreter 
                                                 
18 Smith, Officers’ Row, 92-93.  Smith notes that it was “fairly easy to criticize civilian 
management of federal Indian policy.”  Men like Burleigh would seem to substantiate officers’ low 
opinions of civilian agents.     
19 Alexander Johnston to Dennis N. Cooley, Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs 
to the Secretary of the Interior for the Year 1866, 16 July 1866, 181-85. 
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promptly converted into unbounded eulogies of the agent and the manner in which he conducted 
the affairs of the Indians, and the special [agent] returned to Washington with glowing accounts of 
the condition of things on the reservation.20
 
 
The next special agent sent to investigate, Alexander Johnston, was not as 
gullible. He struggled to find out what was going on at the agency, but locals refused to 
speak to him.  Jacob Rufner, a resident of nearby Bon Homme, told Johnston, “I know 
what you want, because, if it’s any slur on Dr. Burleigh, I ain’t a-going to have anything 
to do with it.”  But this reticence did not grow out of respect for the good doctor; instead, 
it grew out of fear of Burleigh’s power and influence.  Rufner continued, “If I do he will 
fix it so I’ll never get anything in the world, and he will drive me out of the country.” 21
 Burleigh did not take kindly to criticism from the army either, and when officers 
in the region drew attention to his illegal operations, he fired back at them.  Colonel 
Charles Dimon, commander of the First US Volunteer Infantry at Fort Rice, was one 
early critic of native-white relations in Minnesota and the Dakotas.  In the winter of 1864, 
he explained the situation on the frontier to a Union commander who was serving in 
Virginia: 
   
The Government have [sic] been fighting all summer the Indians in this vicinity involving a great 
expenditure of money and depriving our armies south of many valuable men.  We naturally look 
to the cause of those periodical outbreaks of the tribes.  … has not our policy rather exasperated 
than conciliated? All seems to point to continue involving millions of money, repeated outbreaks, 
and a chaos of chicanery, broken pledges and injustice to a people in whom I can see fear and 
passion predominate, but who are strongly alive to the principle of honor and equity, ready to 
                                                 
20 Doane Robinson, History of South Dakota, vol. 1 (Logansport, Ind.: B.F. Bowen and Co., 
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discriminate the just redemption of the promises from their “Great Father” at Washington from 
principled agents, but resent by treachery and massacre upon all whites within their reach the ill 
treatment and broken promises of the few above named. 
 
Like Sully and Pope, Dimon identified native-white violence in civilian mismanagement 
at the same time that he made ethnocentric assertions about the behavior of Indians 
themselves.  In the officers’ view, it was the supposed “fear and passion” that made 
native people susceptible to a corrupt bureaucracy.  Yet while the Indians were “easily 
managed and controlled through fear,” (including that which he applied himself) Dimon 
remarked bluntly, “The Indian can see he is cheated.”  Sully recognized this and acted on 
it by trying to restrain illegal trading; as a result, Burleigh sought to remove him from 
command.22
 In a letter to Commissioner William T. Dole, Burleigh outlined the failures that he 
attributed to Sully’s mission.  Before the arrival of the Northwest Indian Expedition, 
Burleigh argued, the Yankton Indians who lived in the vicinity of Fort Randall “were 
satisfied” and their “rights protected.”  But in the spring of 1863, Fort Randall became 
the assembly area for the expedition’s members, which led to instances of violence.  
Cavalrymen attacked eight warriors who had retrieved white women and children held 
captive by Sisseton Dakotas under White Lodge.   Burleigh remained “confident that had 
they not possessed more humanity than the murderers of their brothers,” neighboring 
Yanktons and Dakotas “would have wiped out our frontier settlements in blood.”  Yet in 
    
                                                 
22 Dimon had two Dakota prisoners executed after a large group of Dakota and Yanktonai warriors 
stole sixty horses from Fort Rice.  The two Dakota men had taken part in the raid and were later captured.  
The execution did not prevent other warriors from stealing more horses two weeks later.  Dimon is 
associated with the controversial Benjamin F. Butler, the recipient of the letter mentioned above, and a 
general known for his lack of strategic talent.  For more on Dimon, see Robert M. Utley, Frontiersmen in 
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his dramatic appraisal of the soldiers’ actions, Burleigh did not mention the hatred of 
Indians displayed by Anglo-American residents— both civilians and soldiers— in the 
Dakota-Minnesota region.  Troops at Fort Randall demonstrated this hatred when they 
cut down burial scaffolds, broke fences around Yankton cornfields, and let their horses 
forage in Yankton hay.23
 The 1862 revolt intensified the already-widespread loathing and fear of native 
people, and it is not surprising that troops, most of whom were volunteers local to the 
region, would have been eager to kill Indians.  Sully’s failure to “punish” soldiers, in 
Burleigh’s view, meant that he was incompetent.  However, it is clear that frontier 
residents would not have reacted favorably to a court martial of Minnesota soldiers.  As 
military historian Robert Utley has remarked, Anglo-Americans had committed 
themselves to “avenge the death of some eight hundred citizens slain in the [1862] orgy 
of bloodletting, to liberate several hundred white and half-blood captives…. and to 
reopen the upper country to settlers.”  When Sully arrived at Fort Randall, public opinion 
had set against Sibley and his failure to rout several hundred Dakotas near the Redwood 
Agency in the aftermath of the 1862 revolt.  In light of existing civilian criticism of the 
Department of the Northwest, it is unlikely that Sully would have been willing to risk 
losing the public’s confidence. 
   
24
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23 Walter Atwood Burleigh to Commissioner William T. Dole, 18 February 1865, Alfred Sully 
Papers. 
24 Ibid. For more on the Dakota prisoners executed at Fort Rice and the killing of the seven 
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13.  Burleigh described the seven murdered warriors as “Upper Missouri” and Yankton.  Utley, Frontier 
Regulars, 266.    
53 
 
 Nevertheless, Burleigh’s word carried weight.  He declared that the Northwest 
Expedition “proved a failure,” and in support of militia operations, that “no gigantic 
expedition is or was ever required.”  Instead, “one Regiment of active Western men” 
could subdue Dakota resistance.  Much like the bloodhounds that could do the work of a 
regiment, Burleigh’s comment reveals the inordinate amount of faith which was placed in 
the ability of civilians to defend themselves.  In contrast to Sully’s volunteer troops, these 
militia men would “carry moral bearing as well as force of arms.” (One wonders what 
methods these militia men would have used, given that Sully’s command of over three 
thousand men failed to achieve the objective of defeating the Dakota nation).  While 
Burleigh claimed to have no personal animosity toward Sully, he berated him for the 
troops’ lack of discipline and said that he was not qualified to lead troops on the frontier.  
Commissioner Dole rushed through an appropriation for Yankton claims and credited 
Burleigh’s treasury account with $10,000.  Although he said nothing about Sully, he 
encouraged Burleigh to investigate the damages to Yankton property.25
 But the chance to pocket $10,000 at the Yanktons’ expense was not enough 
restitution for Burleigh.  He was determined that Sully would be fired.  By July 1865, 
Burleigh wrote to Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant, general-in-chief of all the Union 
armies, complaining that the charges against Sully had not been investigated.  “The 
charges against this officer,” he wrote, are true, and I can prove them to be so.”  Grant, 
not knowing the circumstances and in the midst of demobilizing the entire Union army, 
advised Sherman to relieve Sully.  However, forces elsewhere were aware of Burleigh’s 
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intentions toward Sully, as well as other plans, which included getting the Sioux City 
army installation moved into Dakota Territory.  The U.S. Representative from Iowa told 
the Secretary of the Interior, “Burleigh… will not hesitate to make any statement which 
he may think will further his interests, and he may misrepresent the facts to the Secretary 
of War.”26
 John Pope quickly responded to Grant’s request, coming to Sully’s defense and 
describing the “idle, groundless & malicious” charges made against him by the Indian 
agent.  Pope explained, “Sully is complained of by persons whose personal views and 
objects he will not promote at the expense of the public interests.  These persons have 
openly proclaimed that they will bring about his removal at any cost… [H]is removal 
would simply be a triumph of these people.”  Pope asserted that Burleigh’s complaints 
originated with regional tensions, and he argued that it was the army’s duty “to support 
Officers enforcing a General or national policy against local pressure & clamor.”
      
27
 The nuances of Burleigh’s letter to Commissioner Dole are significant for more 
than blaming Sully and insulting him under the veneer of respect.  The Indian agent’s 
loud support for militias and his willingness to castigate military authorities earned him 
the overwhelming support of residents of Dakota Territory.  In the spring of 1865, after 
he had been relieved of his appointment at the Yankton Agency, Burleigh went into 
politics.  Approbations of him were so strong that he was elected a territorial delegate and 
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began serving in March.  He managed to take revenge on Governor Edmunds (who had 
failed to hamper the government’s investigation of Burleigh’s corruption) by convincing 
President Andrew Johnson to fire him and replace him with Andrew Jackson Faulk (yet 
another official who had no interest in Indian rights). 28
The irony of Burleigh’s letter is hard to ignore, especially because his descriptions 
of Indian suffering are at complete odds with the suffering that he himself imposed on 
them.  On the one hand he excelled in leveling biting criticism at the army; in his letter to 
Dole, he wrote, “One friendly old Yankton came to me and asked through an interpreter, 
‘if a white Soldier had a heart?’  I asked him why he wanted to know?  His reply was, ‘I 
have just seen them cut down the scaffold, and the dead body of my wife.’”  Had these 
words come from the pens of Alexis Andre or Pierre-Jean DeSmet, they would not be 
suspect, but Burleigh’s shameless manipulation of the Yanktons demonstrates that he had 
no sympathy for them.  More shocking is Burleigh’s assertion that “[Army officers 
should] see that the class of corrupt and unprincipled men who now infest the North 
Western Indian Country are driven out and none but suitable persons allowed to remain 
there.”  It is ironic to note President Lincoln’s observations on his first and only meeting 
with Burleigh before his appointment to the Yankton Agency in 1861.  When told by 
Burleigh that he would have to “starve or steal” if his family were moved to the Dakota 
Territory, the president responded, “Dr. Burleigh, if I am any judge of human nature, you 
won’t starve.”  It was the Indians who starved instead.
  
29
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Long before their clash with Burleigh, Pope and Sully drew attention to the dire 
circumstances faced by the region’s indigenous residents.  Both men focused on one 
common theme — the inconsistency of federal Indian policy.  After a conversation with 
Pope in the winter of 1864, Sully tendered his opinion in writing to the department 
headquarters.  He said bluntly, “The Indians are anxious for peace.  I think there will be 
no difficulty in making peace and of its being maintained, provided the proper course is 
adopted, and that is to treat the Indians in future with justice.  Let them understand that 
the Government intends to see that they will no longer be the prey of dishonest agents 
and traders.”  Indian suffering was obvious; the Yanktons at Fort Randall were nearly 
starving; they would have to move north for the winter and hunt among Dakota bands.  
“Many of these Indians,” Sully remarked, “I fear will join hostile bands, and the reports 
they will spread about the justice of the whites will do much to prevent a peaceful 
termination of the present difficulties.”30
The use of legal instruments like treaties seemed to promise continued negotiation 
and compromise, as well as land cessions that promised a halt to white encroachment.  In 
the hopes of retaining their autonomy, many of the Northern Plains nations signed treaties 
with the federal government by the late autumn of 1865, including representatives of the 
Yanktonai and all of the Teton groups.  Part of the impetus for negotiation lay in 
problems began to have a detrimental effect on Plains Indians in the 1840s and 1850s.  
First, the Lakota, Yankton, and Yanktonai bore the brunt of a sharp and sustained decline 
of the bison along the Missouri and the Platte rivers.  Second, this period coincided with 
the intrusion of white settlers, coupled with increased intertribal warfare.  Yankton land 
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cessions in 1858, for instance, angered the Oglalas and Brulés, who regarded the land as 
their own.  Discord in native communities ultimately benefited the federal government, 
particularly in the case of all Dakota bands involved in the 1865 treaties.31   Indians 
expected reciprocity and honesty from the Americans but never received those things.  As 
historian Jeffrey Ostler has argued, “Having identified American actions as the cause of 
decline, it was only logical for Indians to argue that if Americans reversed those actions, 
bison would flourish once again.”  Two Lances, an influential leader who was present at 
councils with his Two-Kettles community, argued that  if the American authorities 
“washed out all the blood that is on the land…  the game by which we live–the buffalo, 
the elk, and all the rest–will become plenty again.”32
 Anglo-Americans, for their part, painted Indian actions as inherently selfish and 
did not characterize Indian needs as valid or real.  Even Pope the humanitarian fell short 
at times, saying, “It is a common saying with the [Lakota] Sioux that whenever they are 
poor and need powder and lead they have only to go down to the overland  routes and 
murder a few white men, and they will have a treaty to supply their wants.”  At times he 
and Sully ignored the fact that military operations wreaked havoc on native populations 
by displacing communities, destroying resources, and hurting people.
   
33
                                                 
 31 Sully to Pope, August 29, 1864, OR, ser. 1, vol. 41, pt. 1, 150.  Richard White, “The Winning 
of the West: The Expansion of the Western Sioux in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries,” The Journal 
of American History 65, no. 2 (September 1979): 341.  See Indian Affairs, Laws and Treaties, Vol. 2, ed. 
Charles J. Kappler (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1904), 883-886, 896-907.  The terms of the 
treaty required them not only to obligate themselves to the federal government, but “to use their influence, 
and, if necessary, physical force, to prevent other bands of the Dakota or Sioux, or other adjacent tribes, 
from making hostile demonstrations.” 
  However, their 
observation about the dishonesty of the annuity system was not without merit.  The 
32 Jeffrey Ostler, “‘They Regard Their Passing as Wakan’: Interpreting Western Sioux 
Explanations for the Bison’s Decline,” The Western Historical Quarterly 30, no. 4 (Winter 1999): 486. 
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government’s refusal to provide annuities—and to people who needed them 
desperately—was the catalyst for the 1862 revolt.  Indians knew that the army 
represented the military power of the federal government, but they also knew civilians 
wanted their land and businessmen would continue to profit by trading with them.  The 
Dakota warrior’s accusation at the start of the revolt— “Now I will kill the dog who 
wouldn’t give me credit!”—points to the cycle perpetuated by the trade and annuity 
system. Native people on the Plains had traded with Anglo-American fur traders since the 
early 19th century.  As Gary Clayton Anderson has argued, the Dakotas and traders were 
connected by a “fictive blood and… economic relationship” in which the expectation of 
reciprocal obligation was paramount.  The precipitous decline of beaver and deer 
populations in the 1820s led to an imbalance in these relationships.  After the Dakotas 
made treaties with the federal government, their annuity payments (in the form of 
commodity goods) were seized by traders to pay credits in advance.  By the 1830s, 
“economic dependency had created a neocolonial atmosphere from which the Sioux 
could never recover.”34
Army officers had mixed reactions about this economic dependency, as well as 
mixed reactions about federal Indian policy in general.  Pope, like many other officers, 
made the case for a gradual approach that would convince Plains people of the ostensible 
advantages of constant, positive interaction with the military.  He declared, “Without in 
any way restraining their liberty to roam about  [and hunt] as in times past, it is my 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
33 Pope to Halleck, 3 November 1864, OR, ser. 1, vol. 41, pt. 1, 139. 
34 Gary Clayton Anderson, Kinsmen of Another Kind: Dakota-White Relations in the Upper 
Mississippi Valley, 1650-1862 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984; reprint, St. Paul: Minnesota 
Historical Society Press, 1997), xvi-xvii, xxix. 
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purpose to offer them every inducement by kind treatment, protection, and fair dealing in 
trade to make their permanent encampments” near the posts.    But this situation was 
never attained, given the fact that feelings of fear and hostility towards Indians 
predominated among Anglo-Americans, both military and civilian.  Pope and Sully 
argued that these anxieties were exaggerated by self-interested businessmen.  
Contractors, for instance, would see their businesses collapse –and Indian agents would 
have their power and access to corruption taken away – if native-white conflicts were 
truly ended.  Those people were opposed to the army’s operations and hoped that Pope 
and Sully would fail.  Pope stated his opinion boldly when he wrote to Governor 
Edmunds, “Many unscrupulous persons infest our whole frontier who live and thrive by 
exciting apprehension.”  If only the citizens were patient, and the state authorities had 
more confidence in the army’s abilities, problems with Indians would soon be resolved.35
 Such statements display the self-serving attitudes that crept into officers’ critique 
of their civilian adversaries.  By justifying their position in the West as one that was 
poised to respond to the twin dangers of Indian violence and Anglo-American crime, 
army officers could portray themselves as objective observers.  But in some sense Sully 
and Pope were right; contractors did depend on government bids and Indian agents like 
Burleigh would not have been able to manipulate the annuity system if Indians were 
indeed treated fairly.  Unregulated and corrupt trade created anger among Indians near 
and distant from military posts, and as a result, army officers came to the conclusion that 
regulation (and often regulation alone) could solve the problems of native-white conflict.   
   
                                                 
35 Pope to Sully, 11 May 1864, DoNW, LS, RG 393; Sully to Pope, 30 March 1864, DoNW, LS, 
RG 393; Pope to Newton Edmunds, 12 May 1864, DoNW, LS, RG 393. 
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Late in the Dakota conflict, Pope addressed these issues in a letter to General 
Grant.  Especially frustrating, Pope wrote, was the army’s inability to distinguish 
between differing interests within Indian nations – “peacefully disposed bands” and 
“hostile” ones.  While Pope hoped to separate “friendly” and “hostile” Indians, he had no 
effective plan for doing so.  Although native people often identified their own interests in 
councils, Anglo-American authorities failed to understand the small-scale community 
divisions within bands and nations.  Furthermore, Pope argued that the government 
bribed Indians “not to molest the whites” by paying them with annuity goods.  At first 
this might strike us as an oversimplification, but from the Anglo-American perspective, 
the treaty system really did resemble bribery— annuity payments functioned as an 
incentive to curb violent behavior and influence Indians’ decisions.  Still, Pope bristled at 
Anglo-Americans’ mistreatment of the Dakotas, and he made his opinion clear in the 
remainder of his 1865 letter to General Grant.   
 
“[Mining regions] attract… such a horde of emigrants that the Indian country is penetrated in 
every direction; highways are made through it, and the game driven off or destroyed.  The Indians 
are more and more confined to circumscribed areas, where they are less able every day to subsist 
by hunting.  A few more years and they will be driven to extremities.  No one can say what 
outrages are committed upon Indians by these irresponsible crowds of white men flocking through 
their country.  It is only what the Indian does to the white man that is published to the country, 
never what the white man does to the Indian.  … By sending troops enough the Indians can, of 
course, be exterminated; but surely, such cruelty cannot be contemplated by the government. … 
Nothing can save them from [continued harm] unless the government changes its course—gathers 
them together and places them in such a position and condition that they will no longer be objects 
of cupidity to unscrupulous whites… and will be wronged and plundered.” 36
   
  
  Pope saw the reservation system as a logical progression in the inevitable 
“confinement” of native people that would separate them permanently from aggressive 
                                                 
36 Pope to Grant, 14 June 1864, “Supplemental Report of the Joint Committee on the Conduct of 
the War,” in Senate Report No. 142, 38th Cong., 2nd Sess, 1865-1866 (Washington, D.C.: Government 
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civilians.  He was bothered, however, both by abusive Anglo-American behavior and 
Indians’ loss of their liberty and livelihood.  Pope was not surprised by native resistance; 
in some ways, he saw it as a predictable and even rational response.  Nevertheless, many 
civilians and politicians failed to see things from Pope’s point of view.  By allowing 
emigrants to invade native land and promising them military protection from Indian 
retaliation, the federal government lent its support to the ideology of Anglo-American 
exceptionalism and territorial expansion.  The United States Army served as the 
instrument by which the government advanced its colonizing agenda; however, given that 
Pope and Sully critiqued federal Indian policy on a routine basis, it is clear that army 
officers’ did not lend unquestioning support to these larger national goals. 
  
   
  
                                                                                                                                                 
Printing Office: 1866).  For Pope’s final official report on the army’s operations in 1865, see the New York 
Times, 18 November 1864.  
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CHAPTER THREE:  Benjamin Grierson at Fort Sill 
 
In the postwar era, the instability of the trans-Mississippi West challenged the level 
of professionalism thus far reached by the officer corps.  Territorial expansion had 
scattered a small force of regular troops throughout desolate areas and widened the scope 
of their responsibility over pioneers who did not always welcome federal intervention.  
Ill-prepared to engage in unconventional plains warfare, some army officers found 
themselves at the mercy of negative political, public, and media opinion when they failed 
to stop raids and attacks on Anglo-American civilians.  Responses to these problems were 
unique and ever-changing, yet frustration was a common denominator.  In Minnesota, 
Alfred Sully and John Pope resisted the efforts of state officials to marginalize the army, 
and they also criticized the government’s inability to provide for native people.  These 
same issues became particularly salient in northern Texas and Indian Territory after the 
Civil War, when Southerners migrated west in increasing numbers and installed 
themselves in territories that had been controlled by Kiowa and Comanche Indians for 
decades.1
After a strong performance in the Civil War, Grierson assumed command of the 
10th Cavalry and the Fort Still installation in Indian Territory.  He took a deep interest in 
the government’s management of the Kiowas and the northern Comanches and provided 
  In comparison to his colleagues in the Department of the Northwest, Colonel 
Benjamin Grierson combined his vocal critique of federal policy with sincere efforts to 
promote peace.     
                                                 
1Theodore Reed Fehrenbach, Lone Star: A History of Texas and the Texans (New York: Da Capo 
Press, 2000), 287. 
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military support to the Kiowa Indian Agency, as well as to smaller posts throughout the 
region.  After the Civil War, the groups that worried government authorities – and 
civilians – the most were the Sioux in the Northern Plains and the Kiowas and Comanches 
to the south.  In his annual report to the Secretary of the Interior, Ely Parker, 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, wrote of the “murders and outrages in the Indian 
Territory,” where Kiowa warriors “raided time and again into Texas, killing citizens 
thereof, capturing women and children, and stealing stock; and have set at defiance the 
military—audaciously inviting them out to battle!  The Indian Bureau is wholly powerless 
to prevent these raids.”2
The Medicine Lodge Treaty of October 1867 had bound the Kiowa and Comanche 
to a shared reservation in western Oklahoma and established similar provisions for 
Apaches, the Southern Cheyenne, and the Arapaho.  The native leaders made their 
position clear to Senator John Henderson, Colonel Samuel Tappan, General Alfred Howe 
Terry, and the other federal officials and army officers in attendance: “It was you who sent 
out the first soldier and we who sent out the second.”
  
3
                                                 
2 Ely S. Parker to Secretary of Interior, Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to the 
Secretary of the Interior for the Year 1870 (Washington: GPO, 1871), 6. 
  Some of the Kiowa and Comanche 
leaders were receptive the government’s offer to “give them good lands before the whites 
should occupy them all,” because they knew that the Anglo-American invasion of the 
southern Plains was bound to continue.  Others, notably the Kiowa leader Satanta, refused 
to have anything to do with the whites’ “medicine houses.”  The Medicine Lodge treaty, 
like many of the legal instruments used against native people, was never approved by any 
3 Thomas W. Kavanagh, The Comanches: A History, 1706-1875 (Lincoln: University of Nebraska 
Press, 1999), 414.  See 412-19 for Kiowa and Comanche perspectives, as well as the context of the treaty.  
For a general discussion of the history of the Kiowa agency, see Lee Cutler, “Lawrie Tatum and the Kiowa 
Agency, 1869-1873,” Arizona and the West 13, no. 3 (Autumn 1971): 221-44.    
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majority of native people.4
Problems plagued the southern Plains before the treaty’s Congressional ratification 
July 1868—the Comanches razed the Wichita Agency and the Kiowas threatened to do the 
same to Fort Cobb.  As a result, General Philip Sheridan mounted a major offensive 
against the Kiowas and Comanches in the fall of that year.  He sent Colonel Grierson to 
establish a camp at near the Witchita Mountains that lay around thirty five miles from the 
Red River, and thus the Texas border.  This camp, which Grierson called his “medicine 
bluff mountain home” was named Fort Sill in the summer of 1869.
   
5  An agency for the 
Kiowa and Comanche was established nearby, headed by Lawrie Tatum, a Quaker.  
Tatum exhibited great passion for President Grant’s new proposal for federal Indian policy, 
which encouraged the peaceful assimilation of native people whenever possible.6
                                                 
4 Kavanagh, The Comanches, 413, 416. 
  Despite 
these good intentions, inadequate shipments of annuity goods required the Kiowas to 
5 Lee Cutler, “Lawrie Tatum and the Kiowa Agency,” 224-25.  William H. Leckie and Shirley A. 
Leckie, Unlikely Warriors: General Benjamin Grierson and His Family (Norman: University of Oklahoma 
Press, 1984), 162-63.  For Grant’s policy, see Francis Paul Prucha, The Great Father: The United States 
Government and the American Indians, abr. ed. (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1986), 152-53. 
Prucha notes that “the principles it embodied antedated 1869 and continued to the end of the century and 
beyond.  Basically it was a state of mind, a determination that since the old ways of dealing with the Indians 
had not succeeded a new emphasis on kindness and justice was in order.”  The need for this change in policy 
came out of the findings of the Doolittle Committee, which was established in 1865.  This Congressional 
investigative body sent questionnaires to army officers, Indian agents, and other authorities in the West, 
hoping to ascertain the state of Indian affairs on the frontier.  The answers that they gathered gave them 
pause, and thus helped lead to the creation of Grant’s policy.  Grant initially advocated replacing civilian 
Indian agents with army officers, and in 1869, the majority of these agents were drawn from the army’s ranks.  
In July 1870, Congress banned this practice.  For a more detailed explanation of this issue, see Chapter 4, fn. 
44 of this manuscript. 
6 For an overview of this entire period (1866-1869), see 152-66 in Prucha, and for 
Kiowa-Comanche issues, see 168 in Prucha.  For more on the peace policy, see William T. Hagan, United 
States-Comanche Relations: The Reservation Years (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976), 51, 57.  
Grierson’s methods were a departure from those of General William B. Hazen, commander of the larger 
district that encompassed Fort Sill.  Hazen advocated the use of force, describing Indians as “beast[s] of 
prey” and saying that they “delight in torture and murder.”  Interestingly, he argued that the Freedmen’s 
Bureau should be responsible for Indian affairs, describing its chief, General Oliver Otis Howard, as a man of 
“high integrity” who would “certainly give us an honest beginning.” William B. Hazen to the editor, 2 July 
1867, New York Times.   
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support themselves outside of reservation boundaries.  Consequently, the encroachment 
of white settlers in the Red River region, combined with the Kiowas’ emphasis on the 
practical and cultural importance of raiding, saw an increase in native-white violence after 
the Civil War.7
As a representative of federal might, Grierson was tasked with controlling these 
conflicts.  After working closely with the Agency’s Quaker supervisor, Lawrie Tatum, as 
well as the principal men of the Kiowa bands, Grierson concluded that the government had 
failed to provide adequate logistical support to both native people and the military.  His 
response to lawlessness in Texas, therefore, provoked complaints from Texan civilians.  
Moreover, his advocacy of Indians’ fair treatment unfavorably affected his reputation 
among other army officers.  Grierson’s outspoken critiques of federal Indian policy and 
the army’s actions led to him being transferred away from Fort Sill, and the control of the 
“Indian problem” was given to other commanders, some of whom abandoned all efforts at 
negotiation and peace. 
   
 Anglo-Americans headed for Texas during and after the Civil War and 
ultimately settled in areas that were claimed by Kiowa and Comanche Indians.  The 
Kiowas wanted to be left alone and were determined to keep making raids into Texas for 
horses and mules.  Lawrie Tatum summarized their discontent in a letter to the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs: “They claim that the United States has no right to pen 
them up on this small tract of land, only about one hundred miles square, and then give half 
                                                 
7 This chapter does not address the well-known Warren massacre of 1871, for which Kiowa leaders 
Satank (Sitting Bear), Satanta (White Bear), and Big Tree were arrested at Fort Sill. For the massacre, see 
Allen Lee Hamilton, “The Warren Wagon Train Raid: Frontier Indian Policy at the Crossroads,” Arizona and 
the West 28, no.3 (Autumn 1986): 201-24.  For more on Grierson’s liberal views on race, see Paul Hutton, 
Phil Sheridan and His Army (Norman: University of Oklahoma, 1985), 228, and Leckie, Unlikely Warriors, 
137, 147. 
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their rations of provisions in corn, feeding them as the white people do their horses and 
mules.”  Yet also Tatum described Grierson’s abilities with confidence and a sense of 
hope.  
Grierson appears to have an abiding interest in the welfare of the Indians, and cordially lends a 
helping hand. … If the standing of an officer be estimated on the basis that he is the greatest 
general who conquers the most with expending the least amount of blood and treasure, I think 
the commanding officer here will rank right, for I feel confident that it is his wish and intention 
to use all his influence and authority to subdue the wild and ferocious nature of the savage, 
which coming into hostile collision with him, unless some great emergency should arise in 
which he would consider that… weapons were absolutely necessary.  He evidently would 
much prefer to lead than to attempt to drive the aborigines into civilization.8
 
 
Grierson’s background informed his liberal reading of Grant’s policy, given the 
anti-slavery tendencies of his family and his participation in the Civil War.  His Irish 
father had befriended William Lloyd Garrison and other abolitionists early on, and 
Grierson supported the Illinois Republican party at the grass-roots level in the mid-1850s.  
During Lincoln’s presidential campaign in 1860, Grierson registered voters, and soon after 
the start of the Civil War, he joined the Tenth Illinois Infantry as an aide and became a 
commissioned officer.  By the fall of 1861, he was a major in the Sixth Illinois Cavalry.  
Grierson’s fairly modern views on race manifested themselves in a number of ways during 
the war and in connection with his assuming command of the Tenth Cavalry.  He was 
happy to hear of a friend’s marriage to a black woman (“. . . if he is satisfied, I’m sure I am 
and much joy go with them”) and spoke out against proposals for lenient treatment of 
slaveholders after the war.   
While Grierson’s advocacy of peace and racial equality deserves merit, his skills as 
a leader in combat also made him stand out among his fellow officers.  Grierson was the 
man who led the famous 1863 raid to divert Confederate troops from Grant’s main attack 
                                                 
8 Lawrie Tatum to Enoch Hoag, 12 August 1869, Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs to the Secretary of the Interior for the Year 1869 (Washington: GPO, 1870), 385-86. 
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on Vicksburg, Mississippi.  In two weeks, his command rode over six hundred miles 
through Confederate territory, via routes untraveled by Union forces.  On the final leg of 
the raid, they rode over seventy miles in twenty-eight hours and engaged the enemy a 
number of times.  (When they came finally to a halt in a small town, Grierson found a 
piano and sat down to play).  Both Grant and Sherman spoke highly of Grierson’s actions; 
in Grant’s words, “It was Grierson who first set the example of what might be done in the 
interior of the enemy’s country without any base from which to draw supplies.”9
After General Grant hand-picked Grierson to lead the Tenth Cavalry (one of six 
regiments outfitted solely with black troops), Grierson served with them eagerly.
  
Grierson’s command ripped up sixty miles of railroad track and telegraph lines, burned 
Confederate stores, freed slaves, and produced ten times as many casualties as it suffered.  
Sherman called it “the most brilliant expedition of the war.”   
10  
General Sherman wrote that Grierson was “energetic, dedicated, skillfull, takes good care 
of his men,” and the colonel proved this time and again.  He refused to allow anyone to 
refer to his troops as “colored”—they were “simply the Tenth Regiment of Cavalry U.S. 
Army.”11  He made clear his willingness to defend the rights of his soldiers in 1867, when 
the black cavalrymen were forced to stand at parade rest in front of their quarters at Fort 
Leavenworth while the white troops marched on the parade field.  Wrote Grierson, “My 
regiment [was] deprived of their right to participate in inspections and parades at this Post 
upon an equality with the other troops of the garrison.”12
                                                 
9 Leckie, Unlikely Warriors, 98-99. 
   
10 Ibid., 20, 42, 57, 60.  
11 Ibid., 147-148. 
12 Benjamin H. Grierson to Chauncey McKeever, Assistant Adjutant General , 19 June 1867, 
Department of Missouri, Letters Received, Record Group 393 (Hereafter cited as AAG, DoM, LR, and LS 
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In these ways, Grierson set himself apart from colleagues on the frontier as well; in 
a letter to his father-in-law, John Kirk, he described the situation at the newly-established 
installation of Fort Sill in the spring of 1869.  Grierson pointed out that “Indian Wars,” 
fought at an enormous cost to the government, resulted in the deaths of Indian women and 
children.  More important for high-ranking officers, the wars resulted in promotions. 
There are now about 3000 Indians, Kioways, Comanches, Apaches and Arapahoes in this vicinity . 
. . You must not believe all you have heard or read in the papers about this Indian War. . . . Instead of 
a grand success, it has been like most other Indian Wars - a grand “fizzle” - that cost the government 
over $200,000 for every Indian killed.  More soldiers have been killed than Indians, leaving out the 
women and children of the latter.  Custer’s fight [the Washita massacre of November 1868] was a 
big thing on paper.  The 102 warriors he reported killed has dwindled down according to Indian 
count to just eighteen and he reported more material captured and destroyed than all the hostile 
Indians had put together.  Sheridan has however made the most out of it and reported the war over 
just in time for it to have effect at Washington, and was elevated thereby to the position of 
Lieut[enant] General.13
 
 
 Grierson argued that the settlement of the “Indian Question” depended on “strict 
fulfillment of all Government obligations.”14
The Indians are becoming more discontent every day.  They have never been properly supplied … 
and now as the spring opens and grass coming up they are getting . . . nothing but the very poorest 
kind of beef.  It is perfect nonsense to suppose that the wild Indians will remain quiet . . .  while fat 
buffalo roam over their native plains.  Many of the most influential chiefs only declare their 
intentions to leave and say they must do so or starve.  In case they attempt to leave I under my 
instructions will be expected to use force to keep them upon the reservation and to do so is gross 
injustice.  The Government is responsible for the discontent now manifest among the Indians on 
account of not supplying them with the promised supplies.  I have let Gen. Hazen [in command of 
the 6th Infantry] have everything that can be spared and in case we get a supply... I will not hesitate to 
  He maintained this opinion from the day he 
arrived at Fort Sill until the day he left it, for he believed that the Kiowas and Comanches at 
Fort Sill were naturally “friendly and well disposed, despite” what was “published to the 
contrary.”  The Indians’ demeanor changed considerably from the early spring of 1870, 
however; in a letter to his wife Alice, Grierson wrote the following. 
                                                                                                                                                 
for Letters Sent).  See also Leckie, Unlikely Warriors, 147.  Grierson was charged with disrespect of a 
superior officer when he ordered his men to march on the parade field anyway. 
13 Grierson to John Kirk, 6 April 1869, Benjamin Grierson Papers, Southwest Collection, Texas 
Tech University, Lubbock.  
14 Grierson to John Kirk, 25 February 1870, Benjamin Grierson Papers. 
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issue to the Indians altho’ it is against orders or rather I have no orders to do so.15
 
   
 
 What had caused this sudden change?  For one, as Grierson argued, promised 
annuity goods never made it to the Kiowas and Comanches who lived near the agency.  
Furthermore, the Indians took advantage of spring weather to fatten up their horses, raid 
Anglo-American settlements, and free themselves from the confines of the reservation.  
The Comanches refused to camp near Fort Sill, partially because there was not enough 
grass for their 16,000 horses.  Because the Comanches camped about thirty five miles 
away from the agency (and thus were closer to the Texas border), it took up to four days to 
draw rations.  Since rations were issued every two weeks, one can imagine the impatience 
that the Comanches must have felt.  As William T. Hagan argues, “The Kiowas and 
Comanches drew the conclusion that their intransigence [via raiding] drew better returns 
than . . . meekness . . . and told their agent so.”16
Grierson made clear his objections about the failure to provide for the Indians, but 
his superiors ignored him consistently.  To make matters worse, Lawrie Tatum, though at 
first a staunch advocate of the “peace policy” proved an unreliable ally for the colonel.  
Tatum was convinced that his Quaker faith made him an apt guide for the peace policy, but 
his numerous absences from the agency suggest that he was not doing his job.  Tatum left 
the agency from August to October 1869, again from December 1869 to January 1870, and 
then from December 1870 to March 1871.  His clerk, George H. Smith was “rumored to 
have made $16,000 in eighteen months while a silent partner in firms supplying the 
agency.”  Grierson, therefore, probably bore the brunt of the peacemaking efforts at the 
   
                                                 
15 Grierson to Alice Kirk, 7 April 1870, Benjamin Grierson Papers. 
         16 Hagan, United States-Comanche Relations, 68. 
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Indian agency.   
The “discontent now manifest” among Kiowas and Comanches can be heard in 
their testimony at an October 1873 council at Fort Sill.  Although Grierson had left Fort 
Sill for good in early January 1873, the comments of the Indian leaders reflect a 
long-standing distrust of Anglo-Americans that preceded Grierson’s arrival and outlasted 
his departure.  While Commissioner of Indian Affairs Edward P. Smith and 
Superintendent Enoch Hoag were present, the Governor of Texas, Edmund Davis, took a 
dominant role.17  Davis framed his remarks in terms of Texan interests and Texan 
promises to Indian people, and claimed that Texans had not “come to this country 
raiding… have not made war… only defended their homes and families, and have never 
followed to Kiowas and Comanches to their villages,” though the Texans were as 
“numerous as the leaves on the tree.”  To guarantee the release of Satanta and Big Tree, 
the Kiowas and Comanches would have to remain at the agency; they would have to report 
to draw their rations, and if absent from daily inspections, it would be taken for granted that 
they were raiding in Texas.18
The Kiowas seem to have seen little merit in the Americans’ rhetoric.  Lone Wolf, 
a Kiowa leader and member of the elite Tsetanma (Horse Headdresses) warrior society, 
responded that although the tribes had different names, they were “one people, and one 
mind.”
   
19
                                                 
17 Hoag was head of the Central Superintendency, which was comprised of Kansas and all of 
Indian Territory. 
  If any young warriors tried to go to Texas, they would be followed and brought 
18 See fn. 7; they were arrested for killing teamsters in the Warren attack. 
19 Council Minutes, 1873, Department of Texas, Letters Received Relating to Difficulties with 
Indians (“Indian File”), RG 393. (Hereafter abbreviated as Council Minutes, 1873, DoTx, LR, RG 393).  For 
the warrior society, see William C. Meadows, Kiowa, Apache, and Comanche Military Societies: Enduring 
Veterans: 1800 to the Present (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2003), 41.  See also William C. Meadows, 
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back to the agency by their own people.  Davis and the Indian Office officials understood 
Lone Wolf’s leadership in terms of Anglo-American hierarchy and saw his declarations as 
binding, but they did not recognize that his remarks reflected only one part of the Kiowa 
community’s mindset.   
The remarks of Horseback, a Comanche leader, seem to be colored with irony, 
particularly this contention – “When I hear a good talk, I keep it, and don’t go to sleep and 
when I wake up forget it.”  This seems more like an allusion to the promises that 
Anglo-Americans failed to keep rather than a statement about Horseback’s own fealty.  
Horseback had experience with Texas settlers and the Texas Rangers; he led a damaging 
raid into the Texas-Oklahoma borderlands in 1864, and in the early 1870s, he encountered 
Rangers at Keep Ranch in northern Wise County, Texas.  Ranger A.J. Sowell witnessed 
the Comanche leader’s horsemanship and was so impressed by it that he wrote about it at 
length.20
Horseback had been present at the Medicine Lodge Creek council in 1867 where 
Kiowa, Comanche, and Apache leaders were compelled to cede 60,000 square miles of 
tribal territory and to restrict themselves to an area between the Red River and North 
Canadian River in western Oklahoma.  He would have heard Ten Bear’s eloquent words:  
   
The blue-dressed soldiers . . . killed my braves, and the warriors of the tribe cut short their hair for 
the dead.  So it was in Texas.  They made sorrow come in our camps . . . When we found them we 
killed them, and their scalps hang in our lodges.  The Comanches are not weak and blind, like the 
pups of a dog when seven sleeps old. They are strong and farsighted, like grown horses….  Why do 
you ask us to leave the rivers and the sun and the wind and live in houses? Do not ask us to give up 
the buffalo for the sheep. The young men have heard talk of this, and it has made them sad and 
angry.21
                                                                                                                                                 
“Remaining Veterans: A Symbolic and Comparative Ethnohistory of Southern Plains Indian Military 
Societies,” (PhD diss., University of Oklahoma, 1995). 
   
20 A.J. Sowell, Rangers and Pioneers of Texas (Shepherd Bros., 1884; reprint, New York: 
Argosy-Antiquarian Ltd., 1964), 307. 
21 In Ernest Wallace and Edward Adamson Hoebel, The Comanches: Lords of the South Plains, 
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Had the Texans not come into Comanche territory, Horseback believed there might 
have been peace.  He admitted openly that young warriors traveled to Texas, but he 
pointed out that Washington had failed to provide for them.   
Grey Leggings, another Comanche leader, had been present at the first major 
council held at Fort Sill in August 1869.  At the 1873 council, he declared, “I have been 
working with General Grierson . . . But although I have been walking on [the white] road 
some years, I have not seen a house on it yet, though we were promised that some should be 
built for us.”  Now he questioned why the houses built for agency Indians were so rude 
and the houses in Washington so grand.  He had been prohibited from seeing the inside of 
those houses, but did not know why.  “You must have something bad in there, that you 
don’t want me to go into,” he reasoned.  Like other leaders, he was perfectly aware of the 
failures that defined the Indian Office.  His suspicion—that Anglo-Americans were 
hiding something from native people—suggests a native view of whites as perhaps more 
than a rival nation.  From the perspective of these Kiowa and Comanche leaders, white 
people were strange, not worthy of trust, and even bizarre, given their expectation that 
Indians live within walls, in houses that cut people off from the natural world.  Smith 
asked whether Grey Leggings had a house built for him and Grey Leggings replied, “Yes.  
I had [one and] began to work myself when a white man came along and spoilt it all.”22
Chewing Elk, a leader of a local Comanche band, said that he had been told that he 
would be given a house and stock the year before.  He had seen stacks of money in 
Washington, but what became of that money—“whether it goes down in the ground” and 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
10th ed. (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1987), 282-83. 
22 Council Minutes, 1873, DoTx, LR, RG 393.   
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disappeared, he did not know.  He, too, had a house built for him by Lawrie Tatum, but the 
first night he meant to sleep there, a terrific thunderstorm “came right over the house and 
not a cloud any place else.  I thought this was bad medicine, so I lit out and have never 
been there since.”23
Governor Davis and Commissioner Smith did not see the logic in Chewing Elk’s 
reaction, but awareness of his surroundings had shown Chewing Elk that the house could 
not possibly be safe.  Such experiences—houses promised and never built, or houses built 
that could not become real homes—would have been shared among members of the 
community.  Chewing Elk’s story indicates that native people’s reluctance to assimilate 
was based in more than their desire to maintain their heritage.  Anglo-American culture 
was different, so different that the desires and concerns of white people held no attraction 
for many native people.  The annual reports of the Indian Office point to many native 
people’s willingness to assimilate, but it is equally the case that many others, particularly 
the groups on the Plains, balked at the government’s expectations.
   
24
 Indian leaders told Commissioner Smith that they had only been shown how to 
farm after arguing with agents, and that they had wanted the agents to break the soil for 
them.  Smith retorted, “Exactly!  You wanted him to do all the work.”  He reminded 
them of the Witchita leaders who cultivated crops and raised livestock near Waco; those 
Indians accused the Kiowas and Comanches of disturbing them as much as the whites.  
Davis and Smith would not accept the fact that Texans, witnessed by young warriors, had 
stolen horses and mules from Indians living near the agency.  It did not help that Davis 
 
                                                 
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
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declared that he owned Satanta and Big Tree; that angered the native leaders even more.  
Still, he reiterated that the conflict was between Kiowas, Comanches, and Texans, not the 
Wichitas or Caddoes.25
It was into this atmosphere of uncertainty that Grierson entered in 1869.  When he 
took command of Fort Sill, Texans had been clamoring for revenge (albeit behind the 
safety of their newspapers).  Various editorials declared the pressing need for 
self-defense: “It is well known how the US authorities over there connive at the 
depredations of the Indians.  They issue them rations [which] will feed them on a scalping 
and horse-stealing tour into Cooke, Wise, and Denton Counties.  Really!”
     
26
Against the Kiowas and Comanches there is just cause of serious complaint, and I think that severe 
punishment should be meted out to them for the crimes they have committed in the face of their 
solemn treaty obligations, and the forbearance and kindness of the Government.  They have been 
guilty the past year of several murders and outrages in the Indian Territory, and even within the 
bounds of their own reservation, and have raided time and again into Texas, killing citizens thereof, 
capturing women and children, and stealing stock; and have set at defiance the military audaciously 
  The areas 
that seem most affected by Kiowa-Comanche raids were the counties just south of the Red 
River/Indian Territory-Texas border.  Clay, Montage, and Cooke counties bordered the 
Red River; Young, Jack, and Wise counties sat below those, and further south were Parker 
and Denton counties.  The civilian settlements in these counties were particularly 
vulnerable because they were only a three- or four-day ride from Fort Sill, and were not 
close enough to any fort or large town that might offer more protection.  The outcry from 
these settlements drew the attention of Ely S. Parker, the Seneca man who was 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs.      
                                                 
25 Ibid. 
26 Denton Monitor, 19 September 1868, Center for American History, Austin, Texas.  Unless 
otherwise noted, all newspaper references in this chapter were obtained at the Center for American History.  
One wonders at the possible entertainment value of frontier newspapers; inflammatory articles about Indian 
raids appeared next to an “instructional item” titled “All about Kissing” in the September 26th issue of the 
Denton Monitor.  
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inviting them out to battle!  The Indian Bureau is wholly powerless to prevent these raids. The 
spirit that prompts them is vicious and incorrigible, and should be dealt with summarily. These 
Indians claim to be friendly, and assign as a reason for their wicked deeds and cruelty against the 
citizens of Texas that the people thereof are not a part of the United States, and hence they believe, 
so it is said, a war upon them to be perfectly proper. In my judgment they know better, and, if they 
do not, such lessons should be taught them as will effectually deter them from a renewal of their 
crimes. I know of no way to check this marauding spirit except to place all of them under the control 
of the military power, until they shall have learned to be friendly with all whites . . . 27
 
 
 
In the autumn of 1869, however, Grierson reports contradicted the seriousness of 
Parker’s report.  The colonel argued that the likelihood of widespread depredation in 
Texas was remote.  However, sickness caused some uneasiness among Agency Indians 
and a few of the Kiowas “talked large.”  Still, Grierson wrote that “friendly feeling still 
prevails.”  That winter, he reported that a gang of white men had stolen ponies from 
Indians camped near the Agency; in addition to livestock theft, whites ran whiskey into 
Indian Territory and profited from the new vices created by Indians’ increasingly sedentary 
lifestyle.  Grierson had one major concern in his first few months at Fort Sill—the success 
of the patrolling missions along the Red River, which he hoped would prevent the traffic of 
stolen stock by whites and Kiowa alike.28
Asserting that the government failed to fulfill its obligations, Grierson concluded 
that the honest enforcement of treaty standards would mitigate restless reservation Kiowas’ 
interest in violence.  In addition, it troubled him that government stores were not released 
   
                                                 
27 Ely S. Parker to J.D. Cox, 31 October 1870, Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs to the Secretary of the Interior for the Year 1870 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1871), 6.  
According to William T. Hagan, Texas cattlemen “recognize[d] the grazing potential of the reservation” 
early on, and by the early 1880s, large numbers of Texas cattle were “munching free grass” within 
reservation boundaries.  Cattlemen convinced some influential Comanches to let them fence and graze 
reservation land, but most Kiowa and Comanche people opposed giving leasing rights to Texans.  William 
T. Hagan, “Kiowas, Comanches, and Cattlemen, 1867-1906: A Case Study of the Failure of U.S. Reservation 
Policy,” The Pacific Historical Review 40, no. 3 (August 1971), 336, 338, 339-43. 
28Grierson to AAG, 23 November 1869, 1 December 1869, DoM, LR, RG 393.  By the spring of 
1870, Grierson had this to say: “From about the 1st of May I expect to keep some cavalry patrolling along the 
Red River, with a view of preventing white men from stealing horses and mules from the reservation and 
Indians from crossing into Texas to commit like depredations.”  Grierson to AAG, 12 April 1870, DoM, RG 
393. 
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to the Agency until three months after they were promised; food and clothing had only 
reached the Kiowas in the depths of the winter season.  Moreover, the government had 
abrogated hunting rights to a small area without prior warning.  Grierson addressed these 
issues in his reports to his higher headquarters throughout 1869 and the spring of 1870, but 
the responses evinced little concern.  In August 1869, Grierson requested an increase in 
the beef and flour rations.  By the 25th of September, the Kiowa had been relieved by the 
increased rations.  However, the peace was not to last.29
In the spring of 1870, roving Cheyenne from Kansas swept into the Kiowa and 
Comanche camps.  They appealed to the reservation Indians to unite with them in a 
general war.  The steadfast refusal of the head men, however, did not stop young warriors 
from all three tribes from making raids into Texas.  The line units at the Red turned back 
hopeful raiders, both native and white, but not before horses were stolen and a settler was 
killed by Cheyenne.  Grierson interpreted this as an attempt “to implicate the Indians of 
[the Fort Sill] Reserve.”  Sensitive to the depth of the problem that faced him, the colonel 
understood that neither whites nor Indians contributed exclusively to borderland violence. 
He did not discriminate in censuring criminal activity: for example, he acknowledged the 
cooperative nature of Cheyenne and Kiowa raids in a letter of June 24th, yet he also clearly 
stated that their white Texan victim had no authority to be chopping wood four miles west 
of the installation, where troops found him scalped and dead.
  
30
                                                 
29Grierson to AAG, 25 August 1869, 25 September 1869, DoM, LR, RG 393.  See also N.D. 
Badger, Acting Commissary of Subsistence for Indians, 2 August 1869, 30 May 1870, DoM, LS, RG 393.  
Captain Badger also oversaw commissary operations at Fort Sill.  He attested to the poor quality of rations 
that Indians received.  
   
30Grierson to AAG, 24 June 1869, DoM, LR, RG 393.  A few days earlier: “Captain Burke who 
has been patrolling the line of the Red reports that he prevented several parties of Indians from crossing into 
Texas . . . [returned to Post with] four horse thieves and whiskey dealers.”  Grierson to AAG, 21 June 1870, 
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Moreover, Grierson’s refusal to negotiate helped forestall more depredations 
during July 1870.  When a delegation from the heads of the peace and hostile Kiowa 
factions (led by Kicking Bird and Lone Wolf, respectively) approached Fort Sill, they were 
not turned away or subject to aggression.  Rather, Grierson and Tatum requested that the 
Kiowa leaders stop their young warriors from making further incursions with the 
Cheyenne and give up stolen stock and the guilty parties.  Then they would be allowed to 
enter the safety of the reservation.  Conversely, if they failed to surrender stolen property, 
rations would be withheld.31
Grierson had secured a modicum of personal and professional satisfaction by the 
end of the summer of 1870; however, it had not come easily.  As the seat of renegade 
action in the borderlands, Fort Sill grew to represent the shortcomings of the 1868 “peace” 
policy for Texans.
  This tactic proved effective again in August, as Grierson 
demanded the return of a captive white family, the Koozers.  Accustomed to receiving 
compensation for these adopted kin, the Kiowa chiefs were surprised that the colonel was 
unwilling to grant them any additional annuities.  “The practice for paying Indians for 
stolen persons and property,” Grierson noted, “is an inducement for them to commit further 
depredations.”  He reminded higher headquarters that, since his arrival at Sill, the Kiowa 
had consistently received $500 for each captive.  Their agreement to give up part of their 
band’s labor force stood as “certainly a good indicator” of their reasonable attitudes and 
interest in peace.   
32
                                                                                                                                                 
DoM, LR, RG 393. 
  The citizens of Texas witnessed borderland violence on a weekly or 
even daily basis; Indians threatened their financial and physical security when they stole 
31Grierson to AAG, 21 June 1870, 5 July 1870, DoM, LR, RG 393. 
32Grierson to AAG, 7 Aug 1870, 19 August 1870, DoM, LR, RG 393. 
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horses, killed those who threatened the success of raiding expeditions, or took captives to 
augment their bands.  The citizens of the northern counties lived on isolated homesteads; 
because of their proximity to the Red River, they took the brunt of raids.  Forts Richardson 
and Griffin, on either side of the Brazos River, were more than a hundred miles south of 
Fort Sill, and were too consumed with local violence to offer any support.  In effect, 
Kiowa and Comanche raiders operated in a vacuum, at times wholly free from military 
interference.33
Because of federal Reconstruction policies, the Texas state government forbade 
organized private militia.  This means that as individuals, Texans’ only option was to 
defend themselves.  A man could fortify his corrals; he might hope to startle his attackers 
into flight, or less commonly, wound or kill them with a hastily aimed rifle.  Reports from 
the Department of Texas from 1867 to 1872 rarely mentioned civilian-Indian conflict, but 
the reality of Indian depredations was ever present.  In groups, Texans felt that they 
inspired fear and increased their combat effectiveness, even if this was seldom true in 
reality.
     
34
Editorials in local newspapers indicate that decisions about Indian affairs on the 
federal level were not a daily concern in the years following the Civil War.  However, 
raids on local homesteads precipitated vociferous complaints every few weeks.  Although 
the “satrap authorities” would not permit it, the people of Cooke County raised men to 
challenge Kiowa raiders.  “It is well known,” read a Denton Monitor editorial of 
 
                                                 
33 Robert M. Utley, Frontier Regulars: The United States Army and the Indian, 1866-1891 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1973), 207-8. 
34See “Reports of scouts, Indian depredations, and crimes,” in Fifth Military District, 1867-1870, 
DoTx, LR, RG 393, which includes a variety of newspaper clippings and transcriptions of articles.  For 
Texans’ crimes, see “Tabular statement of crimes committed in the state of Texas,” Fifth Military District, 
1869-1870, DoTx, LR, RG 393 .   
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September 19, 1868, “how the US authorities over there [Fort Sill] connive at the 
depredations of the Indians.  They issue them rations from the Agency, where they know 
(the Indians are making it no secret) that these same rations will feed them on a scalping 
and horse stealing tour.”  A month later: “The troops on the contrary are protecting the 
savages.  When the Indians make war upon us they are not molested, [but we are] declared 
hostile.”  When the Senate passed the frontier protection bill on 7 June 1870, a column in 
the Honey Grove Enterprise declared that within the last three years, 260 people had been 
murdered by “those ruthless redskins... [i]t is to be hoped that this new law will be 
successful in expelling all those roving murderers and giving succor to our bleeding 
frontier that has so long prayed for help in vain.”35
Other news items, particularly those in the Denton Monitor put the interests of 
Texas civilians and the U.S. government in blatant opposition.  Demanding that locals 
form militia companies, the editors mused that “reliance upon the United States for 
protection [was] the utmost nonsense.”  The paper also accused the government of using 
the army to force Southern citizens to vote for the Republican Party—citizens who 
comprised “the most peaceable portion of the population.”  In contrast to the newspaper 
editorials that lashed out at Sully and Pope in Minnesota, the Texas papers displayed open 
hostility to the federal government.  Most likely, this is a consequence of the southern 
backgrounds of many postwar Texas residents.
   
36
Ironically, the same Texas newspapers that criticized Grierson also tended to ignore 
the fact that Anglo-Americans were also complicit in the violent crimes that racked the 
        
                                                 
35Denton Monitor, 19 September 1868; 21 October 1868, item reprinted from Weatherford Times; 
Honey Grove Enterprise, 7 June 1870, Center for American History, Austin, Texas.  All newspapers cited in 
this chapter were found at the Center for American History in Austin. 
36 Denton Monitor, 17 October 1868. 
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state in the late 1860s.  The sheer variety of crimes committed in the state of Texas 
indicates that Indian attacks could not have been the only concern for frontier residents 
when compared to the violence created by Anglo-Americans.  From January to March 
1869, there were 318 murders, 170 assaults with intent to kill, 40 instances of horse theft, 
and 186 thefts.  Murders decreased and horse and stock thefts increased in the spring and 
summer of 1869.  By the early spring of 1870, the number of murders was drastically 
reduced, probably as a consequence of more efficient law enforcement.  Furthermore, a 
study of Texas newspapers makes it clear that reports of Indian depredations were 
publicized far more often than reports of crimes committed by whites.   
The Denton Monitor, Honey Grove Enterprise, among others, scarcely mentioned 
violence between Anglo-Americans.  Yet civilians committed crimes far more often than 
Texas newspaper editors admitted.  Army officers at Fort Sill collected excerpts from 
newspapers published in the counties that bordered the Red River (and thus the Indian 
Territory-Texas border) and kept track of local crimes.  In one of the more sensational 
cases, on January 24, 1869, a lone man—tall, “raw boned and grey-eyed,” riding a “dark 
iron-grey horse,” passed through Sherman, Texas.  He had exchanged gold coins for 
several hundred dollars of paper currency at the town bank.  A few hours later, he was shot 
in the head and back, and his body was later found off of the main road.     
Elsewhere in Grayson County, on February 6, 1869, a horse thief was killed by a 
posse after he sold the horses in Indian Territory.  Several days later, a man was shot and 
killed by rustlers who he suspected of stealing his horses.  An attempt was made on the life 
of the editor of the Pilot Point paper in Denton County, around March 10th.  On the 21st of 
March, a soldier with the 6th Cavalry out of Fort Richardson was shot by a civilian in Jack 
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County.  Among the many news items collected by the army officers, an excerpt from the 
Dallas Herald described violence with native people in early April.  “Every paper from 
the frontier brings us reports of Indians.”  Warriors seized upwards of one hundred and 
fifty to two hundred horses from Parker County residents in a matter of days.  Most of the 
stolen horses broke away from the herd and returned to their owners.  Older residents of 
the area feared that the frontier would “give way” unless residents acted in their own 
defense.37
If that were the case, then Texans would be defending themselves from their 
neighbors.  Many crimes attributed to the Kiowas and Comanches at Fort Sill “were made 
by white desperadoes, frequently parading in the attire of Indians.”  Agents in Indian 
Territory, including Lawrie Tatum, argued that horse thieves and whiskey smugglers posed 
greater threats to the reservation-bound Kiowas and Comanches than the Indians posed to 
Texans.
 
38  While both the Texan civilians and proponents of the “peace policy” might 
have been exaggerating the case to benefit their own agendas, it is clear that 
Anglo-Americans shared the responsibility for violence in Texas.  The army itself played 
an important role in supplementing the activities of civil law enforcement in the 
trans-Mississippi West—one at which Texan civilians would bristle.  In 1870 alone, 
Colonel Grierson reported that his command had recovered more than 250 horses, mules, 
and cattle, arrested nearly two dozen men engaged in illegal trade at the installation, and 
shot several thieves.39
                                                 
37 “Reports from Grayson Co., Texas,” in Letters Received Relating to Murders and Attempted 
Murders, 1869-1870, DoTx, RG 393. 
  Texans, however, seemed to place the lions’ share of the blame for 
38 Carl C. Rister, “Outlaws and Vigilantes of the Southern Plains, 1865-1885,” The Mississippi 
Valley Historical Review 19, no. 4 (March 1933), 541, 543. 
39 Clayton D. Laurie, “Filling the Breach: Military Aid to the Civil Power in the Trans-Mississippi 
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frontier violence on Indians and the army.  
Grierson was not immune from criticism either.  The Denton Monitor printed the 
following item on September 3, 1870, in the wake of the Kiowas’ surrendering the Koozer 
family at Fort Sill two weeks earlier.  According to the newspaper, the Indians had killed 
five white men, captured ninety mules, and then demanded rations at the fort.  The 
government agent, unnamed in the newspaper, refused to comply until the stolen animals 
were returned.  According to the paper, “The Indians replied that if rations were not given 
them, they would eat the white men.  Being intimidated by these threats, the government 
authorities, in order to save themselves, furnished the required eatables.”40
As damaging for misinformation as it is for the crude stereotype of Indians that it 
perpetuates, this editorial and others like it suggested to the reading public that federal 
Indian policy served little purpose.  Government authorities commanded no authority, and 
worse yet, they were cowed by threats and the very presence of Indian “savagery.”  The 
Texan contributors implied that federal assessments of Indians were wholly unrealistic; 
only settlers, experienced in dealing with Indians, could stop this scourge.  Residents of 
the northern Texas counties had “a very keen and painful sense of the savage visits made 
by the Quaker pets... supplied by the United States with arms, clothing, and rations.”
 
41
                                                                                                                                                 
West,” The Western Historical Quarterly 25, no. 2 (Summer 1994): 149, 155.  Even after Grierson and 
Tatum left Fort Sill for good in 1873, their successors realized quickly that many reports of Indian raids were 
false.  James A. Haworth, Tatum’s replacement, wrote to Cyrus Beede, Superintendent Enoch Hoag’s clerk, 
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Their opinions illustrate that Texans opposed a central aspect of Grant’s peace policy—the 
emphasis on the ability of religious organizations to best engineer Indian compliance with 
40Denton Monitor, 3 September 1870. 
41Austin State Weekly Journal, 28 April 1870. 
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Anglo-American demands.  Furthermore, the editorials also promote the idea that 
vigilante and militia efforts were best-suited at protecting Anglo-Americans from Indians.  
Texans’ obsession with Kiowa-Comanche “savagery,” coupled with their over-confidence 
in their own fighting capacity, suggests that militia responses would have been far more 
destructive than any operation undertaken by Grierson.          
Grierson’s report of August 19th, the day after the Kiowas surrendered the 
Koozers, stands in stark contrast to the exaggerated language used in the Texas 
newspapers.  As he had done before, Grierson would not issue rations until the family was 
returned.  He “emphatically refused any talk,” and told the Kiowas that no pay would be 
given to them.  Contradicting Grierson’s stance, the Quaker agent, Tatum, “concluded 
that under all the circumstances, something should be given... goods to the amount of $600 
which however will be deducted from the Kiowa annuities.  The colonel explained that he 
wanted to offset any chance that the Kiowas would profit from this enterprise.  As for 
Tatum’s decision, Grierson wrote, “I do not wish it to be understood that I censure Mr. 
Tatum... I know he did what he thought was for the best, but I do not think that anything 
should be given... Sooner or later, the Indians must be taught that no profit will accrue from 
their depredations.”42  Grierson avoided direct confrontation with the Kiowas, but he was 
clearly annoyed at Tatum’s willingness to undermine him.  One wonders whether the 
Kiowas were “practicing the same factional skills they used in intra-tribal squabbles” in 
taking advantage of Tatum’s misplaced generosity and Grierson’s reluctance.43
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43 William A. Dobak, “‘Our Most Reliable Friends’: Army Officers and Tribal Leaders in Western 
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Unlike the editorial in the Denton Monitor, Grierson’s report does not support the 
contention that white men were killed, or stock was stolen.  In fact, government mules 
were stolen in quantity only once in 1870.  On June 12th, 73 unserviceable animals were 
taken from the post corral.  The Kiowas would have most likely traded them or eaten them 
as a consequence of the loss of buffalo herds.  Eventually, over a third of the mules were 
returned by the Kiowas and recovered by a patrol commander, Captain Walsh.  Grierson 
and Tatum, then, did not make their decisions based on self-preservation.  The 
exaggerations made by the press were further exaggerated when they were reprinted in the 
eastern United States; in turn, this amplified both eastern humanitarian efforts and frontier 
settlers’ frustration.44
Some historians have argued that Grierson told officers to withhold information 
about raids in order to improve the public perception of the peace policy’s 
effectiveness—essentially, to give the policy a chance to succeed.  This is highly unlikely, 
given that Grierson’s correspondence is full of references to Kiowa and Comanche raids in 
Texas, as well as proof that he took action against the raids, even overstepping the 
regulations that prevented him from pursuing Indians off the reservation.  Texas 
newspaper editors were already well-aware of raids in their region, so Grierson would have 
no reason to cover up evidence of Indian depredations.
   
45
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  In the September 1870 issue of 
44For Indians’ use of horses as sustenance, see Pekka Hamalainen, “The Rise and Fall of Plains 
Indian Horse Cultures,” The Journal of American History 90, no. 3 (December 2003), 10. 
45 Wilbur S. Nye, Carbine and Lance: The Story of Old Fort Sill, 2nd ed. (Norman: University of 
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the Army and Navy Journal, a joint-service publication established during the Civil War, 
an anonymous author claimed that Grierson disapproved “of the Indian troubles here being 
made known to the public.”46
Although Texas newspapers did not often name Fort Sill as the place where Kiowa 
raiders took refuge, some members of the Texas legislature identified Grierson as the cause 
of their constituents’ discontent.  Since the spring of 1870, they sought to remove 
Grierson from his post.  Based on the report of an unidentified party, the legislators 
advocated Grierson’s dismissal.  His removal from command was proposed by a 
resolution of Senator Albert Jennings Fountain, who was the main proponent of the frontier 
protection bill to reactivate the Texas Rangers.
  The author also claimed that Grierson allowed Tatum to 
give rations and goods to the Kiowas in return for releasing captives, and claimed that 
Grierson did not allow subordinate officers to attend his councils with Kiowa and 
Comanche leaders.  Like any other army unit, the Tenth Cavalry had its own factions and 
internal disagreements, and it is likely that these false claims originated with individuals 
who opposed Grierson’s efforts to support the peace policy.      
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Quarterly 25, no. 3 (Autumn 1994), 313-38.   
  This had larger implications within the 
Grant administration as well, because the “growing militancy of those living in the Texas 
46 “From the Indian Territory,” Army and Navy Journal, 17 September 1870.  This item was sent 
to the author by William Dobak from the microfilm collections of the United States Army Center of Military 
History.    
47 Grierson to AAG, 20 July 1870, DoM, LR, RG 393.   
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Panhandle came at a time when the state of Texas was able to force the federal government 
to rethink its policies.”  When Governor Edmund J. Davis, a Republican, organized seven 
new ranger companies, he insinuated that Texans would no longer rely on the army for 
protection.48
In his rebuttal of the committee’s charges, Grierson insisted that he had no control 
over annuity issues, which were Tatum’s sole responsibility instead.  His orders forbade 
him from interfering with Indians on the reservations, and he was not obligated to follow 
them beyond post limits.  Regardless, he had sent troops in pursuit of Indians as well as 
kept a series of patrols on the south side of the Red River.  Grierson wrote that he had 
“done all in his power to protect the Texas border from depredations by both Indians and 
white marauders... returned horses and mules stolen from citizens of Texas by Indians, and 
returned to the Indians... horses stolen from them by thieves from Texas.”  Furthermore, 
most white thieves were “disguised as Indians... the obvious suggestion presents itself that, 
while the Legislature is taking measures to protect their border from marauding Indians, 
they should also [suppress] the organized gangs of white thieves who infest their state and 
steal alike from Indians, citizens, and the Government.”
  This put Grierson in the uncomfortable position of defending himself if he 
was to retain his command.  It should be noted that in proposing that Grierson should be 
removed from command, the Texas legislature said nothing about Grierson’s alleged 
silence about Indian raids, and in his response to the Texans, Grierson made bold 
statements about his willingness to track down warriors who did raid. 
49
                                                 
48Gary Clayton Anderson, The Conquest of Texas: Ethnic Cleansing in the Promised Land, 
1820-1875 (Norman: University of Oklahoma, 2005), 353. 
  In his letter, he declared 
49Grierson to AAG, 20 July 1870, DoM, LR, RG 393.  Grierson’s letter to his higher headquarters 
is rather cryptic.  He refers to himself in the third person for the entire letter, refers to the Texas legislature 
several times, and only identifies Senator Fountain once, at the very end of the letter.  He does not identify 
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Prohibited by orders from interfering with Indians, while on the rez, and not even obliged to follow 
them beyond its limits, unless called upon by the Agent, the CO has nevertheless repeatedly sent 
troops in pursuit of Indians and kept them patrolling the south side of Red River with orders to 
attack any Indians found off their reserve, talking upon himself the responsibility of such action in 
view of the emergency.  Notice has also been sent upon learning the departure of any raiding parties 
of Indians... to enable the military authorities and citizens of Texas to take steps to punish them.  
The CO has done all in his power to protect the Texas border from depredations by both Indians and 
white marauders.  He has returned upwards of 50 horses and mules stolen from the citizens of 
Texas by Indians, and returned to Indians 50 or more head, stolen from them by thieves from Texas, 
and during the last eighteen months his command captured and returned upwards of 200 horses and 
mules, stolen by persons from Texas... some twenty thieves, and whiskey dealers, and killed a 
number who resisted the troops... Many of these desperadoes are disguised as Indians... the obvious 
suggestion presents itself that, while the Legislature is taking measures to protect their border from 
marauding Indians, they should also devise some means for suppressing the organized gangs of 
white thieves, who infest their state, and steal alike from Indians, citizens, and the Government.50
 
   
The curious subject of whites’ duplicity received little attention from the vocal 
Texas newspapermen.  If white Texans stole so predominantly from Indians and whites 
alike as Grierson charged, then Texas newspapers failed to comment.  As Colin Calloway 
argues, Anglo-American society “sought to protect its assumed racial and cultural purity 
and viewed with suspicion individuals who moved between two worlds.”  In the late 
eighteenth century, when the boundaries between the white and Indian worlds were most 
tenuous, “accepted wisdom held that cultural interaction was much more likely to produce 
an individual who personified the worst of both worlds.”51
                                                                                                                                                 
(and probably did not know) the identity of the person who provided the Texans with the negative report 
about Fort Sill.  I have been unable to find any further evidence about this incident in the primary sources at 
present.  One thing is clear—Grierson felt that he was under attack from Fountain and Texas politicians over 
the issue of Kiowa-Comanche raids.  The Leckies’ biography of Grierson, which is the best source available, 
does not mention the 20 July 1870 letter or Senator Fountain.   
  These fears did not diminish 
during the settlement of Texas in the 1820s, and throughout the nineteenth century.  The 
need for group defense can be seen as a bid for social preservation.  Men would be less apt 
to feel the inducements of the wilderness if they interacted and challenged Indians as a 
group.  By protecting their communities through voluntary and non-regulated militias, 
50 Ibid. 
51Colin G. Calloway, “Neither White nor Red: White Renegades on the American Indian Frontier,” 
The Western Historical Quarterly 17, no. 1 (January 1986): 49. 
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such as Ranger groups, they actively contributed to their own security.  If they let the U.S. 
Army take full responsibility for them, they would abrogate their own rights to Texan 
sovereignty and their pride.  Their failure to ensure order in Texas since its settlement was 
also compounded by the mythic status of the pioneer.  In order to justify the state’s chaos, 
they persisted with the myth of the “embattled” Texan.  However, Texans were hindered 
by more than their own hubris.  Like the military and the Bureau of Indian Affairs, they 
failed to understand plains political economy and the economic and cultural imperatives of 
raiding.52
Intertribal warfare on the plains, as John Ewers has argued, can be read as a 
precursor to interracial conflict.  In this sense, Kiowa-Comanche raids on whites were 
modifications of their original political economy.  Instead of attacking other Indians’ 
source of prestige, wealth, and food, they went after Texans.  Prior to the 1840s, horse 
herding and trade involved southern tribes in raids “with neighboring sedentary groups... 
although ingrained in the male warrior cult, raiding was... primarily an act of resource 
extraction.”  As white settlement forced them to change their political economy, 
factionalism increased along with raids on pioneers.
  
53
Furthermore, Texans had unrealistic expectations for frontier defense.  They lived 
on homesteads miles apart from each other, but they expected that the army, or alternately, 
their fellow Texans, would be able to interrupt raids.  An item in the Austin State Weekly 
Journal claimed that “no warfare against them, unless it be annihilation, will check this 
   
                                                 
52Anderson, Conquest of Texas, 15, 244. 
53 John C. Ewers, “Intertribal Warfare as the Precursor of Indian-White Warfare on the Northern 
Great Plains,” The Western Historical Quarterly 6, no. 4 (October 1975): 397-410. Hamalainen, “Horse 
Cultures,” 8. 
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inherent natural propensity” of the Indian for theft.  The author suggested that ranger 
volunteers should be “well armed, well mounted, and well paid.”  The units’ procedures 
were as follows: settlers would raise the alert at a nearby station, “and within forty eight 
hours” the company would be on the Indians’ trail “until the scoundrels are overtaken and 
killed.”  These rangers would not require forts or supply depots; they would be able to 
react quickly to changing situations; and, without any authoritative oversight, they would 
kill Indians without criticism.  Challenges to these plans were rare; an article on March 15, 
1870 challenged the ranger system, as the “demoralizing effect” of the Civil War would 
make potential Rangers violent enough, but difficult to depend on.54
The letter of James M. Waide of Denton, Texas, of 13 September 1870, represents 
the kind of suspicions that civilians had of Grierson and his line officers.  Although the 
letter was addressed to President Grant, it was relayed through Grierson’s post adjutant; 
after the Executive Secretary forwarded it to the Department of Texas, it was referred to the 
commanding officer of Fort Richardson, Texas.  Though Grierson did not directly 
respond to the letter, he was probably aware of it; at any rate, he would have been familiar 
with its tone and contents, and his own reports to higher headquarters are similar to that of 
Fort Richardson’s commanding officer. 
     
Like many of the people affected by operations out of Fort Sill, Waide lived close 
to the Texas border—twenty miles south of the Red River.  He had moved to Texas in 
1861 to farm and raise horses.  His brother-in-law was captured, scalped, and supposedly 
burned to death by native warriors in October 1868.  His letter does not suggest what 
                                                 
54“The Frontier: How to protect it and at what cost,” Austin State Weekly Journal, 26 May 1870; 
“Frontier Defense: Our frontier bleeds while US senators cut fantastic tricks,” Austin State Weekly Journal, 
15 March 1870. 
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prompted him to write to the President two years later, but his anger at the government is 
readily apparent.  He detailed the deaths of several Texan men, the capture of their 
families, and the seizure of over 4,000 horses since 1868.55
Waide’s appraisal of federal Indian policy identified what many citizens must have 
seen as an obvious gap between army leaders’ abilities and their prosecution of Indians.  
Waide questioned why depredations were increasing when two Civil War veterans, 
William T. Sherman and Philip H. Sheridan, commanded the Army and the division that 
included Texas.  He pointed at a fundamental hypocrisy too – Indians were protected and 
even armed by the government (or through its neglect of illegal arms trading), but seldom 
punished for raiding.  Waide’s suggestion that “blood means blood” was echoed by 
contributors to the local Texas papers.
   
56
Texas civilians were not alone in focusing on Grierson’s command.  His fellow 
army officers also opposed his approach to federal Indian policy and his close association 
with Tatum, a representative of the most peaceful sect of Eastern humanitarian reformers.  
In 1871, the Sixth Cavalry at Fort Richardson, Texas, was replaced by the Fourth Cavalry, 
under the command of Ranald Slidell Mackenzie.  Mackenzie was known among Kiowa 
and Comanche as ‘Bad Hand’ for disfigurement he sustained during the Civil War.  He 
conducted raids outside of government authority and razed at least three Indian 
encampments in Mexico.
   
57
                                                 
55J.M. Waide to Headquarters, Fort Sill, 13 September 1870, DoM, LR, RG 393.  See also Frances 
Simpson Abelson and Rheba Rippey Marshall, “Bolivar, Texas–A History,” courtesy of Denton County 
Historical Commission. 
  Captain Robert Goldwaithe Carter, a company commander 
with Mackenzie’s Fourth Cavalry, had choice words for Grierson.    
56 Ibid. 
57Utley, Frontier Regulars, 209, 346-50. 
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Carter was among the officers who went so far as to believe that Grierson and the 
Indian agent were providing arms and aid to the Kiowas.  (Colonel James Oakes, 
commanding the Sixth Cavalry at Fort Richardson in 1870, falsely claimed that Grierson 
and Tatum issued repeating rifles to the Indians).  The captain participated in a joint 
operation with Mackenzie’s forces and Grierson’s Tenth Cavalry, pursuing the Kiowa 
leader Kicking Bird through Texas and back to Indian Territory in October 1871.  
(Although Kicking Bird was the leading proponent of the peace faction, he also 
participated in raids to maintain his authority among the Kiowas as a whole).  Carter 
believed that Grierson was a member of the “Indian Ring.”  This group of government 
officials was said to manipulate the Indians through sympathetic treatment, and profited 
illegally from annuity payments and bribes of frontier post traders.58
Carter wrote that the Indian Ring “sent an order to Grierson to assume command of 
both columns, as long as the Fourth Cavalry was in Indian Territory, to hold Mackenzie in 
check. … This accounted for Kicking Bird’s getting into Sill so hastily when later we were 
so close to his village…  Grierson [was] under positive orders [from the Indian Ring] to 
avoid war… [and] sent Horace P. Jones, his interpreter, to warn Kicking Bird to get in 
without notifying Mackenzie.”
  
59
Carter saw this as “one of the most wily and diplomatic ‘side steps’ and ‘double 
crosses’  …. Grierson had slyly anticipated all our plans and wants by warning Kicking 
Bird of our approach.”  Certainly, Grierson’s correspondence with his superiors suggests 
   
                                                 
58 Robert G. Carter, Pursuit of Kicking Bird: A Campaign in the Texas Badlands (Washington 
D.C., Gibson Brothers, 1920), 21, 27, 37, 43.  See Leckie, Unlikely Warriors, 176-77, 190-92.  Annual 
Report of the Secretary of War (1870).  Hutton argues that “the episode reflected Sherman’s confidence” in 
Grierson, as he had ordered Mackenzie not to move into Indian Territory without orders from Grierson, 
238-39. 
59 Ibid. 
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that he tended to have a solid, honest relationship with the Kiowa leader, and took seriously 
Kicking Bird’s assessments of his own people’s unhappiness.  However, it seems 
improbable that Grierson benefitted from any kind of collusion with the Bureau of Indian 
Affairs, given his family’s constant financial trouble.  Moreover, federal policy, and 
therefore all army installations by extension, were aimed at preventing a general war in the 
southwest.  But because Grierson’s position towards Indians and his appraisal of Texans’ 
crimes had damaged his reputation, Sheridan transferred him from Fort Sill to the eastern 
Indian Territory post of Fort Gibson.60
Grierson summarized his own position on borderland tension and his 
responsibility: “An officer can have no policy of his own, but is simply required to obey 
without questioning, the orders of his superiors.”  The pattern of depredations was 
accepted by all parties concerned, but “its dimensions were open to debate” at the time.  
What was the extent of the actual depredations, and who were the principal participants?  
Which government policy–military force or accommodation–would prove more effective, 
and which would appease a greater number of American citizens?
   
61
Grierson took part in this debate in two ways.  While he privately averred his 
support for the peace policy, he enforced federal policy at Fort Sill and the Kiowa Agency, 
refusing to negotiate as his predecessors had done.  Grierson was no blind advocate of 
army policy; he believed that Custer had exaggerated the number of Indian men killed at 
the Washita massacre in 1868, discounting women and children.  To Lawrie Tatum, 
Grierson promised “to pursue such a course as to control the Indians and prevent 
   
                                                 
60Ibid. and Grierson to John Kirk, 4 March 1869, Grierson Papers, Edward Ayer Collection, 
Newberry Library, Chicago. 
61 Grierson to John Kirk, 4 March 1869, Grierson Papers, Edward Ayer Collection, Newberry 
Library, Chicago. 
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depredations without losing sight of the object contemplated by the philanthropic good 
people of this land without bringing on a war for the purpose of gaining an opportunity of 
killing off Indians. ... I will do only what I believe to be just and right even at a sacrifice of 
my position and commission in the army.”62
Grierson also acknowledged that both Indians and the government shared 
complicity in the policy’s failures, but was convinced that “judicious management,” the 
Kiowa and Comanche would cease to trouble the government.
   
63   Clearly Grierson had 
established himself as proponent of peace rather than war.  More than anything, he 
advocated the fair treatment of reservation Indians: “Without strait [sic] forward 
manliness, generosity and integrity the case is hopeless.”64
                                                 
62 Utley, Frontier Regulars, 209. For the Washita massacre, see Jerome A. Greene, Washita: The 
U.S. Army and the Southern Cheyennes, 1867-1869 (Norman: University of Oklahoma, 2004), 136.  
Grierson to Lawrie Tatum, 30 September 1869, Letters and Documents, Grierson Papers, Edward Ayer 
Collection, Newberry Library, Chicago. Emphasis is Grierson’s.   
  However, the situation at Fort 
Sill in the early 1870s demonstrates that the federal government did little to seek peaceful 
remedies to problems to which Grierson, unlike many of his peers, was alert. 
63Grierson to AAG, 31 October 1869, DoM, LR, RG 393.  See also Hutton, Phil Sheridan and His 
Army, 230-34.  
64 Leckie, Unlikely Warriors, 163. 
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CHAPTER FOUR:  The Problem of the Black Hills 
 
Despite the unproven and elusive promises of the gold regions of the frontier, 
Anglo-Americans moved westward, drawn by the idea of the possibilities there.  “GOLD, 
SILVER, COPPER, IRON, COAL, AND IMMENSE FORESTS OF PINE!”  These were 
the terms in which the Black Hills were sold to the American public and the adventure 
seekers.  The Black Hills had been the subject of great curiosity since the end of the Civil 
War, but the 1868 Treaty of Fort Laramie forbade white men from entering the region.  
When Custer’s 1874 expedition found gold in small quantities, rumors alone propelled 
men west.  By 1875, there was an unmistakable Anglo-American presence in and around 
the mountains.  Travelers would see the dark, shaggy mountains looming up from the 
foothills at night, bristling with enormous trees that could be four feet wide and over 
eighty feet tall.  Within the hills themselves there were herds of buffalo and pronghorn 
antelope, wide, clear lakes, and broad tall-grass pastures.  Arable farm land had 
stimulated Anglo-American emigration into the trans-Mississippi West since the 1840s, 
but the immediacy of mineral resources proved even more attractive.   
Emigration companies promised that thousands of prospectors would find enough 
“precious ore to overflow their buckskin bags, and make their hearts rejoice in the 
contemplation of better days.”1
                                                            
1 Lawrence K. Fox, "Gold Discovery," typescript, n.d., Lawrence K. Fox Papers, State Archives, 
South Dakota State Historical Society, Pierre.  Fox was a state historian and succeeded Doane Robinson.  
Peter B. Davy, “Capt. Davy’s Expedition,” (Blue Earth City, Minn., 1868), 13, 15, Minnesota Historical 
Society, Minneapolis.   
  However, men would not be mining American soil — 
they wanted to invade the territory of the sovereign Lakota nation.  The United States 
Army, placed between the Lakota and the whites, was tasked with keeping the miners out 
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of the Black Hills.  This objective was based on the 1868 Treaty of Fort Laramie, which 
guaranteed Lakota possession of the region.  Army officers in the Department of Dakota 
contended with the growing number of prospectors who clamored to be let into the Black 
Hills.2
Although army officers had not reached a consensus on their approach to the 
“Indian problem,” some of them were surprisingly equitable in responding to abuses of 
the Fort Laramie treaty, and their willingness to follow the law reflected a limited but 
conscious effort to support Lakota rights.  Army officers eventually failed to stem 
emigration to the Black Hills, for they found themselves hampered by the contradictory 
demands of the American public and federal authorities.  Civilians clamored for 
protection from Indians; the government fomented anger and resentment among native 
people by failing to keep its promises to them.  Furthermore, officers approached native 
people inconsistently, defending their actions but then damning them.  While many 
officers recognized that the Lakota had legitimate complaints, they failed to grasp 
changes in the Lakota polity that would affect their own mission.  Similar problems had 
  While the army succeeded in keeping these men out of Lakota territory until early 
1875, the miners’ very presence threatened the treaty’s validity and put the army in a 
tenuous position.  At the same time that army officers prevented emigrants from entering 
the region, the Lakota people sought to retain their autonomy, sovereignty, and power as 
an imperial force.  Their use of diplomacy and intimidation of Anglo-Americans on 
Indian terms reflects their understanding of the power of negotiation, their recognition of 
the dynamics of power on the frontier, and their ability to shape the struggle for 
dominance in the West.   
                                                            
2 David Sloane Stanley to Alfred Howe Terry, 19 May 1868, Middle District, Department of 
Dakota, Letters Sent, RG 393.  (Hereafter cited as DoDak, LS, and LR for Letters Received).  Stanley to 
Francis A. Walker, 16 March 1872, Middle District, DoDak, LS, RG 393.   
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plagued army officers after the 1862 Dakota revolt in Minnesota; they would find 
themselves facing many of the same issues in the Black Hills.    
Many illegal prospectors had spilled out of Minnesota in the wake of the 1862 
conflict.  Their travels were encouraged by men in the emigration business who bragged 
of rich placer diggings in places like Montana, as well as large tracts of farm land that 
were available throughout the Great Plains.3  Among these entrepreneurs was Captain 
P.B. Davy, who claimed to have led a successful expedition overland from Minnesota to 
Montana in 1867.  He organized another expedition to start in June of 1868, drumming 
up support with a promotional piece that exhorted the “thriving and energetic people” of 
the west to “bring to light the weight of her slumbering wealth.”4  Davy, a Civil War 
veteran, promised to guide civilians safely to the Black Hills; if they traveled in large 
enough numbers, they could make sure that no Indians interfered with them.5  General 
William Tecumseh Sherman, commanding general of the army, forbade the expedition on 
the grounds that civilians would clamor for protection which the army was not in a 
position to provide.6
                                                            
3 Francis McGee Thompson, promotional material, 26 July 1865, Special Collections, Montana 
Historical Society, Helena. 
  Despite the failure of Davy’s expedition, people continued to move 
into the region.  Yankton and Vermillion, two towns on the Missouri River, grew out of 
trading posts established in 1858, and Yankton became a popular place of assembly for 
those heading to the Black Hills.  Implicit in promotional literature were long-held 
assumptions about native people; they knew nothing about the mineral wealth in their 
4 James S. Foster, Outlines of history of the Territory of Dakota (Yankton, Dakota Territory: 
M’Intyre & Foster, Printers, 1870), 36. 
5 Andrew Osland, a member of the expedition complained of Davy’s draconian treatment and poor 
provisioning of the expedition members.  Andrew Osland letter, 19 October 1867, Special Collections, 
Montana Historical Society, Helena. 
6 George Kingsbury, History of Dakota Territory (Chicago: S.J. Clark Publishing Company, 
1915), 1:863.  Doane Robinson, “History of Sioux Indians,” South Dakota Historical Collections 
(Aberdeen, S.D.: News Printing Co., 1904), 1:115.   
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territory - at least not enough to appreciate it or make intelligent decisions about 
exploiting it.  Only Anglo-Americans, circulars suggested, were industrious enough to 
cultivate the wealth there.   
 Yet for native people, the Black Hills and other lands had meanings beyond 
access to material gain.  When the federal government attempted to negotiate for the Hills 
in 1875, Red Cloud argued that his creator had given the mountains to the Lakota people; 
the Black Hills were worth more than “all the wild beasts and the tame beasts” under 
Anglo-American control.7  Neither federal authorities nor civilians would have 
understood the spiritual and status-based significance of his declaration.  Native people 
saw animals as sources of wisdom and skill; when a warrior accrued personal wealth in 
the form of buffalo horses and war horses, he heightened his status in his community by 
perhaps giving a talented horse as a gift to someone else.  Without the horse, Plains 
people would have been hard pressed to achieve mobility, hunt buffalo in numbers, or 
engage in successful warfare.8
                                                            
7 Doane Robinson, “History of the Sioux Indians,” South Dakota Historical Collections 
(Aberdeen, S.D.: News Printing Co., 1904), 2: 419.  For a fairly recent biography of Red Cloud, see Robert 
W. Larson, Red Cloud: Warrior-Statesman of the Lakota Sioux (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 
1997). 
  For the Lakota, horses were allies and friends; their 
willingness to let themselves be tamed was a signal of generosity.  Buffalo, too, 
expressed their generosity toward human beings by allowing themselves to be killed for 
use as sustenance.  In contrast, for many Anglo-Americans, buffalo were valuable only 
for their hides, tongues, and bones; horses were beasts of burden who endured daily 
abuse.  The fight over the Black Hills rested on similar terms of mutual incomprehension.   
8 Emil Her Many Horses and George P. Horse Capture, eds. A Song for the Horse Nation: Horses 
in Native American Cultures (Golden, Colo.: Fulcrum Publishing, 2006), 5. Gary Clayton Anderson, Sitting 
Bull: The Paradox of Lakota Sioux Nationhood (New York: Harper Collins College Publishers, 1996), 38. 
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 Many frontier military historians have not engaged the issue of native 
sovereignty; Robert Utley, for instance, has argued that the Sioux and the government 
entered negotiation on uneven terms, and the latter almost always dominated.  If “none of 
the tribes more than remotely resembled the independent sovereignties, masters of their 
own destiny,” then how can one explain their ability to circumvent Anglo-American 
designs on native land in a variety of ways, and better yet explain Lakota references to 
themselves as sovereign nations?  Current literature on Indians and empire seeks to 
overturn these older arguments.  The signing of the 1868 Fort Laramie treaty 
demonstrated that Lakota leaders sought to surmount not only differences among 
themselves, but also sought to build coalitions with other Plains people, even their rivals.9
 In the aftermath of the 1862 Dakota War, the government sought to cement peace 
treaties with native people throughout the Great Plains.  All the treaties bore great 
similarity to one another—native people agreed to maintain peaceful relationships with 
Anglo-Americans, pursue the goals of assimilation, and, most significantly, prevent other 
Indians from attacking American civilians and government forces. Native people were to 
  
Men like Spotted Tail and Red Cloud made serious attempts to retain their hold on their 
land and often united to preserve their security despite disagreement.   
                                                            
9 Robert M. Utley, Frontier Regulars: The United States Army and the Indian, 1866-1891 
(Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1973), 7.  For a more balanced argument on native sovereignty, see 
Jeffrey Ostler, The Plains Sioux and U.S. Colonialism from Lewis and Clark to Wounded Knee, vol. 7 in 
Studies in North American Indian History, eds. Frederick Hoxie and  Neal Salisbury (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), 48.  For Indians and empire, see Pekka Hämäläinen, The Comanche 
Empire (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2008); some reviewers note that this book resurrects 
Eurocentric notions of empire first developed by historians of the Comanches in the 1940s.  See the review 
by Dan Flores in Montana: The Magazine of Western History 59, no. 4 (Winter 2009).  Unfortunately, there 
is little discussion of native sovereignty in the literature published by respected military historians 
(including Paul Andrew Hutton, Robert Wooster, Sherry Smith, and Michael Tate).  Noted exceptions are 
Jerome Greene and R. Eli Paul, both of whom rely heavily on native sources.  As Sherry Smith noted in a 
review essay in 1998, military historians “have been slow to incorporate… a prominent place for Indian 
perspectives.” See Sherry L. Smith, “Lost Soldiers: Re-Searching the Army in the American West,” The 
Western Historical Quarterly 29, no. 2 (Summer 1998), 152.   
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“obligate and bind themselves individually and collectively, not only to cease all 
hostilities against the persons and property of its citizens, but to use their influence, and, 
if necessary, physical force, to prevent other bands… from making hostile 
demonstrations against the Government of the United States or its people.”10
 Such demands show the subjective and even illusory nature of federal authorities’ 
expectations in treaty proceedings.  To begin with, each of these treaties required that 
Plains Indians move to reservations which did not yet exist in their late nineteenth-
century form.  Yet agents at these reservations exercised little power over native people 
until the postwar period, and were even then responsible for little more than distributing 
annuity goods and attempting to track bands’ movements.  Indian agents’ reports also 
attest to the fact that they struggled to provide for starving bands of Sioux in the 
immediate postwar period, yet perhaps their greatest obstacle lay in their inability to 
appreciate the nuances of native culture and society.
  
11
 Lakota communities were made up of tiyospaye—extended families that are 
linked by language, culture, and ethnic heritage.  These groups constitute the basic social 
and political unit of Lakota society.  The tiyospaye that appeared ‘local’ to agents in fact 
   
                                                            
10 Charles J. Kappler, ed. Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties, vol. 2 (Washington D.C.: 
Government Printing Office, 1904).  For example, the treaties made with the Cheyenne and Arapaho, 890; 
the Blackfeet, 898; and the various Sioux bands, 883, 885, 896, 899, 901, 903, 905, 907.   
11 Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to the Secretary of the Interior for the 
Year 1866  (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1866), 209.   The Upper Platte Agency, established 
in 1846, bore responsibility for overseeing the groups mentioned.    The agency moved from the vicinity of 
Fort Laramie and the North Platte to Whetstone Creek, a tributary of the Missouri River.  In 1869 the 
agency was renamed Whetstone, and responsible for Spotted Tail’s band of Brulé Lakota, and also Oglala 
and Minneconjou Lakotas.  In 1871 the agency relocated again, to the White River on the Dakota-Nebraska 
border, was renamed Spotted Tail Agency in 1874, and was finally moved to its present location and 
renamed the Rosebud.  Red Cloud’s Agency fell under the aegis of the Upper Platte Agency until 1871, 
when it was established as a separate agency.  The agency was moved again in the fall of 1873, as well as 
in years thereafter, until it was established as the contemporary Pine Ridge in 1878.   South Dakota State 
Historical Society, Indian Archives Project, Finding Aid.  Robert W. Larson, Red Cloud: Warrior-
Statesmen of the Lakota Sioux, vol. 13 of the Oklahoma Western Biographies series (Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press), 152-53. 
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migrated to summer and winter camps, moving “in relation to the [buffalo] herds in a 
definite pattern.”12
 Tribal lands came under the scrutiny of the Board of Indian Commissioners in 
July of 1867 in response to the widespread violence that had racked the frontier in the last 
four years.  Starting in 1863, Lakota warriors attacked miners traveling from Fort 
Laramie to Bozeman, Montana, on the Bozeman Trail.  The next year, the government 
sent a physician to vaccinate native people in the Southern plains, yet the governor of 
Colorado threatened to exterminate some of those same people.
  Multiple tiyospayes were linked in a flexible system of seasonal 
interaction, marriage, and alliances occasioned by their given needs.  However, the 
federal government lacked the armed power and financial resources to force significant 
numbers of Indians on to reservations, much less make native people stay within set 
geographical boundaries.  As a result, the United States turned to ever-increasing land 
cessions after the Civil War as a means of confining native people on reservations, 
controlling them, and seizing their land.    
13
                                                            
12 James R. Walker, Lakota Society, ed. Raymond J. DeMallie (Lincoln: University of Nebraska 
Press, 1992) 3-4, 89; Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz, “Indian Political Economy,” in The Great Sioux Nation : An 
Oral History of the Sioux Nation and its Struggle for Sovereignty, ed. Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz (New York: 
Random House and the American Indian Treaty Council, 1977), 68.   
  In the winter of 1864, 
Colorado civilians formed a volunteer militia under John M. Chivington and brutally 
murdered many members of Black Kettle’s Cheyenne and Arapaho band at Sand Creek.  
In the spring of 1866, the federal government sought a council at Fort Laramie so that 
Anglo-Americans could obtain permission to pass through the Powder River country.  
Red Cloud, the Oglala leader, discovered that American troops, tasked to build three forts 
13 J. Diane Pearson, “Lewis Cass and the Politics of Disease: The Indian Vaccination Act of 
1832,” Wicazo Sa Review 18, no. 2 (Autumn 2003): 28. 
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in the region, had already occupied native land.  He left the council promising to resist 
any Anglo-American incursions into Lakota-claimed territory.14
 Red Cloud and other Oglala warriors harassed the troops throughout the hot, dry 
summer and prevented them from escorting civilian expeditions to Montana and Idaho.  
That winter, Captain William J. Fetterman, who bragged that he could ride through the 
entire Sioux Nation with eighty men, died in a Lakota ambush.  Federal authorities 
supported plans to improve the Bozeman Trail, also known as the Powder River road, yet 
Lakotas and their northern Cheyenne and Arapaho allies effectively closed the road 
throughout 1867.
   
15  They halted further Anglo-American traffic, but civilians could reach 
Montana and the Dakotas through other routes.  Montana residents also retaliated against 
the Lakota without restraint.  One man wrote that leading citizens in Virginia City were 
raising militia units and “killing everything the shape of Indians they meet” in return for a 
scalp bounty of two hundred dollars and “everything in the shape of plunder” that they 
could find, including ponies and buffalo robes.16
 Red Cloud’s War, as the daring joint raids and assaults came to be called, earned 
Lakota warriors prestige and influence.  However, the army failed to mount an offensive; 
missions led by General Winfield S. Hancock and George Armstrong Custer could not 
even secure railroad workers, supply depots, or stage lines from Sioux attack.
  
17
                                                            
14 Utley, Frontier Regulars, 135. 
  Anglo-
American assumptions about the war’s causes alternately placed the blame on frontier 
residents and, much less deservedly, native people.  An article in Harper’s Weekly 
15 Dennis Driscoll Reminiscences, 3 October 1913, Special Collections, Montana Historical 
Society, Helena. 
16 Francis Elliot to father, May 1867, Francis Elliot Letters, Special Collections, Montana 
Historical Society, Helena. 
17 Utley, Frontier Regulars, 100, 119, 125. 
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declared that “[f]or several years past the settlers of Colorado and Kansas have been 
desirous of driving their Indian neighbors from their reservations in those Territories; 
they sought and made opportunities for war, and have persistently forced that issue on the 
Indians.”18
 The spaces contested by the Lakota during Red Cloud’s War illustrate one of the 
fundamental ways in which army officers and government officials failed to see native 
sovereignty.  In order to best understand this failure, an explanation of sovereignty vis-à-
vis federal treaties is in order.  The Lakota fought not only within the boundaries of 
Lakota land, but also Crow land that had been granted to that tribe in the first Fort 
Laramie treaty of September 1851.  That year, Sioux, Cheyenne, Crow, Arikara, and 
Shoshone people had gathered to meet the federal government in council and left with re-
defined boundaries assigned to their territories.  Anglo-Americans also promised to give 
the Lakota a wide berth if they stayed north of the Platte River and allowed emigrants to 
travel on the Oregon Trail without interference.  The treaty ostensibly recognized Lakota 
sovereignty over sixty million acres, extending west from the Missouri River to the Black 
Hills, and from the Platte River north to the Heart River.   But the government made 
ambiguous promises to more than one party, hoping to increase the leverage which the 
United States had over native people.   
   
 For instance, the Crow, whose relationship with the Lakota was often tenuous, 
received the Powder River territory that was also claimed by the Lakota.  This area 
included the Bighorn, Tongue, Powder and Rosebud rivers—essentially the northern half 
of Wyoming and southern half of Montana, nearly forty million acres.  Federal 
authorities probably hoped to increase the hostility between the Lakota and Crow, the 
                                                            
18 “The Indian War,” Harper’s Weekly, 15 June 1867, 371. 
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potential for which was already created by the imbalance of the Crows’ ownership of rich 
horse herds that were targeted by neighboring Indian communities.19  Anglo-Americans 
did not approach the Lakota, or any other native people, as a truly sovereign nation.  One 
senior leader in the army, for instance, argued that the United States had to establish its 
dominance in councils or continue the risk of losing to the Sioux in unconventional 
warfare.  “To dictate terms to an enemy it is necessary to establish power. . . . It is better 
to make peace than to continue a war feebly conducted.”20
 Federal authorities came to realize that the elective, decentralized nature of 
Lakota society would not facilitate the treaty process.  Therefore, they asked the Sioux to 
choose representatives who would speak for the entire nation.  But the Lakota lived by 
consensus. Members of the tiyospaye chose leaders who had distinguished themselves by 
their combat skills, eloquence, generosity, and other characteristics by which they, as a 
prominent Indian historian has noted, “best represented the idea of what it was, as is, to 
be Lakota” and “carried out the collective mind, the collective wishes,” of his 
tiyospaye.
 
21
                                                            
19 Ostler, The Plains Sioux, 37-38.  Indian Life on the Upper Missouri, ed. John C. Ewers, vol. 89 
of The Civilization of the American Indian series (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1968; reprint, 
Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1988): 21, 144-46.  Frederick E. Hoxie, Parading through 
History: The Making of the Crow Nation in America, 1805-1935 (Cambridge University Press, 1995), 42. 
Rodney Frey, The World of the Crow Indians: As Driftwood Lodges, vol. 185 of The Civilization of the 
American Indian series (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1987), 28-29.   
  Even then, not all members agreed with community decisions.  Still, 
Americans interpreted the fluid Sioux polity as proof that native people lacked true 
political institutions and interests.  Indian agent John Burbank believed that the Lakota 
chose their leaders “in proportion to their powers in the field and in the chase . . . as soon 
20 “Statement of General Hancock Before the Indian Peace Commission,” 12 August 1867, in 
Proceedings of the Great Peace Commission of 1867-1868 (Washington: Institute for the Development of 
Indian Law, 1975), 13. 
21 Father Peter Powell, “The Sacred Way,” in The Great Sioux Nation, 63. 
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as any band of Indians abandon the war path . . . their chiefs lose their influence.”22
 Most significantly, the treaty of 1851 stated that the Plains’ nations would “not 
abandon or prejudice any rights or claims they may have to other lands.”
  This 
primitive reading of sophisticated native societies meant that Americans often 
underestimated their Indian foes.    
23  This 
equivocal language was meant to satisfy competing claims on a superficial level and 
spare federal authorities the trouble of addressing native concerns in great depth.  Like 
the later provisions in the 1865 treaties which exhorted native people to prevent attacks 
on whites, the 1851 treaty ostensibly supported conflicting native land claims while it 
fomented intertribal violence in reality.  There was little reason for the Lakota to give the 
Crow unanimous control of valuable hunting territory in 1851.  Red Cloud’s War of 1866 
can be seen as an extension of this Lakota agenda, in which warriors not only resisted 
Anglo-American encroachment, but simultaneously bid for control of enemy territory.  
As a result of this second Treaty of Fort Laramie, the government whittled away the 
Crow Reservation to one-fifth of its original size.24
                                                            
22 John A. Burbank to Ely S. Parker, 1 October 1869, Dakota Superintendency, Report of the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs to the Secretary of the Interior for the Year 1870 (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1870), 305.    
  This land was set apart for the 
“absolute and undisturbed use” of the Crow.  Indeed, in 1876 Crow scouts would help 
guide Custer to the joint Lakota-Cheyenne-Arapaho encampment on the Little Bighorn 
River, deep within Crow territory, with the obvious intention of expelling Lakota 
enemies.  These tensions illustrate the government’s often willful ignorance of native 
political interests and the ironic ways in which this ignorance later plagued federal 
23 Kappler, Indian Affairs, 2:595. 
24 Landmark Indian Law Cases, National Indian Law Library, American Association of Law 
Libraries Series No. 65 (Buffalo, N.Y: Wm. S. Hein Publishing, 2002), 401.   
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authorities.  The 1868 Treaty of Fort Laramie—the most influential and destructive treaty 
in the span of American and Lakota relations—was no exception.   
 In 1868, the recently-formed Indian Peace Commission convinced Spotted Tail 
and other native leaders, including Swift Bear, Iron Shell, and Man that Walks Under the 
Ground, to meet them at Fort Laramie.  There they signed a major treaty that designated 
Lakota territory as the “Great Sioux Reservation.”  The federal government promised that 
the Lakota would command all of South Dakota west of the Missouri River and the 
Lakota would also retain their rights to hunt adjacent lands in northwestern Nebraska, 
eastern Wyoming, and southeastern Montana.  Native people balked at the construction 
of the Union Pacific Railroad, which ran along the Platte and cut directly through Brulé 
land by 1867.   
 One other major obstacle to Lakota mobility—the Powder River Road—slashed 
through their territory as well.  Lakota leaders hoped to convince the government to close 
both of these routes, which allowed unprecedented numbers of civilians to settle in 
Lakota territory.  Most important, they hoped that war between the Lakota nation and the 
United States would cease.  This particular provision held the most importance for 
Indians, who viewed the treaty as a binding promise between two sovereign nations.  
Moreover, they viewed themselves as the aggrieved party, and rightly so; white people 
had invaded Lakota land, not the other way around.  It is clear that Lakota views of 
sovereignty, tribal authority, property rights, and even the perception of time, differed 
radically from Anglo-American concepts of the same.25
                                                            
25 Raymond J. DeMallie, “Treaties Are Made Between Nations,” in The Great Sioux Nation, 114-
15. 
  Native people understood 
resources as key to their hold on territory, not boundary lines.  This access to particular 
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parts of the country at certain times of the year was crucial for survival.  When 
Americans invaded those lands, they put native people on notice that they did not care 
whether Indians lived or died.  Access to resources also overlapped with territory claimed 
by other tribes, creating intertribal feuds.  Thus, warriors who protected those resources 
through combat were considered important members of their societies. 
 It is also clear that white authorities did not understand the complexities of Lakota 
belief; the testimony of native leaders would have established a singular and distinct 
perspective that was undeniably native in its character, and therefore largely alien to the 
average government functionary.  At council proceedings in September and November 
1867 and April 1868, Spotted Tail, Swift Bear, and Pawnee Killer reiterated their chief 
concern and aim—stopping hostilities between whites and Indians.  They said little or 
nothing about the future education of subsequent generations and nothing of cultivating 
the land.  Swift Bear’s first question to the commissioners – “Did you come here to make 
peace with us?” illustrates the fact that the Lakota focused on putting an end to native-
white violence.  Pawnee Killer, an Oglala, said, “We need what little country we have 
and the game that is in it to live on.”  Turkey Leg, a Cheyenne, referred to the unity 
between his people and many Lakota: “All around this country and around us, the tribes 
are all like us.  We have all the same kind of flesh.”  Spotted Tail hoped that the whites 
would stop building roads through Indian country, and he clearly expressed his interests: 
“I do not look for anything in this country but game; that is what we live on.  We want to 
live on the wild game as long as it lasts.  This country across the river all belongs to us. . . 
. There is plenty of game in our country at present and we cannot go to farming until all 
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that is gone.  When that time comes, I will let my grandfather [President Johnson] know 
it.”   
 Such remarks show that native leaders’ main concerns centered around a 
ceasefire, their ability to move freely within their own territory, and their intent to 
continue living in the traditional ways.  As ethnohistorian Raymond DeMallie has noted, 
the Lakota believed that, based on their position as a sovereign nation, they were giving 
Anglo-Americans the right to cross Sioux territory, but not to permanently occupy it.  
Anglo-Americans, understanding themselves as sovereign, believed that the Lakota 
submitted to the power of the federal government and ceded land.  The Lakota 
understood the “protection” of the United States “to be the same kind of kinship 
metaphor which they used in any kind of interaction between human beings,” and most 
likely protection by the government against white civilians.  Thus, the treaty meant vastly 
different things to both parties.  
 Treaty proceedings happened fairly quickly; the councils with Lakota leaders 
occurred over a scant number of days, making it even less likely that they had time to 
consider the treaty at length, much less discuss among themselves how its provisions 
might affect them.  The commissioners worded the treaty in ambiguous ways that 
concealed the ultimate intention to forcibly assimilate native people into white society 
and therefore destroy Lakota culture.  Two significant assertions—that the Lakota would 
establish private land ownership, cultivate the land, and ensure their children attended 
Anglo-organized schools—followed this pattern.  The third, sixth, and seventh articles 
referred to an indefinite future in which Indians would assume a “disposition to 
commence cultivating the soil,” a “desire to commence farming,” and a “pledge  
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. . . to compel their children” to go to school, but there was no explanation of when this 
might or ought to occur.  From the Lakota point of view, these stipulations probably 
carried little or no sense of obligation toward the federal government.  Other aspects of 
the treaty ostensibly reinforced Lakota sovereignty, yet provided ways to dismantle it at 
the same time.  Article 1 asserted that only the United States had authority over criminal 
offenses committed within the reservation.  It also stipulated that Lakotas could seek 
restitution through annuity payments if a Lakota person were the victim of a crime, 
echoing the idea of reciprocity, a concept fundamental to Lakota life.  While this 
provision gave Lakotas ways to redress wrongs done to them, it jeopardized their claim to 
sovereignty in American minds because it reduced the idea of due process to a material 
transaction.  Indians’ lack of control over methods of restitution meant that American 
officials could turn a blind eye to civilian crimes against natives. 26
 The treaty lacked legitimacy on other grounds, for the men who signed it did not 
represent all of the Lakota tiyospayes, something of which government authorities were 
aware.  Conflicts of tiyospaye interest versus band or national interest also meant that 
native leaders would have been hard pressed to make decisions for dissenters.  Nor were 
council participants receptive to treaty proceedings for the same reasons.  Spotted Tail 
may have worried that his tiyospaye risked punishment if he refused to participate in the 
councils. The government would have labeled him as an associate of Red Cloud, who 
balked at the Powder River Road that cut through Lakota land.  Spotted Tail’s 
community would have been subject to twin threats of starvation and American reprisal if 
it continued to resist the Americans.  Army officers argued that other Brulés to the north 
had already suffered through terrible conditions that would face more native communities 
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as game populations declined.  General Samuel Ryan Curtis, assigned to the 
Northwestern Treaty Commission, described Indians eating “all the dead carcasses in the 
country” in the summer of 1866.  Locals had implicated Brulé warriors in the murder of a 
trader, as well as an ox.  “Even now, when they have nothing but dry buffalo meat, and 
not much of that . . . they will run like chickens to gather the offal from . . . garrison 
kitchens, while they pass a pile of corn and hundreds of loose cattle without touching a 
thing except when told . . . corn is plenty for horses, mules, and cattle . . . but not a pound 
can be issued to the craving Indians, whose hunting grounds we occupy.”27
 Leaders from several of the Lakota bands had intimated at the multiple dilemmas 
that faced Plains communities.  By convincing actively “hostile” bands to come in to the 
agencies, other bands could get food, weapons, and ammunition from the government.  
Yet these efforts led to greater factionalism within the Lakota polity, and to make matters 
worse, the government never provided the promised annuities after the first round of 
treaty councils at Fort Laramie.  This led a Two Kettle warrior to protest, “By doing all 
this for the whites I thought it would help me more but I do not believe they will help me 
at all . . . I thought the hostile Indians were the ones to suffer but they are better off than I 
am.”  Oglala leader Man that Walks Under the Ground referred to the growth of 
dependency, declaring that Lakotas “always share what we have . . . [we] cannot make 
powder.  We cannot make balls and caps, and in what direction shall we go to make 
peace and to live happy, unless we can get ammunition from you?” He also hinted at the 
factionalism that drove a wedge between Lakota bands.  Eager to obtain signatures for 
   
                                                            
 27 Major General Samuel Ryan Curtis, member of the Northwestern Treaty Commission, to 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs, 30 May 1866, Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to the 
Secretary of the Interior for the Year 1866 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1866), 167-68. 
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the treaty, the government declared him a ‘chief’ of the Oglala nation.  The position 
hindered him.  Said Man Under the Ground, it “caused me to be very poor and my 
children have suffered by reason of my holding it.”  
 At the councils in 1867 and 1868, Spotted Tail objected to the government’s 
interests in blunt terms that were echoed by other Lakota leaders.  His remarks illustrate 
that native people were willing to accommodate limited American aims in return for 
recognition of Lakota rights – the most fundamental of which was to live as Lakota and 
not as whites.   
    The country in which we live is cut up by the white men who drive away all the game.   That is 
the cause of our troubles.  I have been friend to the whites and am now their friend.  I hope, my 
friends, that you will ask our grandfather [President Grant] to stop these two roads.  They run right 
through our buffalo  country.  I do not look for anything in this country but game; that is what we 
live on.  We want to live on the wild game as long as it lasts.  This country across the [Missouri] 
river all belongs to us. . . . If these two roads are stopped, there will be no further troubles.  There 
is plenty of game in our country at present and we cannot go to farming until all that is gone.28
 
   
 Spotted Tail realized that the future of his community was intertwined with the 
now-unavoidable Anglo-American presence.  Historian Kingsley M. Bray has called him 
“an astute antagonist to relentless government efforts to weaken his people and his own 
authority.”  Like Little Big Man, Spotted Tail took advantage of a Lakota “consensus for 
negotiation” that allowed him to retain status as a leader at the same time that he tried to 
guarantee the protection of his community against the growing Anglo-American threat.  
Signing the treaty meant that the Brulés acknowledged the American presence in the 
region while hoping to ensure their long-term security.29
                                                            
28 Proceedings of the Great Peace Commission, 59, 64 
  Theirs was even a position of 
power which whites would be wise to recognize and respect.  Orators balanced frank 
 29 Kingsley M. Bray, “Crazy Horse and the End of the Great Sioux War” in American Nations: 
Encounters in Indian Country, 1850 to the Present, eds. Frederick E. Hoxie, Peter Mancall, and James Hart 
Merrell (New York: Routledge, 2001), 43, fn. 34 
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assessments of the difficulties that faced them with declarations of sovereignty.  Man that 
Walks Under the Ground declared, “Tell our grandfather that our hands are long as we 
can almost reach to where he is.”  Iron Shell, one of the older Brulé men at the council, 
argued that Anglo-Americans upheld a double standard for native behavior; from the 
Lakota perspective, whites had instigated frontier conflict.  “I know that the whites are 
like the grass on the prairie . . . You have come into my country without my consent and 
spread your soldiers all over it.  I have looked around for the cause of the trouble and I 
can not see that my young men were the cause of it.”  Many of these leaders argued that 
they would be willing to live in proximity to whites if only the government controlled its 
civilian citizens and soldiers.   
 In contrast, Red Cloud refused to sign the Treaty of Fort Laramie until troops 
abandoned Forts Phil Kearny, Reno and C.F. Smith.  Lakota warriors burned the forts in 
the summer of 1868.  Finally satisfied that the army had been excised from Indian 
territory, Red Cloud signed the treaty that November.  However, the disagreement 
between Spotted Tail and Red Cloud over the 1868 treaty—and more accurately, the 
Lakota polity—does not negate the existence of Lakota sovereignty.  Nor does it mean 
that Spotted Tail was “friendly” and Red Cloud “hostile.”  Spotted Tail had met army 
troops in combat at Blue Water creek in 1855, and during the winter of 1864-65, he 
helped organize raids on Julesburg, Colorado Territory, a border town that served as a 
junction point on the Overland Trail.  Spotted Tail and Red Cloud would later work in 
tandem; both went to Washington DC in 1870, hoping that federal officials would clarify 
the terms of the 1868 treaty.  Spotted Tail consistently defended the rights of the Brulé, 
and other Lakota, as sovereign.  Although Spotted Tail refused to participate in Red 
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Cloud’s War, both leaders shared similar goals—retaining Lakota sovereignty.  While 
their approaches differed dramatically at times, they reiterated their commitment to 
protect their interests, and they believed that other Lakotas shared those interests.30
 Assumptions about “traditional” or “historic” inter-tribal relationships 
underscored government officials’ strategy of creating divisions between native people.  
This approach reflects their limited and derisive characterization of Indian societies as 
apolitical or incapable of developing dynamic political systems.  Many historians echoed 
these assumptions in the past.  Robert Utley, for instance, wrote that in dealing with the 
Crows, the “Lakota leadership [tried] to outwit their historic enemies.”  American 
councils with the Crows, however, prove the inadequacy of these descriptions of the 
Lakota-Crow relationship.  The Crows were not really “historic” or constant enemies of 
the Lakota.  Richard White has argued that too many historians have treated intertribal warfare 
as a fixed concept, one that is more the product of “ingrained cultural pugnacity,” rather than a 
fluid political system.  According to ethnohistorian Theodore Binnema, native people were 
able to “achieve through informal means exactly what state societies accomplish in other 
ways . . . the flexibility, fluidity, and informality of band societies enabled them to 
respond quickly and effectively” to the changes created by the Anglo-American presence 
on the frontier.  Native people practiced aggression in ways that were fundamentally 
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different from Anglo-Americans; the Lakota might feud with rivals, then take up trade 
with them for a time, and eventually return to fighting.31
 Even those less receptive to the Lakota admitted that some Sioux had tried to 
engineer an alliance.  At councils with American authorities, a Crow leader named Wolf 
Bow said that he “did not want his country made the battle ground of the Sioux, as you 
might think my nation was mixed up with them.”  Bear’s Tooth, another Crow leader, 
told the Americans, “You called for the Sioux the same as you did for us . . . the Sioux 
told us to come and listen to you and then return and tell them what we had heard.  They 
told us that you were going to fool us and not give us back our country and that you 
would play us the same trick you did them.”  This potent statement demonstrates the 
strength of the Lakota bid for sovereignty in the West, the frankness with which they 
assessed American goals, and the fact that they were interested in forming an association 
with rivals who, they believed, had more than enough cause to join them.  Like Lakota 
leaders, the Crow leaders emphasized the culpability of Anglo-American civilians and 
soldiers: “Your young men have destroyed the young grass and have set the country on 
fire.  They kill all the game, not because they want it.  They leave it to rot on the 
roadside.  Suppose [we] were to go into your country and destroy your cattle?”
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 Nevertheless, the appeal of a coalition with the powerful Lakota could not change 
the minds of many Crows.  Decades of being challenged by rivals among the Lakota and 
Blackfoot nations left the Crows more vulnerable to the incentives offered by the United 
States.  “We are very poor and keep getting poorer,” argued Sits in the Middle of the 
Land (Black Foot), the leader of the Crow.  “The great spirit has forgotten me.  We are 
being surrounded by the whites and by other nations.”  They Fear Even His Horses, his 
Oglala brother-in-law, said that the Lakota would stop fighting the Americans as soon as 
the Powder River road was closed.  The rush of emigration did not abate, however, and 
thus cemented Lakota enmity toward the Crow.33
 The threat of illegal prospectors also made it difficult, if not impossible, for both 
the Lakota and the army to adhere to the terms of the 1868 treaty.  Colonel Stanley, for 
one, did not believe that the civilians could elude his troops in the Black Hills.   “A party 
could hardly collect . . . without my knowing it,” he wrote confidently.  He had orders 
from General Alfred Howe Terry, commander of the Department of Dakota, to stop, by 
force, any miners who were travelling through the region. Stanley also suggested that 
native people who encouraged others to report to the agency be rewarded for their efforts, 
but he would not make promises or provide provisions to the Lakotas until given further 
instructions. The government had promised annuities to the Lakota in the winter of 1867, 
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but by the spring, few goods had arrived at the agencies, and game was scarce.  Stanley 
forecast trouble from these worried Indian people.34
 Spotted Tail had told the peace commissioners in 1868, “All the people north are 
relatives of ours and I want them to come down and live like we do.”  Yet Stanley 
reported that the landscape of native communities on the Upper Missouri was shifting as 
the Lakota polity began to structure itself in new ways.  By the spring of 1868, most of 
the Lakota bands moved their attention to the northwest, far away from the Northern 
Pacific Railroad and civilian traffic.  The majority of the communities in five out of the 
seven Lakota bands would eventually establish themselves in Montana near the 
Yellowstone and Big Horn rivers.  Their southern relatives faced familiar challenges, 
particularly hunger and pressure to accommodate federal interests.   The southern Oglalas 
and Brulés had chosen to go to the new Whetstone agency.  Meanwhile, wary bands of 
Minneconjou, Sans Arc, and Oglala Sioux had meant to visit their agency, but then they 
refused to go.  Minneconjou, Two Kettle, and Sans Arc leaders were trying to convince 
the other Lakota bands to make peace agreements, but they had little success.  The 
Oglalas were friendly but said that some of them would leave the area for the summer, 
heading south to the Republican River valley in Nebraska instead.  The Hunkpapas also 
refused to go to the agency, saying that they planned to trade on the Red River in Canada.  
These changes in the Lakota polity foreshadowed the armed conflicts of 1875 and 1876 
as the strong northern nation readied for war.
   
35
                                                            
34 Stanley to Terry, 19 May 1868, Middle District, DoDak, LS, RG 393.  The Upper Platte River 
Agency was located on the North Platte River near Fort Laramie from 1863-1867, then moved to the mouth 
of Whetstone Creek on the Missouri in December 1868.  It was renamed Whetstone Agency the following 
June.   
     
35 See Proceedings of the Great Peace Commission, 101, 104-105, 110-11 for native testimony 
about hunger and resentment among the different bands. 
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  Political decisions and debates being weighed in Washington in the late 1860s 
and early 1870s also contributed to the tensions in the region, and were often tied to the 
outcome of events on the frontier.  While civilian agents were responsible for distributing 
annuities, notifying native people of policy changes, hearing their grievances, and 
ensuring basic housing and health needs, army officers often played these roles as well, 
and argued that they could perform more justly and efficiently than the Department of the 
Interior’s Office of Indian Affairs.  As a result, bitterness between departments made it 
difficult to manage Indian affairs without constant friction. 
 Neither department communicated directly with the other; as a result of this 
haughty behavior on both sides, Sherman struggled to get copies of Indian treaties from 
the Office of Indian Affairs, and Indian agents often refused to tell army officers where 
native people had camped outside of the agencies.36
                                                            
36 Robert Wooster, The Military and United States Indian Policy, 1865-1903 (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1988; reprint, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1995), 80. 
  If Congress decided that the Indian 
Office would have exclusive control over Indian affairs, Sherman hoped that the army 
would be “absolved from all responsibility and can only act when their agents confess 
their inability to hold the Indians in subjugation.” Army leaders, as well as their 
advocates in the House of Representatives, proposed transferring the Office of Indian 
Affairs to the War Department several times from 1868 to 1876.  Each time, the Senate 
rebuffed the army’s demand for greater control of Indian Affairs.  Legislators’ 
connections to reformers’ interests, as well as support from territorial leaders, made them 
less inclined to give more power to the military.  Sherman told one his subordinate 
commanders, “This mixed business is bound to fail and will in the end impose on the 
military a most difficult war, but we must not interfere so long as the secretary thinks he 
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can manage his red subjects.” 37
 Equitable relations with native people became even more difficult for army 
officers to achieve as a result of the Piegan massacre, which also created a maelstrom of 
negative public opinion.  Although these events occurred outside of the Black Hills, they 
illustrate that the army’s challenges formed on not only local, but departmental and 
regional levels.  In January 1870, the Second Cavalry murdered 173 Piegan Indians on 
the Marias River in Montana.  The Piegans, a division of the Blackfeet tribe, had been 
blamed for raiding Anglo-American settlements on both sides of the border.
  These problems made it harder for army officers like 
Stanley to satisfy the needs of the Indians for whom the military was deemed responsible.   
38  Under the 
command of Major Eugene Baker, cavalrymen swept into the villages and shot, stabbed, 
and bludgeoned unarmed Piegans.  Baker claimed that only 53 of the casualties were 
women and children.  Vincent Colyer, secretary to the Board of Indian Commissioners, 
said that 158 women and children had been killed.  Coyler, an advocate of Grant’s 
peaceful Indian policy, earned Sheridan’s wrath.  In his description of alleged Piegan 
atrocities, Sheridan relied on the conventional, grisly, and often exaggerated themes of 
rape and mutilation that characterized popular writing and media reporting about Plains 
people.39  “It would appear that Mr. Vincent Collyer [sic] wants this work to go on,” the 
general wrote.40
                                                            
37 William T. Sherman to Alfred Sully, 15 April 1867, Alfred Sully Papers, Western Americana 
Collection, mBeinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Yale University. 
  Sherman reminded Sheridan that the army had to deal with “two classes 
of people, one demanding the utter extinction of the Indians, and the other full of love for 
38 Sully to Ely S. Parker, 10 February 1870, House Ex. Doc. no. 185, 41st Congress, 2d  Session., 
Serial 1418, 6. 
39 Robert F. Berkhofer, The White Man’s Indian: Images of the American Indian from Columbus 
to the present (New York: Knopf, 1978), 98.   
40 Paul Hutton, Phil Sheridan and His Army, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1985; 
reprint, Norman: University of Oklahoma, 2003), 190-94; “The Piegan Massacre,” New York Times, 29 
March 1870. 
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their conversion to civilization and Christianity.  Unfortunately the army stands between 
and gets the cuffs from both sides.”41
 In the aftermath of the Piegan killings, Congress launched an inquiry.  General de 
Trobriand argued that “the whole thing is no more than an intrigue to prevent the Office 
of Indian Affairs from being placed under the War Department.”
  This assertion is central to understanding the role 
which the frontier army played in respect to the American public and the government.  It 
is also indicative of the ways in which army officers saw themselves as having been 
marginalized by civilians and federal officials.  
42  The failure of the 
transfer bill, while in part a response to Grant’s attempts to dismantle the Congressional 
patronage system, ultimately limited the power of the army over Indian affairs.43  
Legislators also put limitations on the army’s numbers of enlisted men and prohibited 
army officers from holding civil offices—for instance, Indian agency positions on 
reservations.  The passage of this legislation explains why troops were initially ordered 
out of all agencies in the Department of the Dakota in the spring of 1871; this order was 
soon rescinded, in all likelihood because legislators realized that the army provided 
much-needed protection for agency officials.44
                                                            
41 Sherman to Philip Henry Sheridan, 5 March 1870 and 7 March 1870, Sheridan Papers, 
microfilm, University of Oklahoma. 
  Such legislation was meant to solve the 
constant quarrels between the Department of the Interior and the War Department, but in 
reality it created more animosity.   
42 Regis de Trobriand to Albert Kintzing Post, 18 March 1870, de Trobriand Letters, Special 
Collections, Montana Historical Society, Helena.  Marie Caroline Post, The Post Family (New York: 
Sterling Potter), 207. 
43 Utley, Frontier Regulars, 191.  
44 Stanley to Assistant Adjutant General (hereafter abbreviated as AAG), 1 October 1871, Middle 
District, DoDak, LS, RG 393.  For more on the Congressional issue of army officers as agents, see William 
T. Hagan, United States-Comanche Relations: The Reservation Years (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1976), 57.  Hagan argues that Congress was “[reluctant] to spend the money necessary to impose a military 
solution on the Indian problem in the West” during this time period.  This makes sense when considered in 
concert with the Piegan massacre—Congressmen were also reluctant to fund operations that might lead to 
the deaths of noncombatants and would thus create an outcry among Eastern constituents.   
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The Piegan case also revealed the individual animosity felt between some senior 
army leaders.  More importantly, it showed that Sheridan, as commander of the Division 
of the Missouri, often deliberately sought to expunge officers from influential positions in 
his command if they did not meet his expectations.  As Paul Hutton has argued, 
Sheridan’s “pragmatism and elastic ethics” allowed the general to feel justified in treating 
ill-favored subordinate commanders with a vindictive attitude.  While the army had no 
consensus on how to reach its objectives, Sheridan knew what kind of fighters he wanted.  
Alfred Sully had fought the Dakota Sioux from 1863 to 1865; although he did not 
manage to quell Dakota resistance in the Canadian-American borderlands, the public and 
fellow army officers considered his mission a success for the most part.  But Sully, in 
Sheridan’s eyes, was not tough enough.   
In 1868, Sully had twice failed to find and destroy the Cheyenne and Arapaho 
bands that were responsible for raids across Kansas and Indian Territory.  He clashed 
with not only Sheridan, but the most favored of Sheridan’s men— George Armstrong 
Custer.  Custer succeeded in attacking Black Kettle’s Cheyenne band at the Washita 
River that November.45
                                                            
45 Jerome Greene, Washita: The U.S. Army and the Southern Cheyennes, 1867-1869 (Norman, 
University of Oklahoma Press, 2004), 136-137.  Estimates of Indians killed at the Washita River range 
from at least two dozen warriors and thirty to fifty women and children killed.  At least sixty people, badly 
wounded, fled from the camp Greene and Hutton find that Custer exaggerated his given estimate of 103 to 
over 140 native deaths, based on native testimony and oral history. His actions at the Washita massacre in 
1868 are also revealing.  Sheridan had ordered Custer to go to “the supposed winter seat of the hostile 
tribes; to destroy their villages and ponies; to kill or hang all warriors, and bring back all women and 
children.” (Hutton, Phil Sheridan and his Army, 63)  Warriors in the camp had fought Hazen’s soldiers and 
their leaders had been told that they would find themselves facing the army if they did not surrender.  Black 
Kettle’s supposed sister and the other women had feared that they and the children would be killed (Hutton, 
73) but during the firefight, Custer stopped noncombatants from being killed (Hutton, 100).  Stan Hoig 
takes a different tack, arguing that the troops committed a massacre because they attacked without warning 
and killed indiscriminately.  Cheyenne people today dispute the notion of the Washita massacre as a battle, 
arguing that women and children did not participate in battles (i.e. the defense of the camp).  See testimony 
of John L. Sipes, Jr.in Washita Memories: Eyewitness Views of Custer’s Attack on Black Kettle’s Village, 
  Custer’s troops had moved on his initiative, not Sully’s; in fact, 
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several days earlier, Sully had refused to give Custer permission to follow the Cheyenne 
warriors.46  Sheridan himself went to the field, and he responded to Sully’s pacific 
attitude by ordering him back to district headquarters.47
Spurred by the vociferous complaints of Montana residents, Sully had argued that 
relations between natives and whites were tenuous, and without reinforcements, 
settlements would be in danger.  Colonel de Trobriand believed that Sully exaggerated 
the evidence of violence in order to help bolster business and mining interests and 
opportunities for contractors.  Given that Sully probably hoped to restore his reputation, 
and his willingness in the Dakota Conflict to at least consider using volunteer militia 
troops in the field, these accusations may have had some truth.  However, Sully did not 
subscribe to the broad anti-Indian ideas expressed by other army officers.   His balanced 
reading of the violence in Montana suggests just the opposite.   
  By May 1869, Sully had been 
assigned as superintendent of Indian affairs in Montana, but his tenure there was short-
lived.  
 As he had done during the Dakota conflict, Sully argued that both Anglo-
Americans and native people bore responsibility for conflict.  Piegan and other Blackfoot 
Indians traveled through the Powder River country, the borderlands, and the Pacific 
Northwest to raid white settlements.   Before the Piegan massacre of 1870, two white 
men were killed by non-Blackfoot Indians while they herded cattle near Fort Benton.  In 
retaliation, civilians at Fort Benton shot four Piegans, including an elderly man and a 
teenage boy.  Sully reacted strongly to these murders writing that white men “retaliate by 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
ed. Richard G. Hardoff (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2006), 331.  There is some validity to the 
idea that soldiers were under the influence of alcohol as well.  See Hardoff, 300. 
46 Hutton, Phil Sheridan and his Army, 61. 
47 Langdon Sully, No Tears for the General (Palo Alto, Calif., American West Publishing Co., 
1974), 217-18. 
121 
 
killing any Indians they may chance to meet, sometimes in the most brutal and cowardly 
manner.”  The stipulations of reciprocal killing meant that Blackfeet warriors would be in 
the right by killing other whites in retaliation.  The agent for the Blackfeet made an effort 
to grasp this fact.  “Though the chiefs are using every exertion to restrain the young men 
from taking revenge, which usually falls upon defenseless persons, innocent of the deeds 
for which they are called upon to pay the penalty, I fear they will not be able to control 
them,” he wrote to Sully.  Anglo-American civilians ignored these kinds of culturally-
based decisions and lumped all the Piegans together as savages.48
 The government contributed to this myopia too, in the case of the brave 
actions of two Blackfeet brothers.  These two warriors, who were connected to the 
Yankton Agency, rescued two white women from captivity in 1865.  Even though they 
gave up two of their horses in exchange for the women, the brothers’ bravery went 
largely ignored.  Three years later, their meritorious actions were finally recognized; the 
generals on the Indian peace commission paid them three hundred dollars in silver.  
Instead of questioning the prevalent views of native people, the army officers and the 
Indian agents involved said little or nothing about the fact that the brothers’ actions 
negated every Anglo-American stereotype about native people.   
   
Sully, for one, pointed out that local white residents were often responsible for the 
endemic violence in the Department of Dakota.  He wrote privately to Brevet Major 
General Nelson A. Miles, then the commander of the Fifth Infantry in Kansas.   
We have every prospect of having a nice Indian war on hand … the population of this Territory is 
composed of some of the best people in our country as a whole, yet they have among them some 
of the most unmitigated cut throats to be found who live by selling whisky to Indians & shoot 
                                                            
48 Sully to Ely S. Parker, 3 August 1869, House Ex. Doc. no. 185, 41st Congress, 2d Session., 
Serial 1418, 2.  F.D. Pease to Sully, 10 August 1869, Blackfeet Agency, Annual Report of the 
Commissioner of Indian Affairs to the Secretary of the Interior for the Year 1869 (Washington: 
Government Printing Office, 1870), 300. 
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down a harmless Indian when the fancy takes them.  Of course the Indians retaliate & usually a 
peaceable citizen is their victim.  This sort of thing has been going on for over a year.  At Berthold 
over a week ago two Indians were killed in broad day in the street in the most brutal manner.  I 
have ever since been trying to get the names of the murderers but cannot.  Those who are disposed 
to tell are afraid to do so. 49
 
 
Sheridan, however, put little stock in Sully’s assertions.  In the aftermath of the 
killings, de Trobriand would applaud Baker’s actions as “a complete success, with most 
of the murderers, and marauders, of last summer” now dead, and Sheridan would do the 
same.  Three weeks later, newspapers published an official account of the massacre that 
counted 140 women and children killed.  This report was contrary to Baker’s report, 
which reported only 53 killed, and its publication infuriated Sheridan.50
This was not a deception on Sully’s part, but another example of the ways in 
which the blurred boundaries between civilian and military handling of Indian affairs 
created friction.  The situation also demonstrated the efforts of some officers to treat 
native people fairly.  Sully’s endorsement read: “The report that Lieutenant Pease sends 
is entirely what the Indians say of the affair, and of course it is natural to suppose it is 
prejudiced in their own favor.  It is the Indians’ side of the question, and, as I am here as 
  The report had 
been written by Lieutenant Pease, agent to the Piegans; he forwarded it to Sully, who 
forwarded it to Colyer.  Sheridan believed that Sully should have sent it to him first, as 
commander of Division of the Missouri, but Sully was the territory’s superintendent of 
Indian affairs, and like all other superintendents, was obligated to contact the Office of 
Indian Affairs.   
                                                            
49 Sully to Nelson A. Miles, 14 August 1869, Sully Papers. A.J. Faulk to Charles Mix, Dakota 
Superintendency, 22 October 1868, Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to the Secretary 
of the Interior for the Year 1868 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1868), 186. 
50 Sheridan to Sherman, 29 January 1870, Sheridan Papers, microfilm, University of Oklahoma.   
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their only representative, I consider it my duty to give them a hearing.”51
Some critics agreed that armed force should be used against ‘hostile’ Plains 
Indians, yet they also averred that it had a “retroactive influence” on the Grant 
administration’s Indian policy.  An editorial in the New York Times located the central 
hypocrisy of Sheridan’s complaints – he condoned and encouraged Anglo-Americans’ 
use of violence, yet he would have citizens “regard as virtuous in us which we shudder at 
in savages.”
  Sheridan 
considered Indian sources suspect and refused to recognize their veracity; Sherman 
accused Sully of unprofessional conduct, another indication of the clannish behavior 
within the army.  Both generals expected that the public sphere would react negatively in 
the aftermath of the massacre.  Their predictions, for the most part, were correct.  
52  Harper’s Weekly characterized federal Indian policy as one of 
“extermination.”  Four months after the massacre, when tempers had cooled, Harper’s 
editors wrote, “War has plainly failed. Let us try a policy of peace.” 53
 Newspapers farther west decried the reports of Indian deaths and mocked 
eastern attitudes, rhetorically asking Sheridan, “Why do you want to go around making a 
graveyard of everybody that murders American citizens? . . . Suppose the poor Piegans 
have taken a scalp or two, and dug the bowels out a few live babies . . . You should send 
missionaries to them.  Send them a Peace Commissioner . . . send them a bald-headed 
Quaker that can’t be scalped.”
 
54
                                                            
51 Sully to Ely S. Parker, 10 February 1870, House Ex. Doc. no. 185, 41st Congress, 2d Session., 
Serial 1418, 6. 
  Newspaper editors in Yankton, South Dakota, remarked 
that eastern newspapers “discuss the late Indian fight with more brass than brains.”  
52 “The Piegan Slaughter and its Apologists,” New York Times, 10 March 1870. 
53 “Our Indian Policy of Extermination,” Harper’s Weekly, 19 March 1870. “A Policy of Peace,” 
Harper’s Weekly, 2 April 1870. 
54 “A Little Wholesome Advice Administered to Philip Sheridan Esq,” Leavenworth Bulletin, 12 
March 1870. 
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Frontier papers trotted out the popular stereotypes of native people, pointed out that only 
they knew the circumstances “out here in these wild, unclaimed territories.”55
 Despite critical missteps in dealing with the Lakota throughout the 1860s, 
federal authorities did sometimes recognize that stemming civilian emigration could 
benefit relations with native people.  In the case of the Big Horn Mining Expedition, the 
army acted swiftly to stop a breach of the 1868 treaty.  Not long after the Piegan 
massacre, the members of the Big Horn Mining Expedition, based in Wyoming, aimed to 
open parts of Montana to increased settlement; they assumed that the government would 
support them.  The expedition’s leader, W.L. Kuykendall, had received lucrative 
government contracts to build forts for the army in 1866 and 1867; with his business 
partners, he helped boost Cheyenne from a railroad point into a thriving town.  
Kuykendall and other frontier entrepreneurs stood to benefit from territorial development; 
he argued that “it must have been the intention of congress in organizing [the] territory to 
secure its speedy settlement and development.”
  These 
papers failed to recognize Baker’s criminal actions (and Sheridan’s tacit approval of 
them) at the same time that they harangued the army for failing protect civilians—or 
worse yet, protecting native people at civilians’ expense.  Moreover, these remarks show 
that Anglo-Americans in the West rarely recognized that their ethnocentric behavior and 
their avarice for native-controlled territory contributed to violence.     
56
                                                            
55 “The Piegan Massacre,” Yankton Press and Dakotan, published as The Union Dakotian, 24 
March 1870.  “From the Plains,” Leavenworth Bulletin, 1 June 1870. 
  Kuykendall’s expedition was a small 
one that provided its own security, relied on vociferous local promotion for publicity, and 
 56 A.W. Bowen, Progressive Men of the State of Wyoming (Chicago: A.W. Bowen & Company, 
1903), 115-16. T.A. Larson, History of Wyoming (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1990), 170. 
James C. Olson, Red Cloud and the Sioux Problem (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1965), 91.  See 
also Raymond L. Welty, “The Policing of the Frontier by the Army, 1860-1870,” Kansas Historical 
Quarterly 7 (1938): 154-69.       
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received little approbation from the government, if not outright criticism.  Frontier papers 
bragged of the strength of these illegal groups, yet the miners in both cases did not 
represent a “massive” civilian force, much less ones that were “armed to the teeth.”  As 
they strove to drum up support in the autumn of 1869, Cheyenne businessmen made false 
claims that their plans were backed by the government and investors in Chicago and 
Omaha.  The expedition grew into a community-led effort that reflected the goals of its 
founding members, including special interests rooted in town development, railroad 
expansion, livestock ranching, and land acquisition.  What served the Big Horn Mining 
Expedition would serve the town.  This remained the case for other frontier communities 
that shared a common goal of trampling native rights throughout the Northern Plains in 
order to increase Anglo-American power.   
 Two weeks before the Grant administration discovered the “pretended 
exploring party” and their planned dash through Indian country in Montana, the army 
stepped in.  General C.C. Augur, commanding the Department of the Platte, held up the 
expedition long enough for it to dwindle to 127 members.  When Kuykendall and his men 
finally departed Cheyenne in the summer of 1870, Augur sent a cavalry detachment to 
overtake them.  Although he let the demoralized group disband and slink back to 
Wyoming, Augur’s rebuff showed that the army could not be easily swayed from its 
mission by civilian influences.  His prompt actions mollified the anger that smoldered 
among the Oglalas and Brulés who were still settling in at the relocated Whetstone 
Agency.  Many of these people affiliated with either They Fear Even His Horses and 
other iwastela (moderates) with whom Red Cloud became increasingly allied in the late 
1860s.  Crazy Horse and other northern leaders led an enduring core of resisters; their 
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presence did not dissuade gradualists from seeking negotiation with whites, and probably 
boosted other Lakota leaders’ confidence that the nation as a whole could go head to head 
with the army if they needed to do so.57
 Captain DeWitt Poole, an agent at Whetstone, worried that Lakota people 
would leave the agency if the expedition took place.  He had good reason to be nervous – 
several Lakota warrior societies and resistance leaders had given their approval to the 
proposed delegation to Washington D.C. in the late spring.  This new development 
bolstered Poole’s hopes that more Sioux could be convinced to stay on the reservation.  
With the exception of Swift Bear, who tried to convince his tiyospaye to farm, most of 
the Brulé leaders and their families balked at agents’ attempts to ‘domesticate’ them.  
Spotted Tail roved thirty to sixty miles from the agency from the time of his arrival there 
in 1869, and he refused to stay at the agency itself for the most part.  Agency officials 
agreed that Spotted Tail was interested in peace, but he made it clear to them that he 
wanted to go to the White River, eighty miles northwest.  That location had better land, 
more wood, and more fresh water; it would also put his group farther away from the 
Missouri River and the dangers posed by white emigrants.   
          
 Spotted Tail’s response to the agents made sense.  Americans had not fulfilled 
the 1868 treaty in terms of stemming civilian encroachment or annuity payments to 
Indians.  To protect his community, he kept them at least a day’s ride from government 
control, enough to convince the army of his intentions, yet far enough to maintain 
                                                            
57 Kingsley M. Bray claims that the expedition was “massive” and “armed to the teeth.”  See 
Crazy Horse: A Lakota Life, vol. 254 of the Civilization of the American Indian series (Norman: University 
of Oklahoma Press, 2008), 133.  For the iwastela and growing moderation in parts of the Lakota polity, see 
134-36, 139.  See Cincinnati Daily Gazette, 21 June 1870, for information about the expedition.  While the 
initial membership of the association was high, it fielded a much smaller number of actual prospectors.  
The men were armed with ‘needle’ guns (typical breech-loading bolt action rifles) and a 12-pound 
howitzer.  For the town of Cheyenne and the expedition, see Gilbert Stelter, “The City and Westward 
Expansion,” The Western Historical Quarterly 4, no. 2 (April 1973): 193-94, 196, 199-200.   
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independence and an advantage if they decided to leave the area.  The Brulés also wanted 
to stay close, both in terms of geography and shared interests, to Red Cloud’s 
community.  Through the fall and winter of 1869, Brulé and Oglala at Whetstone 
continued to argue for the relocation of the agency to the White River.  Civilian agents 
chalked up their discontent to their “nomadic habits” rather than real concerns.  Hunger 
struck the agency once again that year, making everyone even less inclined to farm.  
Spotted Tail still kept his community far away from the agency; the younger men would 
come to the agency for cattle and drive them back to their camp.  Poole made little effort 
to force Spotted Tail to come in, reasoning that he retained more control over his warriors 
away from the agency.   
 Poole also observed that Brulé and Oglala leaders frequently “talked of the 
power and greatness of the Government since their return” from the council in 
Washington D.C.  He attributed this to their awe at the nation’s capital, but it stands to 
reason that the Lakota were not simply daunted by their experiences on the trip.   They 
were debating how to best deal with the intractable American empire.  By the summer of 
1870, of the nearly five thousand Brulés and Oglalas who drew annuities at Whetstone, 
only half lived there on a mostly permanent basis.  Spotted Tail and others still lived 
outside the agency.  Through Spotted Tail’s influence, warriors voluntarily returned 
stolen stock without being asked to do so, but other than this their overtures toward the 
government were minimal.  One of their solutions, moving to White River, remained 
unrealized. Poole recognized that the Lakota were suspicious of the government that had 
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consistently failed to uphold its end of the bargain: “They recall the promises made… and 
ask, pertinently, who can they believe now?”58
 One major change in federal Indian policy likely served as an impetus for the 
Lakota’s reaffirmation of sovereignty in the early 1870s.  The Indian Appropriations Act 
of March 1871 declared that the United States would no longer acknowledge Indian 
people as members of sovereign, independent nations with which the United States could 
contract by treaty.  In the spring of 1871, troops were ordered out of all agencies in the 
department, but the order was then countered.  Agents told Colonel Stanley that they 
could not work without the protection of troops.  Their fears were unfounded, for 
retaliatory killing provoked many of the violent encounters.  A Sioux horse raid in June 
was not directed at Anglo-Americans but instigated by a young man whose brother had 
been killed by the Arikara enemies of the Sioux; he wanted to capture the enemy scouts’ 
ponies but was dissuaded.  In another incident, George Baldwin, a white man, had been 
killed by Indians for trespassing.  Wrote Stanley,  
   
I am sorry for him, and sorry for his friends, but the plain truth is that he had no business there.  
The number of unemployed men who hang around the agencies, living no one knows how, any 
way but by work, is the greatest obstacle in the way of civilizing the Indians.  They do more harm 
in one year than the peace commissions, and missionaries can commit in ten years.”59
 
   
Fractured Dakota Indian communities, although now less visible than their Lakota 
relatives, presented another challenge to the army.  Stanley’s references to Standing 
Buffalo’s Sisseton band demonstrate that the Dakotas continued to use the Canadian-
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American borderlands to their advantage several years later.  Armed with bows and 
arrows and heavy rifles acquired at the British trading posts,  Thundering Bull and his 
Sisseton community often traveled and camped with a Yanktonais group.  These 
Yanktonais, a few hundred lodges strong, “pretended to be friendly” and entered Fort 
Peck, Montana, “without fear.”  They were better armed with trade rifles, Henry rifles, 
and shotguns.  Together, these two communities moved with the buffalo herds and stayed 
clear the reservations.  Stanley believed that it would be impossible to get them to rejoin 
their relatives in the Dakotas, and their proximity to trade opportunities across the border 
may have worried him as well.60
Stanley also attested to the growing power of the northern nations and the 
persistence of native defiance.  In the spring of 1871 he reported that Hunkpapas “who 
came all the way from the Yellowstone for that purpose,” had stolen horses belonging to 
whites.  Stanley also reported that almost five thousand Lakota lived in the Yellowstone 
region in December 1871, including Two Kettles, Sans Arc, Minneconjou, and a few 
Ogalala and Brulé people.  He estimated that this population included over a thousand 
warriors—“a number we know they can put in the field, but whether that many can be 
induced to make war upon the whites is in my mind doubtful.”  Those bands had joined 
together in the Powder River basin every summer that Stanley had been in the 
department, since 1866.  The army would have to be careful to avoid a “collision” with 
them.  Stanley argued that the Lakota should be treated as men and not “children or 
brutes” who could be bullied.
  
61
                                                            
60 Stanley to AAG, 1 October 1871 and 30 July 1871, Middle District, DoDak, LS, RG 393. 
  Pressured by territorial leaders and convinced of 
61 Stanley to AAG, 11 December 1871, Middle District, DoDak, LS, RG 393.  
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American superiority, the army’s senior leaders seem to have had little use for Stanley’s 
remarks.    
As increasing numbers of civilians slunk around the Black Hills like ravening 
wolves, Stanley reported that miners at Sioux City, Iowa, were outfitting an expedition.  
Their plans were bolstered by rumors spread by J.M. Washburn, the unscrupulous and 
absentee agent at the Whetstone Agency for the Brulé Lakota.  Stanley described the 
stories as “enormous lies” meant to encourage emigrants to spend money.  Mining 
expeditions, composed of the “greatest scoundrels in the country,” would endanger 
emigrants and provide the impetus for another war with native people.  If the current 
encroachment continued, said Stanley, the assimilation policy might “as well be given 
up.”  The frontier newspaper editors knew that the rumors were meant to “bring dopes 
into their particular towns to get their money.”62
By the spring of 1872, chances for accommodation between natives and whites 
appeared less frequently.  Nowhere were these differences more apparent than at a 
meeting between Stanley and a Lakota warrior who represented the growing power of the 
northern nations.  Spotted Eagle, an influential Sans Arc Lakota, had been wounded 
while leading a war party against the Crows in 1871.  He and his warriors came from the 
Rosebud River and stayed at Fort Sully to trade and then return home.  Spotted Eagle 
refused to accept rations or annuities while at the agency, but he talked to Stanley at 
length.  The colonel reported, “I was somewhat surprised to find the savage so well 
  Stanley’s strenuous objections to 
civilian activity would later be echoed by other field grade officers and their superiors as 
Anglo-Americans became the dominant force in the region.   
                                                            
62 Stanley to Francis A. Walker, 16 March 1872, Middle District, DoDak, LS, RG 393.  Hyde, 
Spotted Tail’s Folk, 195-97. 
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informed.  He knew all about the threatened invasion of the Black Hills” as well as the 
Pacific Telegraph line and the Northern Pacific Railway, which had reached Moorhead, 
Minnesota in the winter of 1871.  When Stanley asked him how the Lakota would 
respond to continued railroad construction, Spotted Eagle responded that he would tear 
up the railroad line and kill its builders.  The driving off of the buffalo meant certain 
death to his people.  Stanley took Spotted Eagle’s dispassionate speech seriously.  Like 
Hunkpapa warriors who accused white men of failing to listen to native people because 
they had “no ears,” Spotted Eagle recognized the dangers of dependency.  His stance can 
be seen as part of a concerted, though not yet unified, Sioux challenge to Anglo-
American invasion of the Lakota nation.  This situation would begin to change by 1873 
when the Brulés forced an opportunity to maintain their part of the southern Lakota 
polity, by demanding that the government move their agency closer to their Oglala 
allies.63
Officials in the Office of Indian Affairs by 1873 believed that the relationship 
between native people and the United States contained “a radical hindrance . . . which 
require[d] [Indians] to be treated as sovereign powers and wards at one and the same time 
. . . the weakness of the early republic required the government to engage native people 
as members of independent nations.” They argued that this led to “a kind of fiction and 
absurdity” in federal policy.  The “double condition of sovereignty and wardship” also 
changed the meaning of native leadership by making Indian leaders little more than the 
conduit for government goods and left them at the center of the anti-American feelings 
that often flared among Indians at agencies.  But federal domination struggled to assert 
 
                                                            
63 Stanley to Walker, 7 April 1872, Middle District, DoDak, LS, RG 393. Carroll Engelhardt, 
Gateway to the Northern Plains: Railroads and the Birth of Fargo and Moorhead (University of Minnesota 
Press, 2007), xiv. 
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itself at Spotted Tail’s and Red Cloud’s camps, where Lakotas drew more rations at 
agencies than they were allowed.  Both Lakota leaders refused to allow the agents to 
count lodges, so native people provided population numbers themselves.  The agents had 
no way to quell resistance and ultimately issued too many goods, which strengthened 
Lakotas’ sense of control over their own affairs.64
 Native-white violence occurred at a constant pace through 1874 and 1875, with 
the federal government opening formal negotiations for the Black Hills toward the end of 
this period.  The agent at Spotted Tail Agency feared violence between Indians and 
trespassers; he asked for assistance in making arrests from the nearest military post.  An 
officer with the First Infantry pleaded for more recruits – “The Sioux Indians are very 
uneasy about the invasion of their countries by lawless bands of whites and it may prove 
impossible to restrain them from committing outrages along the borders.”   A company 
commander responsible for enforcement within the Black Hills reported that a group of 
Lakota leaders, including Red Cloud and Spotted Tail, had demanded $60,000 for the 
damages done by miners “digging holes in their country.”  Expeditions from Fort Rice, 
South Dakota pursued various groups of Indians who stole government stock in the Black 
Hills and from contractors elsewhere, as well as Indians who killed two citizens on 
separate occasions.  Lakota and Cheyenne raids for American horses continued 
throughout the winter.  Army officers did in fact recognize the anger that percolated 
  Events like these demonstrate that 
even when they became increasingly reliant on government aid, Indian people found 
ways to exercise agency and relieve themselves of the dependency to which they were 
subject.   
                                                            
64 Edward P. Smith to Columbus Delano, 1 November 1873, Report of the Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs to the Secretary of the Interior for the Year 1873 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
1873), 3-6. 
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among native people, and many of them took Indian responses seriously.  “There is no 
disguising the fact,” wrote one officer, “that there is a general and bitter discontent 
among them . . . No Flesh [a Lakota leader] says a few of his young warriors have gone 
on the War path, and he fears he cannot restrain other discontents.”65
Custer’s 1874 expedition to the Black Hills angered the Lakota people as a whole, 
who saw it “as a palpable infraction of their treaty” that “filled [them] with the 
apprehension that it might lead to their exclusion from a country held sacredly their 
own.”   Officials in the Department of the Interior hoped that the miners, confronted with 
a paucity of gold, would eventually give up prospecting in the Black Hills.  The Indians 
and the army would then be able to limit civilian encroachment.  Yet Army officers were 
perhaps most often hampered by their inability to detain, arrest, or otherwise restrain 
Anglo-American civilians who committed crimes against native people.  Although 
Sheridan had ordered Terry in September 1874 to “burn the wagon trains, destroy the 
outfit, and arrest the leaders” of trespassers in the region, officers struggled to achieve 
this objective.  Their lament would have been familiar to all those who study frontier 
military history: among other problems, the lack of troops, the difficulty of operating 
patrols in mountainous terrain that allowed miners to slip away unnoticed, and the 
problem of maintaining positive public relations when Anglo-American citizens insisted 
that they alone, and not native people, had the right to the resources of the Black Hills.   
A few officers also intimated that state authority seemed to trump their own federal 
authority as well.   
  
                                                            
65 Anson Mills to AAG, 9 April 1875, Department of the Platte, LS, RG 393.  Pickney Lugenbeel 
to AAG, 24 April 1875, District of Southeastern Dakota, LS, RG 393.  Edwin Pollock to AAG, 2 August 
1875, District of Black Hills, Endorsements Sent, RG 393. 30 November 1875, District of Black Hills, 
Endorsements Sent, RG 393.  Anson Mills to AAG, 16 May 1875, Department of the Platte, LS, RG 393.    
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A case of horse theft puts many of these issues in stark perspective.  In December 
1875, two Anglo-American men stole twenty seven ponies from the Indians at the 
Spotted Tail agency.  The rustlers herded the horses to Sidney Barracks, Nebraska, and 
then to Julesburg, Colorado, where the horses were bought by a white buyer.  One of the 
thieves was able to elude a deputy US marshal and a contingent of soldiers.  Stock 
owners in Sidney feared a retaliatory raid by Indians, yet several local citizens were said 
to be involved in the theft, including the sheriff.  The agent at Spotted Tail vouched for 
the integrity of the ponies’ Lakota owners, but the animals had been rebranded.  “These 
fellows can get as many [illegible] as they want to swear to their ownership.  This is the 
worst nest of villains and cutthroats I ever saw!” exclaimed the captain at Sidney 
Barracks.  “The only way the stock can be recovered is by force, upon recognition by 
these Indians—and I judge that will be interfering with the state authority.”  It is clear 
that while army officers supported the government’s ultimate aim to seize the Black 
Hills, many of them were also fully cognizant of the mistreatment heaped upon native 
people.66
 By the late summer of 1875, over twelve hundred miners were reported to be in 
the Black Hills.  There were probably many more in reality.  Prospecting work was 
sometimes haphazard because of miners’ fear of arrest, but by and large, this fear did not 
keep Anglo-Americans from searching for gold.  George Crook, commander of the 
Department of the Platte, wrote that as soon as reconnaissance patrols stopped, the miners 
always returned, believing that the Black Hills would be opened to settlement by the time 
      
                                                            
66 Edward P. Smith to Columbus Delano, Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs to the 
Secretary of the Interior for the Year 1874 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1874), 7-8.  New 
York Times, 3 September 1874. Frederick Van Vliet to George Crook, 1 January 1876, Department of the 
Platte, LS, RG 393. 
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they arrived there.  “The majority have all they have in the world invested in their outfit; 
they have no means to live outside of the claims they have made.”67
 The claims that these men struck carried with them tremendous personal risk.  
Their Anglo-American identity, of course, ensured that they would be supported by 
federal authorities and the rights of native people ignored.  This kind of sentiment helps 
account for why the government later reneged on the guarantees made to the Lakota in 
1868.  Understanding the Lakota interpretation of the Treaty of Fort Laramie—and their 
responses to it—allows us to see the ways in which native people approached their 
Anglo-American opponents on the frontier.  The Lakota nation did not act as a 
monolithic entity, and the fact that it was distinguished by an unfamiliar value system, 
constant change, and even contradictions, explains why the army had such difficulty in 
predicting what native people might do next.  Yet rather than offer blind support for the 
prevailing ethnocentric and racist opinions of their age, army officers like David Stanley 
criticized the illegal actions of white civilians in Lakota territory at the same time that 
they called Indians “savages.”  A surprising number of officers recognized that Indians 
were justified in resisting the relinquishment of their land, and they offered quiet but 
generally consistent support for the most basic Indian treaty rights through the mid-
1870s.    
   
 In the short time between Custer’s 1874 expedition and the government’s 
attempts to seize the area in the winter of 1875, the native-white relationship in the Black 
Hills changed in a number of ways.  First, the government sought native submission 
through negotiation with many different Lakota communities, then allowed miners to run 
roughshod over Sioux territory.  The voices of dozens of Lakota warriors and leaders 
                                                            
67 Crook to AAG, 16 August 1875, Department of the Platte, LS, RG 393.  
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were recorded by a government committee led by Senator William Boyd Allison in the 
summer of 1875; these minutes show that Lakota opinions on the fate of the Black Hills 
were strong and varied.  The Lakotas’ overall refusal to surrender the Black Hills was 
ignored, and despite army officers’ continued efforts to uphold the law in favor of their 
native foes, they continued to lose control over civilian activity in the Black Hills through 
the winter of 1875.  In the end, given the choice to defend the rights of native people or to 
support the goals of national expansion and Manifest Destiny, army officers would 
ultimately chose the latter.    
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CHAPTER FIVE:  The Lakota Nation, the Army, and the Theft of Paha Sapa  
 
The army felt keenly the threat of illegal prospectors by the late summer of 1874, 
when reports of Custer’s expedition to the Black Hills began to filter through to 
newspapers around the United States.  Reporters promised “quantities so great that with 
pick and pan a single miner may take out $100 per day.”  The conclusions reached by 
Custer’s expedition, however, were radically different.1  The journals of members of 
Custer’s 1874 expedition reflect the fact that gold was found in small amounts; the 
majority of finds were less than fifty cents’ worth each.  Some members of the expedition 
doubted whether it existed in quantity.  Newton Horace Winchell, the University of 
Minnesota geologist who accompanied the expedition, made no reference to finding gold 
at all.2  Despite Winchell’s opinion—that he had “taken the gold reports with a large 
grain of allowance” and had not seen any gold—both Custer and the newspapers 
proclaimed that the Black Hills’ mineral resources exceeded everyone’s expectations.  
When Winchell contradicted these reports by repeating his assertions to the Minnesota 
Academy of Natural Sciences, newspapers in Chicago, Minnesota, Dakota Territory, and 
other parts of the west labeled him “absent minded” and incompetent.3
                                                 
1 New York Times, 23 August 1874. 
  In a letter to 
General Sheridan, however, Lieutenant Colonel Frederick Grant doubted the legitimacy 
of the gold claims.  He argued that the miners “all lived together and could concoct any 
plan they wished,” and that they lied about the amount of gold they found.  “I don’t 
2 These facts are corroborated in Lawrence K. Fox, "Gold Discovery," typescript, n.d., Lawrence 
K. Fox Papers, State Archives, South Dakota State Historical Society, Pierre.   
3 G.B. Morey, “Newton Horace Winchell, The George Armstrong Custer Expedition of 1874, and 
the ‘Discovery’ of Gold in the Black Hills,” Earth Sciences History 18, no. 1 (1999): 78, 86.  Custer’s 
report is reproduced in Peter Rosen, Pa-Ha Sa-Pah, or, The Black Hills of South Dakota (St. Louis: Nixon-
Jones Printing Company, 1895), 274-307.  Rosen was in charge of the St. Ambrose Parish in Deadwood, 
and the Roman Catholic missions in the Black Hills in the 1880s.     
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believe there was two dollars all put together and that they took out of there with them . . 
. I don’t believe that any gold was found at all.”4  To banish further doubt and confirm 
the Custer expedition’s findings, the government launched an expedition under geologist 
Walter P. Jenney in the summer of 1875.5
 Federal authorities and senior army leaders often condoned the activities of illegal 
miners by 1874, but line officers were less inclined to do so.
  Despite the proliferation of these mixed 
reports, the threat of illegal prospecting soared in the Black Hills. 
6
The commissioners’ statements about their objectives—to secure a treaty that surrendered 
the Black Hills—demonstrate that government officials wanted to dismantle the 
protections afforded by the 1868 Treaty of Fort Laramie at the same time that army 
officers were tracking and arresting illegal prospectors.  This contradictory stance 
undermined officers who were committed to keeping miners out of the hills, and it 
  Their role in preventing 
and controlling native-white violence in the Black Hills made them acutely aware of the 
precarious position that they occupied.  At the same time that they monitored the 
activities of Indians and miners, they fielded the bitter complaints of both parties.  Some 
native leaders acknowledged these officers’ attempts to protect Indian rights, but they 
recognized also that the army lacked the ability to keep miners off of their land.  
Therefore, when the government-endorsed Allison Commission approached Lakota 
community members about relinquishing their claim to the Black Hills, many of the 
Indians who spoke with the Commission reacted with disbelief and anger.   
                                                 
4 Morey, “Black Hills,” 87; see also Frederick D. Grant to Acting Adjutant General, 7 September 
1874, Division of the Missouri, Letters Received, RG 98.  (Hereafter Acting Adjutant General is 
abbreviated as AAG). Grant was Ulysses S. Grant’s son. 
5 For this expedition, see The Black Hills Journals of Richard Irving Dodge, ed. Wayne R. Kime 
(Norman: University of Oklahoma, 1996).  Colonel Dodge led the military escort for Jenney’s surveying 
party.  
6 Line officers are those trained to lead ground combat units. 
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proved to the Lakota that the United States, once again, was intent on making them 
destitute.  President Grant worsened this contradiction when he decided on November 3, 
1875 that the army should stop protecting the boundaries of Lakota territory from the 
miners.  Clearly, individual army officers remained dedicated to their mission to arrest 
miners through the winter of 1875-1876. Military and civilian leaders, however, seemed 
equally dedicated to creating a long-standing “engineered crisis” that put in motion the 
theft of Paha Sapa years before Grant’s 1875 order.7
 Restlessness and short tempers swept the main Lakota agencies in the winter of 
1873, several months before Custer’s expedition to the Black Hills.  Spotted Tail 
succeeded in slowing down farming efforts, and the communities at his and Red Cloud’s 
camps stymied Indian agents’ efforts to count their lodges.  Hundreds of northern Lakotas 
came to the agencies for the winter and demanded food; the chief clerk at Red Cloud was 
murdered.
     
8  Frightened by the Lakotas’ “impudent manners and . . . hostile threats,” 
afraid for their safety, and without military reinforcements, the Indian agents gave up and 
issued rations to all.9
                                                 
7 Janet E. Graebner, “The Last War Cry: Battle Butte, January 8, 1877,” in The Way West: True 
Stories of the American Frontier, 100.  Graebner argues that perhaps “Custer and others were sacrificed by 
an engineered crisis in the cause for western expansion.”  This chapter, however, argues that plans to seize 
the Black Hills were set in motion long before Custer’s death in June 1876. 
  After a number of relocations, by the spring of 1874, agencies were 
forty-two miles apart—a one- or two-day ride at most.   The proximity of Red Cloud and 
Spotted Tail agencies worried the commander of the Black Hills district, leading him to 
8 George E. Hyde, Spotted Tail’s Folk: A History of the Brulé Sioux, vol. 57 of The Civilization of 
the American Indian Series, 2nd edition (Norman: University of Oklahoma, 1974),  221.  Paul Hutton, Phil 
Sheridan and His Army, (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1985; reprint, Norman: University of 
Oklahoma, 2003), 287.   
9 Edward P. Smith to Columbus Delano, 1 November 1873, Report of the Commissioner of Indian 
Affairs to the Secretary of the Interior for the Year 1873 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1874), 
6.    
140 
 
recommend that both agencies be consolidated.10
The Black Hills attracted some attention from miners even before Custer’s 
expedition.  In February 1874, Charles Avery, a member of an illegal prospecting party, 
described the gold fever that struck both Montana and Dakota Territory.  “As men had 
been driven out of the Black Hills for prospecting, we did not care to have our old Uncle 
Sam take too much interest in our trip, as we had very sure knowledge that the boys with 
brass buttons . . . would take us in before we got started.”
  The agencies remained separate and 
the Lakota continued to win concessions from the timid agents who oversaw them.  The 
threat of illegal prospectors, however, became just as troubling for the army by 1874. 
11  In late August, the staff at 
Fort Hale, South Dakota, was told be on the look-out for miners leaving Sioux City and 
Yankton and heading for the hills.12
                                                 
10 Luther P. Bradley to Reverend Samuel D. Hinman, 6 September 1874, District of the Black 
Hills, Department of Dakota, Letters Sent, RG 393.  (Hereafter cited as DoDak, LS, and LR for Letters 
Received).     
  A small detachment headed to nearby Brule City, an 
Anglo-American settlement south of the Lower Brule reservation.  The lieutenant in 
charge of the detachment could not find any evidence of mining parties at the time. Two 
or three weeks later, however, a group of four or five men crossed through the Lower 
Brule reservation and headed for the Black Hills.  The leader of the group was an 
associate of men who owned Brule City and promoted it as a starting point for mining 
expeditions.  Dougherty had learned that these men were trying to divert emigrants from 
other areas to bolster up Brule City.  Although he did not record whether the men were 
11 Charles E. Avery Reminiscence, [1915?], Special Collections, Montana Historical Society, 
Helena.   
12 Assistant Adjutant General to Pinkney Lugenbeel, 27 August 1874, Fort Hale, Letters Received, 
RG 393, Part V.  Fort Hale was located north of Chamberlain, South Dakota, on the west bank of the 
Missouri River (near the contemporary Crow Creek and Lower Brule reservations.  South Dakota 
Historical Society, Finding Aid on “Forts and Posts.” 
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able to get close to the Black Hills, the lieutenant’s report indicated that the army faced 
an uphill struggle against civilian incursions.13
 General Sheridan, therefore, ordered General Alfred Howe Terry, commanding 
the Department of the Dakota, to strike back against the miners.  Terry’s subordinate 
commanders were to “burn the wagon trains, destroy the outfit, and arrest the leaders” of 
parties that crossed into Sioux territory.  Terry replied that if Sheridan’s instructions were 
made public, there would be little or no occasion to use force, perhaps assuming that the 
mere threat of violence would chase away the miners.  Terry then wrote to George Custer 
at Fort Lincoln, saying that if Congress opened up the hills “by extinguishing the treaty 
rights of the Indians,” Terry would give his “cordial support” to the settlement of the 
hills.
  
14
The staff at Fort Hale sent to their headquarters newspaper excerpts from the 
Yankton Press and Dakotan, a regional newspaper.  Men had gotten word of Sheridan’s 
telegram to Terry, which ordered him to arrest prospectors and destroy their property.  
Citizens believed the orders were arbitrary and illegal.  The intent of the “Black Hills 
Pioneers,” and similar citizens’ groups, after all, was “simply one of exploration” aimed 
  This early demonstration of support for the 1868 treaty’s revocation, and Terry’s 
acknowledgement of Congressional interest, suggests that federal authorities, both civil 
and military, were interested in acquiring the Black Hills at an early rate.  Although Terry 
did at times express his willingness to uphold Lakota treaty rights, the fact that he 
dismissed those rights illustrates where his true intent lay.     
                                                 
13 William Dougherty to Post Adjutant, Lower Brule Agency, 11 September 1874, Fort Hale, LR, 
RG 393, Part V.  For Brule City, see Democratic Party National Committee, The Campaign Text Book: 
Why the People Want a Change; The Republican Party Reviewed; Its Sins of Commission and Omission 
(New York: 1876), 703.   
14 Philip H. Sheridan to Alfred Howe Terry, 3 September 1873, Division of the Missouri, Special 
File, Box 1, RG 393; Terry to Sheridan, 3 September 1873, Division of the Missouri, Special File, Box 1, 
RG 393; George Armstrong Custer to Terry, 3 September 1873, Division of the Missouri, Special File, Box 
1, RG 393.  See also New York Times, 4 September 1874. 
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at making peaceful settlements and had “no intention of interfering with the rights of the 
Indians.”  In the Yankton Press article, men declared that as “free American citizens,” 
they were allowed “to go when and where we please, without asking the consent” of a 
‘military chieftan.’”  Walter A. Burleigh, the corrupt Indian agent and Republican 
representative for Dakota Territory, was now a citizen of Montana.  He gave his support 
to the organization, and was “frequently applauded” by citizens as an advocate for further 
settlement into Indian lands.15
 Many local commanders applied Sheridan’s orders stringently, but the limits of 
their authority hampered their ability to arrest suspected miners.  The commander at Fort 
Ellis was told that he had no authority to capture miners or destroy their property on the 
suspicion that they would enter the hills, but that he could act if they crossed the 
boundaries of Lakota territory.
 
16  The lieutenant colonel in command of the First 
Infantry, stationed at Fort Randall, wrote, “The squatters care nothing about law, orders, 
or Indian rights, and would undoubtedly resist any attempt on my part to drive them out.”  
Because the country was covered in snow, any expedition sent out would have to take 
grain and hay for their horses.  To the colonel’s dismay, the command did not have 
enough horses in the first place to mount an expedition.17
                                                 
15 William Smith to Anson Mills, 13 September 1874, Fort Hale, LR, RG 393, Part V. 
  Other patrols were similarly 
unsuccessful.  General Terry told Sheridan in late December 1874 that a patrol unit sent 
out from Fort Sully had gotten thirty miles into the Black Hills but had to retreat when 
their horses came up lame.  Lakota guides from Red Cloud and Spotted Tail agencies 
accompanied patrols into the hills, for, “being interested parties,” they had an incentive to 
16 AAG to the commanding officer at Fort Ellis, 24 September 1874, Department of Dakota, LS, 
RG 393. 
17 Pickney Lugenbeel to AAG, 23 December 1874, Southern District, DoDak, LS, RG 393. 
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discover where prospectors were.  Colonel Bradley, commanding the Black Hills District, 
had told Terry that “the guides must be charged not to molest the miners themselves,” 
recognizing implicitly the Lakota anger over intrusion into their lands.18
 The new year brought few changes to the situation in the Black Hills region.  
Lakota leaders, infuriated by the state of affairs, wanted to go to Washington and talk to 
President Grant.  The captain in command of Camp Robinson, the military post at Red 
Cloud’s agency, wrote that Indian agents had led Red Cloud to believe that he could go 
with them to Washington that spring.  Red Cloud asked the officers to remove white men 
who were loafing at the agency, but the captain refused, saying that the civilians were out 
of his jurisdiction.  The captain also took on a defensive tone, saying that Red Cloud had 
lied to him, saying that the army officers at the post had interfered with Indian affairs.  
Equally “absurd” was Red Cloud’s claim that Indian Agent John Saville had cheated the 
Indians.
   
19
Similarly, at Spotted Tail’s agency, the Indians asked the acting agent to rid their 
camp of trespassers.  Some of these men were mixed-blood men and residents of the 
agency.  They had been caught in the Black Hills and were brought in by soldiers from 
Camp Sheridan, the sister unit to Camp Robinson.  The acting Indian agent at Spotted 
Tail wrote to the Department of the Interior, stating that he could not remove the 
trespassers without help from the military.  In a rather perfect example of the bureaucracy 
  When Saville was acquitted of fraud, Lakota enmity grew toward Indian 
agents.   
                                                 
18 Luther P. Bradley to Terry, District of Black Hills, LS, enclosed in Special Order No. 13, Terry 
to Sheridan, 31 December 1874, District of Black Hills, LS, RG 393. 
19 William Jordan to AAG, 11 February 1875, District of Black Hills, DoDak, Endorsements Sent, 
RG 393. (Hereafter abbreviated as ES).  Following the killing of Frank Appleton, the chief clerk, the 
government assigned troops to Red Cloud’s agency and thus established Camp Robinson.  For more on 
Saville, see James C. Olson, Red Cloud and the Sioux Problem (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 
1965), 158-70.  Similarly, the army established Camp Sheridan at Spotted Tail’s agency.  
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that often stymied the frontier army, the commander at Camp Sheridan had to wait for 
authorization from the War Department before he could do anything about the civilians 
who plagued his own jurisdiction.20  When three of these miners were released, they 
started off for the hills with pack animals.  “It is rumored,” wrote Willard, “that they are 
going to the Black Hills and that they are going to assist the troops.  If they are not going 
by permission, ought they not to be recaptured by the troops?”21
 In March, General Terry made it clear that the army faced a difficult future unless 
commanders could shut out the miners decisively.  
  
I think that there is no longer room for doubt that as soon as the spring opens a persistent effort 
will be made by numerous parties of miners to invade the Black Hills.  It seems to be established 
that at least one such party has passed the winter in the hills and that it has found gold. . . . a 
corporation with large capital has been formed at Sioux City [with the] avowed purpose . . . to 
violate and defy the law.  [Now] when large numbers are out of employment, men are easily 
attracted to any scheme of adventure which promotes profit . . . [unless the Army acts] the whole 
of the hill country will be over run by miners as soon as the season will permit. . . . Every part of it 
which is left unguarded will be invaded.  I need not dwell on the importance [of] the enforcement 
of the law because it is law, considerations touching the national good faith and honor. . . any 
attempts to defy the law and to trample on the rights secured to the Sioux by the treaty of 1868 
should be met in the most vigorous manner. . . . If during the coming season the Hills can be 
absolutely closed to intruders [this would dissuade miners when they see others fail]. . . .  The 
temper of the Sioux along the Missouri is such that it will be no surprise to me should an outbreak 
occur as soon as the grass grows in the spring.22
 
 
Terry’s letter seems to refute the popular contention that the army succeeded in 
keeping all miners out of the Black Hills until November 1875, when officers were told 
to stop resisting the civilian invasion.  The letters of Lieutenant Dougherty of Fort Hale 
and Lieutenant Colonel Lugenbeel of Fort Randall, as well as the complaints levied by 
Colonel David Stanley at Fort Laramie, indicate that a small but nonetheless significant 
                                                 
20 Edward P. Smith to Columbus Delano, 9 April 1875, Department of the Platte, LS, RG 393; 
enclosed with Edward Willard to Office of Indian Affairs, 28 March 1875, Department of the Platte, LS, 
RG 393.  E.A. Howard and Edward Willard to Anson Mills, commanding Camp Sheridan, 5 May 1875, 
Department of the Platte, LS, RG 393.  (Hereafter abbreviated as DoPlatte).  The problem of War and 
Interior Department bureaucracy is discussed in chapter 4 of this manuscript. 
21 Edward Willard to Anson Mills, 10 May 1875, DoPlatte, LS, RG 393. 
22 Terry to AAG, 9 March 1875, Division of Missouri, LR, RG 393. 
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number of miners may have eluded the army.  Given that the two major commands in the 
Black Hills district—the Ninth Infantry and Twenty-Second Infantry—had limited 
numbers of troops and had to patrol a large area with inhospitable terrain, it would have 
been impossible for the army to prevent every single miner from getting into the Black 
Hills.23  Lakota resistance was a very real concern, particularly because all of the 
agencies in the region had suffered for want of food over the winter.  Custer reported in 
March that the Hunkpapa and Blackfeet Lakota at the Standing Rock agency had been on 
half rations for two months.  His patrols had not seen any game for hundreds of miles.  
By the end of the month, the agency would run out of food.  Custer pointed out that most 
of the yearly ration was still in Sioux City warehouses.24
 Many officers recognized that the railroad had an indispensable role to play in the 
development of the West, and railroad agents realized that the army could help their 
business.  The army’s involvement with the railroad industry does not exactly constitute a 
matter of unhindered cooperation; both Sheridan and Sherman, for instance, had little 
patience for railroad owners who treated the army like a private security force.
  Chronic mismanagement, 
therefore, continued to add to Lakota unrest.  
25
                                                 
23 Fred Radford Brown, History of the Ninth U.S. Infantry, 1799-1909 (Chicago: R.R. Donnelley 
and Sons, Co., 1909), 104-16 for the unit’s activities on the Northern Plains from January 1872 to 
December 1875.  Elements of the unit were often assigned to missions outside of the Black Hills; limited 
manpower on the Plains meant that many units were over-extended.  See also Hutton,  Phil Sheridan and 
His Army, 291-294. 
  Still, 
the suggestion of tacit collusion between the railroad and the army reflects the degree to 
24 Custer to AAG, 10 March 1875, DoDak, LS, RG 393.  See also Report of the Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs to the Secretary of the Interior for the Year 1875 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 
1876), 6, 91, for problems at Standing Rock and its tribal composition.  
25 Hutton, Phil Sheridan and His Army, 172-73.  Colonel Lugenbeel (at Fort Randall) argued that 
“all the vagrant population of this frontier will endeavor early in the season, to go into the Sioux 
reservation.”  He felt that “railroad and newspaper people,” among others, fueled the public’s interest in the 
Black Hills.  See in Hutton, 293 fn 3, Pickney Lugenbeel to Terry, 5 March 1875, Division of the Missouri, 
Special File, Box 1, RG 393.  See also the classic study by Robert G. Athearn, William Tecumseh Sherman 
and the Settlement of the West (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1956), 186.  
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which their interests were intertwined.  Thomas L. Kimball, the general ticket agent for 
the Union Pacific Railroad, wrote to General Edward Ord, commander of the Department 
of the Platte, in March 1875.  Kimball wanted to know about local whites’ numerous 
inquiries about rates and routes to the Black Hills.  While Kimball admitted that he had 
done nothing to discourage the prospectors, he asked whether the railroad should 
cooperate with the military and refuse to make arrangements for miners.  If some men 
succeeded in getting to the hills, however, Kimball suggested that the railroad encourage 
others to outfit themselves at Omaha and Cheyenne.26
Developments outside of the Black Hills illustrate that the gold rush was fast 
becoming a matter of national concern.  On March 17th, President Grant forwarded 
correspondence about the Black Hills situation to the Senate.  Congress wanted to know 
about civilian emigration to the region and whether the Indians consented to white 
encroachment on their lands.  Secretary of the Interior Columbus Delano told the 
president that his department was organizing a Lakota delegation to Washington, in the 
hopes of getting the Indians to relinquish their possession of the Black Hills.  Yet while 
Delano promised that both the Interior and War Departments would strive to protect the 
Indians’ rights under the 1868 treaty of Fort Laramie, he promised to “use every effort 
possible to extinguish the Indian title to the Black Hills country and open the same to 
settlement.”  Thus, Delano, Grant, and other federal authorities, with the help of the 
army’s senior leadership, introduced yet another paradoxical element into the 
government’s relationship with Indians.  One wonders whether Grant was influenced by 
    
                                                 
26 Thomas L. Kimball to Edward Ord, 11 March 1875, Department of the Platte, LS, RG 393. 
Ord’s reply, if any, to Kimball could not be located in the archives. 
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the petition from citizens from Nebraska, asking him for the “Simple justice” that 
opening the Black Hills would bring.27
 A few days later, Delano wrote to the Secretary of War, William Belknap, 
insisting that “trespassers now in that country, in violation of law and treaty stipulations, 
[would] endanger the success of these negotiations.”
 
28  Others, however, had worried 
about the implications of attempting to court the favor of the Lakota at the same time that 
the government supported the invasion of their territory.  When he had learned of 
Custer’s expedition in June 1874, William H. Hare wrote a long and worried letter to 
Grant.  As the Episcopal bishop of the Dakota region, Hare had worked closely among 
both white and Indian communities in rural areas.  Either the government could invite 
Lakota delegates to Washington, or it could permit Custer’s expedition to cross the 
boundaries of Sioux territory—but the government could not do both.  He wrote, “An 
invasion of the Black Hills means, I fear, or at least will surely result in, War, and war to 
the knife. . . . this invasion of the Indian territory will almost beyond a question be made 
the occasion of the inroad of large numbers of rapacious and unprincipled civilians.”  
Belknap mollified these fears of a “general Indian war” in a letter to Delano, arguing that 
the army’s planned reconnaissance mission would not provoke the Lakota.  In fact, 
Custer’s expedition encountered few Lakotas, and his successful return to Fort Lincoln 
reinforced the idea that Hare’s worries were unfounded.29
                                                 
27 Ulysses Simpson Grant, The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant, 1875., ed. John Y. Simon, vol. 26 
(Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1967), 84. 
  The expedition proceeded as 
planned, and as of the spring of 1875, nothing had really been done to mollify Lakota 
discontent.       
28 Ibid., 85. 
29 Ibid., 87. 
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 Frustration and confusion characterized officers’ reactions to illegal prospectors 
in the late spring of 1875, perhaps because some commanders were aware of the 
government’s avowed interest in acquiring the Black Hills through a treaty.  A letter to 
General Ord on March 17 directed that all expeditions into the Black Hills would be 
prevented as long as the 1868 treaty existed.  “Efforts are now being made to arrange for 
the extinguishment of the Indian title”—but if those efforts failed, the settlers would be 
expelled.30  At Fort D.A. Russell in Wyoming Territory, an infantry major described a 
party of miners pursued by his cavalry troops.  Twenty-four miners had collected in 
Cheyenne and headed for the Black Hills.  Wrote the major, “I have little faith in the 
success of such expeditions,” for the miners headed in different directions, and if each 
party was followed, they would deplete the garrison.  The major doubted that the miners 
would reach the hills successfully, for the men were “mostly ignorant of the country and 
would be afraid of encountering Indians.”  Either the citizens in Cheyenne were ignorant 
of the miners, or they refused to tell the army what they knew.  The miners, “knowing 
how much depends on secrecy,” had kept quiet about their plans.  The major lamented in 
closing that every officer and enlisted man in his unit, even in civilian clothes, was 
known to Cheyenne residents, which made it impossible for them to get information.31
                                                 
30 AAG to Edward Ord, 17 March 1875, DoPlatte, LR, RG 393. 
  In 
a letter to Custer, General Terry wrote that parties from Sioux City and Yankton would 
aim for the hills through Nebraska, making it difficult for the troops at Fort Randall to 
catch them.  Custer had not thought that miners would be expelled during the 
negotiations for the hills, but Terry corrected him, saying that the miners would be 
expelled as soon as the weather permitted.  “I don’t see how any sale of the hills country 
31 Major A___ (illegible) to AAG, 24 March 1875, DoPlatte, LS, RG 393.   
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can take effect until the next session of Congress.  Until the sale if made is ratified by 
Congress, the government must keep intruders out.”32
 Line officers’ reports reflected disturbing developments throughout the region.  
The commander at Fort Randall insisted, “Recruits are very much needed.  The Sioux 
Indians are very uneasy about the invasion of their countries by lawless bands of whites 
and it may prove impossible to restrain them from committing outrages along the 
borders.”
 
33
Captain Anson Mills, commanding Camp Sheridan, wrote of his conversation 
with No Flesh, the man who served in Spotted Tail’s absence when the Brule leader went 
to Washington for the May 1875 council with President Grant.  The Minneconjous 
wanted No Flesh to hold a council with them, but he did not know why they wanted to 
talk to him.  No Flesh had not decided yet whether he would join them.  Mills described 
No Flesh as “very bitter in his denunciations of the Agents here,” for the people were 
hungry.  Mills knew that wild game was scarce and admitted that the agent had only 
presented the Lakota with thirteen head of cattle.
   
34  When he had first arrived at Camp 
Sheridan, Spotted Tail had told him that the Indian agent, Mr. Howard, did not let them 
have enough food.  When Mills confronted Howard, the man told him that he had given 
the Indians “all they were entitled to, and if they starved it wasn’t his fault.”  Without 
permission, Mills issued the Lakotas ample amounts of bread and bacon.35
                                                 
32 Terry to Custer, 7 April 1875, DoDak, LS, RG 393. 
 
33 Pickney Lugenbeel to AAG, 24 April 18 75, Southern District, DoDak, LS, RG 393. 
34 Anson Mills to AAG, 16 May 1875, DoPlatte, LS, RG 393. 
35 Anson Mills, My Story, ed. C.H. Claudy, 2nd ed.(Washington: Press of Byron S. Adams, 1921), 
151-52.   Mills describes a close working relationship with Spotted Tail and other Indian leaders, who 
impressed him with their candor and sense of humor.  When Lone Horn, the Minneconjou leader, came to 
the agency on a hot day, Mills made him a big glass of cold lemonade.  Seeing Lone Horn gulp the cold 
drink, Spotted Tail warned him, “Have you drank all that?  You had better lie down and hold onto the 
grass, for the whole world will begin to turn over in a few minutes.”  Lone Horn was genuinely startled, 
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Mills had been present at a Brulé Lakota council on April 29th as well, and wrote 
about the anger that characterized that meeting.  “There is no disguising the fact… that 
there is a general and bitter discontent among them… No Flesh says, a few of his young 
warriors have gone on the War path, and he fears he cannot restrain other discontents.”  
Spotted Tail and other leaders had been “unusually bitter” before they left for 
Washington.  The Lakota were most likely still starving, and their leading men must have 
sensed the belligerence of the white men who would not deign to protect the reservation 
from interlopers and thieves who smuggled alcohol to the agency and crossed into the 
Black Hills.  Leaders like Red Cloud and Spotted Tail must have seen a journey to 
Washington as a kind of recourse, where they would meet American authorities with far 
greater power than a local Indian agent.36  Despite the risk of alienating the Lakota 
further, General Sheridan allowed miners under arrest at Fort Randall (and possibly other 
installations) to be released if they signed a written affidavit.37
Conflict with civilians became increasingly violent and risky in the early summer 
months.  Thawed streams, lack of snow and more easily navigable terrain allowed the 
miners to elude the troops.  And although some officers manifested helplessness against 
the miners in their reports, they did not hesitate to challenge miners when they had the 
  Sheridan’s interest in 
protecting Lakota treaty rights remained a procedural interest only—not a matter of the 
fair treatment of Indians that some of his subordinates supported.   
                                                                                                                                                 
much to Spotted Tail’s amusement.   See Mills, My Story, 161-62.  On a more serious note, Mills attests to 
the direct connection between the Black Hills invasion and increased Lakota militancy.   
36 Mills to AAG, 16 May 1875, DoPlatte, LS, RG 393. 
37 Lugenbeel to R. Armstrong, 15 May 75, Southern District, DoDak, LS, RG 393.  Lieutenant 
Armstrong commanded the guard in charge of the captured miners.  Hutton argues, “Sheridan did not 
oppose white settlement in the Black Hills, except to the extent that he was required by law and duty to 
prevent trespass on the Sioux reservation, but he was even more eager for whites to move into northern 
Wyoming and southeastern Montana. . . . Sheridan saw a way to [stop Lakota resistance] through the 
promotion of western lands.  As these lands filled with whites, the politicians would be made to listen, the 
game killed off, and the Indian right to hunt nullified.”  Hutton, Phil Sheridan and His Army, 292.      
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chance.  Fergus Walker, a captain with the First Infantry, had encountered nearly a 
hundred and fifty well-armed men on the outskirts of the Black Hills.  Since he only had 
thirty soldiers with him and wished “to avoid bloodshed,” Walker allowed the men to 
remain in the area under a written pledge that they would not attempt to enter the hills 
again until the government withdrew its restrictions against the miners.  Walker insisted 
that “it was the opinion in Washington” that the mere organization of an expedition 
violated the law as much as an actual incursion on to Indian land.38  Walker wrote Mills a 
few days later that he had arrested fifty to seventy five men who were the “bad spirits of 
the original outfit.”  The prospectors were well armed, possessing nearly a hundred 
firearms between them. “There is a rumor that many of them have arms, and that it was 
their intention to resist if I attempted to move them by force across the River towards 
Randall,” he wrote.  While Walker did not “altogether credit” that rumor, his cautious 
action showed that he took the miners’ threats seriously.39  In response, Captain Mills 
struck out for Walker’s location with sixty soldiers and a Gatling gun, and was able to 
turn back the miners.40
 The miners in question were led by the infamous John Gordon, who took a small 
party to the hills in the winter of 1874.  Generally credited as the first party to winter 
successfully in the Black Hills, Gordon’s first group arrived there on December 9, 1874 
and built a sizeable stockade.  In February 1875 Gordon and another leader of the party 
went to Sioux City to announce their successful strike.  In April, when the remaining 
prospectors were bogged down by snow storms, troops from Fort Randall accosted 
   
                                                 
38 Fergus Walker to Anson Mills, 15 May 1875, DoPlatte, LS, RG 393. 
39 Walker to Anson Mills, 20 May 1875, DoPlatte, LS, RG 393. 
40 Special Order No. 35, 17 May 1875, DoPlatte, LS, RG 393.  Captain Mills’ detachment 
consisted of fifty non-commissioned officers and enlisted men; a detachment of ten soldiers manned the 
Gatling gun.  
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them.41  Despite Gordon’s orders that no one could leave the camp, men deserted it in his 
absence, and two of them led the Randall troops to the stockade.  Now Gordon was trying 
to get to the hills again, and this time with a much larger and openly aggressive force.  
His men, who had left Sioux City for the hills in April, refused to leave the area and 
surrender themselves at Spotted Tail Agency.  They told Walker that he had no right to 
do so under General Sheridan’s order.  A civilian wrote to General George Crook, now 
commander of the Department of the Platte, about Captain Walker’s obdurate behavior.  
Evidently Walker had allowed his men to seize the miners’ property, even some of their 
boots and shoes, in an effort to discourage them from trying to come back to the area.42
 When the governor of Nebraska heard about the incident, he was livid.  Silias 
Garber’s constituents lived on the outskirts of the Black Hills, and many of Nebraska’s 
citizens clamored to get into the mountains.  In a vituperative tone, Garber complained 
that emigrants had been “stripped of their arms and provisions and taken prisoners.” The 
men had claimed that they were not heading for the Black Hills, but waiting for the land 
to be opened to white settlement.  Garber insisted that the 1868 treaty did not “set aside a 
portion of a sovereign state [Nebraska] as unceded Indian lands.”  Although he would 
have known that Nebraska territory served as a primary place of refuge for emigrants, 
Garber demanded that the army release the prisoners.  He called the current reading of the 
treaty “unwarranted and unjust.”
   
43
                                                 
41 John S. McClintock, Pioneer Days in the Black Hills: Accurate History and Facts Related by 
One of the Early Day Pioneers, ed. Edward L. Senn (Deadwood, S.D., 1939; reprint, Norman: University 
of Oklahoma Press, 2000), 24-28. 
  While Crook stood firm and continued to enforce his 
42Fred Evans to George C. Crook, 29 May 1875, DoPlatte, LR, RG 393.  Anson Mills details this 
incident as well; see My Story, 153-54.   
43 Silias Garber to George C. Crook, 29 May 1875, DoPlatte, LR, RG 393. 
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orders, Garber’s letter illustrates that state authorities in the west saw the army as not 
only an aid to western expansion, but also an obstacle.  
In the midst of these unsettling events, the Lakota delegation traveled to 
Washington to meet President Grant.  On May 19, Grant met Red Cloud, Spotted Tail, 
and other Oglala and Brulé representatives.  Lone Horn spoke first, making the bold and 
honest assertion that “part of the country which I own now, the white people wish to take 
from me.”  Grant responded,” We have the interests of the Indians at heart, and in view of 
the great growth of the population among the white people, we know better what is for 
your interests than you can know yourselves, and it is your interests we are looking 
after.”  The Lakota leaders continued to speak to Grant at length, but his blatant reply 
made the perspective of the government obvious.  Two days later, the Lakotas met with 
members of the Department of the Interior to talk about their dissatisfaction with the 
outcomes of the Treaty of Fort Laramie.  Grant had refused to discuss future treaties with 
them, and for good reason.  John Collins of the Red Cloud Agency had told Grant in 
March that he believed that the Lakota “would be perfectly willing to sell the Black 
Hills.”44
Collins promised the Lakotas that the army would keep miners away from the 
Black Hills, but his assertions did not go over well with Red Cloud:  “White men are 
beginning to know that this is my land.  Look at me!  I am no dog.  I am a man.  You tell 
me about the Great Father’s troops.  He has troops all over the world, and I do not believe 
that the Great Father has not troops enough to keep white men away from the Black Hills 
   
                                                 
44 Ulysses Simpson Grant, The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant, 1875, ed. John Y. Simon, vol. 26 
(Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1967), 121.  See 119-25 for more Indian testimony (and 
the American response).  
 
154 
 
. . . . [The commissioners] all lie to me and want to steal everything I have.”45  Red Cloud 
could not have been more correct.  Shortly after the Lakotas’ return to their agencies, a 
cavalry company was detailed from Camp Robinson to escort the Indian Commissioners 
to Camp Sheridan and the Black Hills.46  The Allison Commission had one purpose—
convince the Lakota people to give the Black Hills to the whites.  The commissioners 
included Senator William Boyd Allison of Iowa, Reverend Samuel D. Hinman, and a 
number of lawyers and judges.  General Terry was also a member, but he did not 
participate in the initial hearings, which were held at Spotted Tail’s and Red Cloud’s 
agencies in the summer of 1875.47  The official report of the September 1875 “grand 
council” between the commissioners and the Indians has been widely available for years; 
less well-known are the preliminary discussions that took place before that meeting.  
These minutes reveal that the question of the Black Hills had divided the Lakota 
community.  To the Lakota people, the Black Hills were (and are) a sacred place, a 
“nexus to the cultural well being of Lakota people [and] a mediator in their relationship 
with all other living things.”48
The testimony gathered over a two-month period by the Allison Commission 
vividly illustrates Lakota communities’ distrust and anger over the proposed sale of the 
  Surrendering them would bring the Lakota closer to the 
uncertainty of economic dependence on the United States.   
                                                 
45 Ibid. See also New York Times, 20 May 1875. 
46 Special Order No. 14, 30 June 1875, District of the Black Hills, DoDak, LS, RG 393.   
47 Rosen, Paha Sapa, 341-344.  See also Mills, My Story, 163-65.  The commissioners were 
William Boyd Allision, the Honorable A. Comingo of Illinois, Reverend Samuel D. Hinman, G.P Beauvais, 
Esq., of Saint Louis, W.H. Ashby, Esq., of  Nebraska, and A.G. Lawrence, Esq.  John S. Collins of the 
Indian Office served as secretary.  See Report of the Commission Appointed to Treat with the Sioux Indians 
for the Relinquishment of the Black Hills (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1875), 5.  
48 John P. LaVelle, “Rescuing Paha Sapa:  Achieving Environmental Justice by Restoring the 
Great Grasslands and Returning the Sacred Black Hills to the Great Sioux Nation,” Great Plains Natural 
Resources Journal 40, no. 5 (2001): 66. See also Donald Worster, “The Black Hills: Sacred or Profane?” in 
Under Western Skies: Nature and History in the American West (New York: Oxford University Press, 
1992): 106-153.   
155 
 
Black Hills.  From July to August of 1875, the commission went to Red Cloud’s and 
Spotted Tail’s agencies and also spoke with their Cheyenne and Arapaho allies.  The 
minutes of the preliminary meetings were condensed into a three-page report to 
Congress, but they reflect little of the complexity of the issue from the Lakota 
perspective.  The Lakota saw the talks as a series of discussions between two sovereign 
nations, one of which seemed intent on deceit; the Americans saw the talks as a re-
affirmation of the Lakotas’ status as wards of the state.  The commissioners decided that 
$70 million would compensate the Lakota adequately.  However, the Lakota did not see 
themselves as the recipients of American paternalism; they used the term “Great Father” 
in a rhetorical sense and did not shy from expressing disappointment in him.  
Furthermore, they argued that the government owed them restitution for civilian trespass 
on their property.  They wanted the commissioners and the president to honor treaty 
obligations, and they wanted the miners off of their land.    
The commissioners first met Red Cloud, They Fear Even His Horses, Pawnee 
Killer, and other Oglala leaders on the 4th of July; they met Spotted Tail, Standing Elk, 
Swift Bear, and other Brulés.  Their goal—“uniformity and one opinion” from the 
Lakota—was fraught with assumptions about native polity.  While the Lakota nation in 
general opposed the sale of the Black Hills, some members, particularly older people, 
saw land cession as a promise (albeit unreliable) of security.  When the commissioners 
first approached the Lakota, they said nothing about another land cession; they referred 
merely to “doing business.”  They did so almost exclusively, out of fear of alienating 
Lakota leaders.  Spotted Tail rebuffed them quickly, however, saying 
If anything displeases me, I say so.  I hold nothing back . . . what I say, I do not [say] for myself.  
If you go to the hills the Indians in other parts of the country would look upon you as they look 
upon other white men who have gone there without authority. . . . The government has given the 
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guardianship of the Black Hills to the soldiers . . . the Indians look to the Great Father and hold 
him responsible.49
 
      
Red Cloud and some of the other Lakota men present at the councils realized that 
their economy would have to shift from a hunting-based system to one based on 
domesticated livestock, farming, and the continued receipt of government annuities.  In 
fact, Red Cloud “[clearly] understood both the value of the Hills and the danger of 
economic support that would have been necessary to achieve an effective transition” to 
Anglo-American expectations of Indians.50  When he met the commissioners on July 14, 
1875, he declared, “This ground is mine and today my Great Father has been pretty hard 
to me.  My Great Father has promised me our pay and I want to try to get that for us.”  
Moreover, the Oglala warehouse had no rations over the winter of 1874.  Spotted Tail 
added, “We went to Washington [and] I gave a great deal of land to the Great Father for 
nothing. . . . My people were not satisfied at all.  The Indians called you flying birds.”  
Thus he criticized the commissioners for their capricious behavior—always traveling 
somewhere new and expecting land to be given to them.51
The commissioners created another major point of contention when they insisted 
that they had to go to the Black Hills to ensure that whites purchased as little native land 
as possible.  They tried to disguise their motives with offhand remarks, saying that that 
had kept their travel plans secret from the other Lakotas “because they did not ask us and 
we did not think it concerned them.”  Spotted Tail reminded them that the military 
 
                                                 
49 Commission Appointed to Treat with the Sioux Indians for the Relinquishment of the Black 
Hills, “Minutes of the Preliminary Meetings, July-August 1875,” 55, Western Americana Collection, 
Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library, Yale University, New Haven.  (Hereafter referred to as 
Allison Commission, “Preliminary Meetings.”) 
50 James Stripes, “We Think in Terms of What is Fair”: Justice versus “Just Compensation” in 
Elizabeth Cook-Lynn’s “From the River’s Edge,” Wicazo Sa Review 12, no. 1 (Spring 1997): 179. 
51 Allison Commission, “Preliminary Meetings,” 70-71. 
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command was responsible for the Black Hills and told them to wait for more information 
from the army.  Senator Allison lied to him, saying, “The president wants to know 
whether gold is actually there before the whites buy the country.”  Spotted Tail repeated 
his assertion, saying that it was better for the commissioners not to go to the hills.  
Allison retorted, “You suffer the soldiers and miners to go the Black Hills but when 
government commissioners want to go in your interests, you raise objections which you 
not ought to do.”52
Spotted Tail’s brusque reply quieted Allison—Grant had sent troops to keep 
miners out; he had not sent the commissioners to go the Black Hills.  If he had, the men 
would have bypassed the agencies instead of visiting them.  If they went to the hills, the 
Brulés would refuse to talk with them, for the Indians feared that the whites would “take 
all the best claims” for themselves.  Spotted Tail’s threat—“You had better remain here 
and attend to this council”—demonstrates that the Lakota, more often than the 
commissioners, had the upper hand during the meetings.  When they did go to the Black 
Hills, a Brule and Oglala delegation accompanied them and continued to harangue them.  
Red Dog told them, “I find white men like grasshoppers in the Black Hills.  All the 
creeks are full. . . . The agents at Red Cloud and Spotted Tail did not tell me true.  They 
told me you was here to drive these miners out.  I find that you are here and nobody is 
away.”
   
53  The colonel in command of the Jenney geological expedition followed up with 
a slip that is recorded in the minutes—he would do everything “with regard to keeping 
the Indians out of the Black Hills.”54
                                                 
52 Ibid., 58. 
 
53 Ibid., 86. 
54Ibid., 88.  Either this is Dodge’s slip or a mistake made by the commission secretary; it speaks 
volumes about the commission’s true intentions and attitudes.   
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The commissioners laid bare their feelings in a private meeting after they first 
spoke to Red Cloud and Spotted Tail.  Their comments reveal that they were worried 
about the Lakotas’ ability to sway the outcome of the council.  They also desired to 
deceive the Indians by withholding information and using the Lakotas’ mixed-blood 
interpreters and relatives against them.55
[t]he Indians at my agency, and I presume at the others, were constantly forming war parties to go 
out against these trespassing miners, and Spotted Tail, realizing the critical status, made a 
confidant of me, and frequently reported as near he could the probable time and numbers of 
warriors that were leaving his agency, suggesting that I intercept them by sending out soldiers to 
head them off, which I often did.  As they were acting in violation of his orders, it was difficult for 
him and the other Sioux chiefs to know where they went, and for what purpose, but he did his very 
best to suppress the insurrection which was then before him.
  One critical admission—their hope that the 
government would not prevent miners from trespassing into the hills—indicates that 
some federal authorities considered taking this step before Grant’s official decision in 
November 1875.  At the same time, the commissioners recognized that the miners’ 
presence threatened their success at the great Lakota council.  Reverend Hinman averred, 
“The Indians are really discussing whether they should not go themselves and drive the 
miners out of the hills.  They do not seem to consider that such a step would lead to a 
general Indian war.”  In fact, the Lakota may have already been trying to rout the miners.  
According to Captain Mills at Camp Sheridan,  
56
 
  
 By the time they met with the Lakotas’ Cheyenne and Arapaho allies, the 
commissioners had changed their tack once again.  The commissioners took advantage of 
                                                 
55 Ibid., 64.  The commissioners were worried particularly about Louis Richard, a mixed-blood 
interpreter, and Francio Bouche, who was a son-in-law of Spotted Tail.  Of Bouche: “He has lived among 
the Indians a long time and they listen to him.  He has influence . . . . In view of that he must be employed 
by us in some capacity or he must be ignored and we must take the chance of his working against us.”  For 
biographical information on Bouche, see Donovin Arleigh Sprague, Rosebud Sioux (Chicago: Arcadia 
Publishing, 2005), 20.  For more on Louis Bordeaux, Brulé-French interpreter, see Richard G. Hardoff, The 
Death of Crazy Horse: A Tragic Episode in Lakota History (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2001), 
95.   
56 Mills, My Story, 151, 394. 
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the fact that the Arapaho were experiencing what Loretta Fowler has termed a “crisis in 
authority.”  According to Fowler, between 1874 and 1876, the Arapahoes’ increasing 
inability to sustain themselves politically and economically meant that their leaders had 
difficult decisions to make.  Eventually, the Arapaho “resolved the dilemma . . . by 
seizing the opportunity to provide scouting services to the army” in the autumn of 1876.57  
At the meeting, the commissioners tried to insinuate that the Cheyenne and Arapaho were 
less well-off than their Lakota friends in order to gain leverage against the Sioux.  Little 
Wolf, Black Coal and The White Maned Horse (White Horse) disagreed with the 
Americans’ take on Cheyenne-Arapaho affairs. 58
                                                 
57 Loretta Fowler, Arapahoe Politics, 1851-1978: Symbols in Crises of Authority (Lincoln: 
University of Nebraska Press, 1982), 58.  The Arapahoes had not been able to secure a reservation in 
Wyoming at this point, which would have made them vulnerable. 
  Little Wolf reminded them, “I 
consider this my country.  We are living here together; the people you see in the county 
[the Lakota] and we are friends.”  Despite Little Wolf’s assertion, Allison pressed the 
issue, saying, “We will try to fix it so you will be as well off as the Sioux,” and that the 
government was “very sorry” for the Cheyenne and Arapaho.  Turning to the Indian 
agent John Saville, Allison asked whether the Indians were getting rations.  Saville 
replied that they got rations through government generosity but were not entitled to them, 
and added cold-bloodedly, “If stopped they would starve to death.”  The Indians would 
have none of the Americans’ nonsense, insisting, “The Sioux and the Cheyennes are all 
the same people: we have been . . . together and we want to remain together.”  Black Coal 
added, “Our forefathers are buried all over this country and when we go just a little 
58 Ibid., 74.  Little Wolf was Northern Cheyenne; Black Coal and White Maned Horse were 
Arapaho.  Little Wolf was forced onto a reservation near Fort Reno, Indian Territory, after Ranald 
Mackenzie attacked Dull Knife’s winter camp  in November 1876.  In September 1878, Little Wolf and 
Dull Knife escaped the reservation with around 300 people, and headed for Pine Ridge, where Red Cloud 
and Spotted Tail had been relocated.  For more on the Northern Cheyenne exodus, see John H. Monnett, 
Tell Them We Are Going Home: The Odyssey of the Northern Cheyennes (Norman: University of 
Oklahoma Press, 2001). 
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buffalo hunting the white man comes against us and hunts us first.”  The commissioners, 
who must not have had very good hearing, said in closing that the Cheyenne and Arapaho 
ought to be provided for like the Lakota.59
 When they returned to Red Cloud’s Agency, the commissioners reiterated the fact 
that land cessions would provide physical and financial security to the Lakota people.  
Red Cloud criticized them for ignoring the problems that plagued the agency, including 
the disorderly behavior of intoxicated soldiers and civilian employees, and instead 
focusing their energies on the Black Hills.  Red Cloud reminded the commissioners that 
they had deceived him by going to the Black Hills without informing him.  “We look 
ahead for our children,” he told them.  This declaration seems to be key in understanding 
the origins of Red Cloud’s status in the Lakota political hierarchy, and more important, 
the Anglo-American interpretation and corruption of that hierarchy.
 
60
Red Cloud distanced himself from more militant leaders like Sitting Bull and 
American Horse by accepting a reservation-bound life as well as the status that Anglo-
Americans assigned to him.  But while Red Cloud acknowledged that the commissioners 
could now influence the future for the Lakotas, he was also acknowledging that the 
Oglalas’ sought pragmatic solutions to their growing dependency—solutions that still 
allowed them a hefty measure of autonomy.  They might sell land, but they would do so 
to provide for their families and their descendants.  As Elizabeth Cook-Lynn has argued, 
“In 1873, when he had finally settled [on the reservation] and his influence among the 
people had diminished considerably, there was every indication that though he had 
   
                                                 
59 Allison Commission, “Preliminary Meetings,” 66. 
60 Ibid., 70.  For Red Cloud and questions of status in the Lakota polity, see Mario Gonzalez and 
Elizabeth Cook-Lynn, The Politics of Hallowed Ground: Wounded Knee and the Struggle for Indian 
Sovereignty (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1999), 28-32. 
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accepted the reservation as a homeland, he had not given up his commitment to 
sovereignty.”61
 Accordingly, Red Cloud, Red Dog, and other Lakota leaders did not hesitate to 
criticize the government’s conduct in front of the commissioners.  They named specific 
individuals who should oversee ration and annuity issues, and they named others who had 
cheated them with “lean old steers” instead of “fat beef cattle.”  They demanded 
restitution for the property stolen from their elders; they described the “principal rascals” 
and thieves who “came in with Pawnee scouts in the Black Hills.”  Brown Hat (Baptiste 
Good), another Lakota leader, declared, “We want to get our pay for the damage that has 
been done our country.  The Brulés and Oglalas are going to have their agencies so long 
as the ground don’t give in and the skies don’t fall.”  The Lakotas also dwelled on the 
commissioners’ eagerness to secure more land cessions before the annuities promised in 
the last treaty were provided.
 
62  Fast Bear mused, “There is something here that don’t suit 
me.  I sent my people to Washington and they brought me news here.  The white men 
wanted the country that I had for game and I let them have it.  I sent them to keep the 
people from going into the Black Hills and they have not done it.63
                                                 
61 Ibid., 30-31.  Cook-Lynn explains, “The flaws of Red Cloud were never overlooked by the 
people who understood their nationalistic/sovereign legacy; though they recognized him as an 
accomplished warrior, they passed him over at least twice during the years of his war exploits [1866-1868] 
and political fame for the position of “shirt wearer,” a position of the highest and most influential status. . . . 
in tribal terms . . . to the people themselves, there were other Indians on the Plains with power, and Red 
Cloud’s acceptance of that supreme title was, at the very least, ambiguous.  Eventually, in spite of what 
Red Cloud considered snubs by his people, he became a decision maker for agency politics. . . . In 1872, 
when Sitting Bull, Gall, Crazy Horse . . . and hundreds of other tribal leaders would not go to the 
designated reservations nor enter into negotiations which they considered stacked against them, Red Cloud 
was available to white politicians for the framing of the dialogues concerning the eventual defense and 
ultimate theft of the Black Hills.” 
   
62 Allison Commission, “Preliminary Meetings,” 70, 71, 75.  For more on Baptiste Good (Brown 
Hat), see Mario Gonzalez and Elizabeth Cook-Lynn, The Politics of Hallowed Ground: Wounded Knee and 
the Struggle for Indian Sovereignty, 246-47. 
63 Allison Commission, “Preliminary Meetings,” 80. 
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Clearly, Lakota and Anglo-American perspectives diverged wildly on the 
meanings of treaties and the intent behind them.  Lakota people would have seen a treaty 
promise as binding— “an inviolable agreement between the parties. . . . an agreement that 
encompasses the whole world, the sacred and secular, a promise they are bound to keep, 
made on the Pipe.”64  But the commissioners operated with an entirely different set of 
assumptions.  Perhaps the most shocking element of the meetings is the commissioners’ 
justification for a new treaty.  Senator Allison declared that the Lakota had not 
understood the 1868 treaty’s provisions correctly—rather than receive food and clothing 
both for thirty years, the Indians had received food for only four years.65  “When the 
treaty came to be printed and distributed so that we could read it, we found that it read 
differently,” Allison claimed.  This bald lie, therefore, became the basis for the new 
demand for Lakota land.66
                                                 
64 Raymond DeMallie, “Treaties are Made Between Nations,” The Great Sioux Nation : An Oral 
History of the Sioux Nation and its Struggle for Sovereignty, ed. Roxanne Dunbar-Ortiz (New York: 
Random House and the American Indian Treaty Council, 1977), 110.   
  The commissioners could then argue that the Lakota had been 
fed by the generosity of the government just as the Cheyenne and Arapaho had, which 
then obligated the Indians to cede land to their benefactors.  Decoding the intended treaty 
stipulations requires little imagination.  In all likelihood, the government promised thirty 
years of food in council talks, but authorities then changed the wording of the treaty to 
reflect a four-year time span instead.  This subterfuge allowed Allison to argue, “One 
reason why the president wants to make a new treaty is because the treaty that they have 
now is a bad one. . . . Now for two years the president of his own accord . . . has been 
65 Allison Commission, “Preliminary Meetings,” 79. 
66 For the text of the Treaty of Fort Laramie, see Indian Affairs, Laws and Treaties, Vol. 2, ed. 
Charles J. Kappler (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1904), 998-1007; for the food and clothing 
provisions, see Article 10.    
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feeding you by the gratuity of the whites.”67
The commission’s final report highlights the dual nature of the “fiction” that ruled 
Indian affairs in the postbellum era.  In one sense, native-white relations were a fiction 
because native people were treated simultaneously as sovereign nations and wards of the 
government.  In another sense, the “fiction” of Indian affairs can be seen in Anglo-
American ignorance of native sophistication.  The preliminary meetings reveal that the 
Lakota and their allies were not “ignorant and almost helpless people,” as the government 
made them out to be.
  In this way, the commissioners took full 
advantage of the Lakota adherence to reciprocity and used the threat of starvation to exact 
more concessions from them.  The Lakota resisted this combination of coercion and 
sleight-of-hand, however, and refused ultimately to agree to the commission’s proposal 
for the sale of the Black Hills.  In the end, the Lakota remained sovereign despite internal 
disagreements, and their refusal to agree to a land sale meant that the commissioners 
went home empty-handed. 
68
Nevertheless, the commissioners perpetuated this fiction of Indian affairs.  They 
intimated that the Lakota had been ignorant of the Black Hills’ value until the staff at the 
Indian agencies gave them other ideas.  They suggested that only greed motivated the 
  Rather, they were dymanic in their use of negotiation, highly 
aware of their wrongful treatment by the Indian Office, and determined to let the 
commissioners know they would not be cowed.   
                                                 
67 Allison Commission, “Preliminary Meetings,” 79.  While some might consider this a wild 
interpretation of events, a number of things are clear from the wording of the Allison Commission: first, 
that the Indians understood initially that they would receive food and clothing for thirty years; second, 
Allison’s contention that the treaty “read differently” when printed, as if it had changed magically between 
its being written and then printed; and third, Allison’s contention that the Lakotas were receiving food on 
borrowed time.  All of these factors point to the coercive nature of the 1868 Treaty of Fort Laramie and the 
use of it as leverage in 1875.   
68 For the “fiction” in Indian affairs, see chapter 4 of this manuscript, fn. 64. See Report of the 
Commission Appointed to Treat with the Sioux Indians for the Relinquishment of the Black Hills 
(Washington: Government Printing Office, 1875), 3. 
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Lakota to sell the land, since the Indians wanted “an exorbitant sum” for it.  Their 
interpretation totally ignores Lakota leaders’ constant assertions of sovereignty and their 
demands for restitution.  At the grand council on September 20th, Red Cloud wanted 
“seven generations ahead” to be cared for; Red Dog told the Americans that the Lakota 
did not want to surrender all of the Black Hills and they wanted whites to stop building 
roads into their country.  Spotted Tail wanted the troops out and for the government to 
pay the Indians “as long as we live on this earth.”  Reinforcing the Lakotas’ regard for the 
sacred nature of the land, Red Cloud added, “Maybe you white people think that I ask too 
much from the Government, but I think those hills extend clear to the sky—maybe they 
go above the sky, and that is the reason I ask for so much.”69
Dead Eyes may have put it best.   
 
You have put all our heads together and covered them with a blanket.  That hill is our wealth, but 
you have been asking it from us.  It is not a very small thing, you must remember . . . it is not very 
much when we ask equal shares.  You white people, you have all come in our reservation and 
helped yourselves to our property, and you are not satisfied; you went beyond to take the whole of 
our safe.  These tribes all here spoke with one word in saying that they look after their children for 
seven generations to come.70
 
 
The rest of the story is fairly well known.  The Lakota nation refused to sell the 
Black Hills, leaving the Anglo-Americans to devise a way to take it from them.  By 
November 9th, when Sheridan wrote to Terry, President Grant had decided on the 
method.  “At a meeting which occurred in Washington on the 3rd of November . . .  the 
                                                 
69 Report of the Commission Appointed to Treat with the Sioux Indians for the Relinquishment of 
the Black Hills (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1875), 6.  In August, Colonel Richard Dodge 
met Spotted Tail and Mr. Howard.  Dodge wrote to Crook, “My private opinion is that this trip is intended 
to enhance the Indians’ idea of the value of the Hills.  Spotted Tail seems all at once to have discovered that 
this is a very valuable country and worth a great deal of money.”   Richard Irving Dodge to Crook, 10 
August 1875, DoPlatte, LS, RG 393.  Captain Edwin Pollock reported that a group of Lakota leaders, 
including Red Cloud and Spotted Tail, had demanded $60,000 for the damages done by miners “digging 
holes in their country.”  Edwin Pollock to AAG, 2 August 1875, District of the Black Hills, DoDak, ES, 
RG 393. 
70Report of the Commission Appointed to Treat with the Sioux Indians for the Relinquishment of 
the Black Hills (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1875), 8. 
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President decided that . . . no further resistance by the military should be made to the 
miners going in, it being his belief that such resistance only increased their desire and 
complicated the troubles.”71
Throughout the summer of 1875, more miners went deeper into Lakota territory.  
They faced Lakota retribution on one hand and the army on the other.  Lieutenant 
Colonel Luther Bradley, commanding the District of the Black Hills, ordered in July 
1875 that miners who entered the hills would be held as prisoners.
  All Lakota people not living on reservations were ordered to 
report to the agencies by January 31.  But the Lakota had no way to comply with the 
order—the horses were at their weakest, and runners could never had made it to all the 
outlying Lakota communities in the cold weather and deep snow.  The troops left the 
hills; Crook mounted a winter campaign that fell flat; the summer campaign in 1876 
ended when Custer got what was coming to him.  Less well-known, however, are the 
stories of increasing internecine violence and the devastating failures encountered by 
miners over the autumn and early winter of 1876, or the problems that line officers 
encountered while trying to extricate themselves from a mission that had lasted seven or 
eight years and now suddenly came to a close.  These events reveal that, at least among 
some army officers, the impulse to resist the miners and uphold Indian rights still 
remained.   
72
                                                 
71 Ulysses Simpson Grant, The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant, 1875., ed. John Y. Simon, vol. 26 
(Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1967), 163. 
  General George 
Crook issued a proclamation shortly thereafter: “The President of the United States has 
directed that no Miners, or other unauthorized Citizens, be allowed to remain in the 
72 Luther P. Bradley to AAG, 12 July 1875, District of Black Hills, DoDak, ES, RG 393.  
Bradley’s order included this caveat: “until permitted to do so by government authority.”   George Crook 
announced that his department had the authority to expel unauthorized parties from the Black Hills as well.  
George Crook to AAG, 16 August 1875, DoPlatte, LS, RG 393, enclosed in Edward P. Smith to Ulysses S. 
Grant, 13 September 1875, DoPlatte, LS, RG 393.  
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Indian Reservation of the Black Hills, or in the unceded Territory to the west, until some 
new treaty arrangements have been made with the Indians.”  All miners were required to 
leave the Hills by August 15.  When the government opened the country, each miner 
would be able to secure “the benefit of his discoveries and the labor he has expended.”73  
The wording of this circular suggests that the Allison Commission approached the 
proposed land sale as an assumptive close.  Civilians came to expect that access to the 
Black Hills was a right; like the indignant governor of Nebraska, they internalized the 
tenets of American exceptionalism.  Miners at French Creek, one of the prime 
prospecting areas, thanked General Crook for the “kind and gentlemanly manner” with 
which his command treated them.  Although the miners were turned out of the hills, they 
were convinced that the area was “one of the richest mining districts” in the country.  
They told Crook, “In obeying the command of the President, Resolved that we do so 
under protest.”74
 In August, expeditions from Fort Rice in central Dakota Territory pursued various 
groups of Indians who stole government stock in the Black Hills and from contractors 
elsewhere; they also chased down Indians who killed two white men near Bismarck in 
August and September.
   
75   Raids for horses continued throughout the winter.76 Crook 
wrote that patrols in the Black Hills were only partially successful, though his soldiers 
had to resort to “stringent measures” in some cases to convince miners to leave.77
                                                 
73 George Crook to AAG, 29 July 1875, Department of the Platte, LS, RG 393. 
  Miners 
were killing each other.  An army surgeon at Camp Collins performed an autopsy on a 
74 W.H. Wood, et al. to Crook, 10 August 1875, DoPlatte, LS, RG 393. 
75 [Unknown], Middle District, DoDak, LS, RG 393.  
76 Frederick Van Vliet, commanding Camp Sidney, to Acting AAG, 30 November 1875, District 
of the Black Hills, DoDak, ES, RG 393.   
77 Crook to AAG, 15 September 1875, DoPlatte, LS, RG 393.   
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man who had been bludgeoned to death with a pick: “Bones, portions of the scalp with 
hair attached, and parts of garments, were strewn along the slope and over the little valley 
. . . scattered by wolves while [they were] devouring the body.”78  Despite the promises 
of travel literature—that elk, deer, and antelope could be found at any of the streams, and 
that stockpiling food was not essential—men starved to death.79  Miners simply 
wandered in the hills when they ran out of food.  Captain Pollock collected a prospector 
who had not eaten in five days: “He had the coldest eyes I have ever seen out of the head 
of a mad man.”  Upon leaving Pollock’s outpost, another man started a tremendous fire 
that lasted for six days, burning all the grass in sight.80
Removing prospectors from the hills proved difficult, for the army lacked enough 
men to escort miners away from the hills and also ensure that miners did not turn around 
once they were out of range of soldiers.  Pollock questioned all miners brought into his 
camp but told his superiors, “I don’t think they are many.”  These men were “hard to find 
. . . if they should desire to stay all winter, they will keep away from the creeks where 
prospecting has been done.”
  
81  Miners often lied to the army; at French Gulch, some 
civilians told Pollock that Crook had given them permission to stay in the hills, collecting 
stray horses.  “We can not help but feel under obligation to the owners of property which 
we have promised to guard and protect,” wrote one of the civilians to Pollock, referring 
to the miners.82
                                                 
78 B.G. McPhail to W. F. Norris, 10 September 1875, Camp Collins, District of the Black Hills, 
LS, RG 393. 
   
79 Thomas McLean Newson, Drama of life in the Black Hills (Saint Paul: Dodge and Larpenteur, 
1878), 15. Minnesota Historical Society, St. Paul. 
80 Edwin Pollock to AAG, 2 August 1875, District of the Black Hills, DoDak, ES, RG 393. 
81 Pollock to Crook, 14 September 1875, District of the Black Hills, DoDak, LS, RG 393.  
82 W.H. Wood, et al to Pollock, 17 September 1875, District of the Black Hills, DoDak, LR, RG 
393. 
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 October heralded the prospect of “serious trouble” at Red Cloud’s agency and 
other places throughout the region.  William Rowlands, the agency interpreter for the 
Cheyenne, had killed a Cheyenne man; this led to the revenge killing of his mules and 
horses, and his cabin was gutted and burned.  The agency had also stopped rations from 
going to Red Cloud’s Oglala bands.83  Most troubling, a large party under Sitting Bull 
supposedly planned to harass the road from Fort Stevenson to Fort Buford in October 
1875.84  A series of orders that directed lenient treatment of miners only worsened the 
atmosphere of unease.  In the Department of Dakota, miners could not be detained by 
soldiers any longer than five days, at which point they would have to be released.85  This 
order effectively invalidated army officers’ authority, making it impossible for them to 
restrain miners who sought to repeatedly enter the Black Hills.  General Terry ordered 
that first-time offenders be taken to the reservation’s limits and released, and that 
previous offenders be turned over to local law enforcement.86
 In the last few weeks before the commanders in the District of the Black Hills 
withdrew with their troops, they received a series of conflicting orders, reflecting the 
confusion that had come to dominate the government’s approach to the Black Hills.  
  Thus, at the same time that 
the army attempted to stem white encroachment, the willingness of senior military 
leaders and civil authorities to condone illegal prospecting weakened line officers’ ability 
to protect reservation boundaries. 
                                                 
83 W.H. Jordan  to Acting AAG, 16 October 1875, District of the Black Hills, DoDak, ES, RG 
393. 
84 [Unknown], 14 October 1875, District of the Black Hills, DoDak, LS, RG 393.  Fort Stevenson, 
North Dakota, was established in 1867, and was located near Garrison, North Dakota.  The site is now 
under water as a result of damming projects.  Fort Buford, also in North Dakota, was established in 1866, 
and is located in Buford.  
85 George D. Ruggles to Luther P. Bradley, 13 October 1875, District of the Black Hills, ES, RG 
393. 
86 Acting AAG to Lugenbeel, 17 October 1875, District of Southeastern Dakota, LS, RG 393. 
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First, General Crook ordered that supplies would be sent to Captain Pollock’s command, 
and that the supplies would last until December 1st.  Pollock was told that he would not 
have to leave the area until he received further orders.  A few days later, the timetable 
was cut short, and a half-month’s ration was set instead.87
On November 9th, six days after Grant made his decision in Washington, the 
companies assigned to the Black Hills were ordered to withdraw.
    
88  On General Crook’s 
orders, Captain Pollock pulled his troops and left.89  The week before, his executive 
officer had noted with chagrin that he had arrested eight prospectors.  The leader of the 
group, a Mr. Kenyon, convinced Captain Pollock that he needed to look for a lost horse.  
Pollock assented, and the man promptly disappeared.  “I was very reluctant to give up my 
belief in his honesty of purpose,” wrote the captain in his final report.90  Thus the army’s 
mission in the Black Hills ended without much fanfare, and the troops and their horses 
tramped through the snow to Fort Laramie and other installations.  In an ironic 
denouement, nearly two months after the troops left, staff members in the Department of 
Dakota sent out copies of the regulations under which soldiers were allowed to detain 
illegal prospectors.91
In subsequent months, federal authorities made a series of impossible demands on 
the Lakota people that were meant to restrict their movements, their access to weapons, 
and their allies.  John Q. Smith, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, wrote to the new 
Secretary of Interior that agents at the major reservations and forts were to stop all sales 
  Scarcely any officers would have been present in the Black Hills to 
receive these instructions, and the instructions themselves were moot.         
                                                 
87 AAG to Pollock, 20 October 1875, District of the Black Hills, DoDak, ES, RG 393. 
88 Special Order No. 34, Headquarters District of the Black Hills, DoDak, LS, RG 393, Part III. 
89 AAG to Pollock, 8 November 1875, District of the Black Hills, DoDak, ES, RG 393. 
90 Pollock to AAG, 27 November 1875, DoDak, LS, RG 393. 
91 Ruggles to Bradley, 22 December 1875, District of the Black Hills, DoDak, ES, RG 393. 
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of arms and ammunition to the Indians and to seize any weapons that might reach them.92  
By January 31st, all nonreservation Indians were ordered to surrender.  Very quickly, the 
“federal bureaucracy produce[d] an official justification for a war on the nonreservation 
Sioux and then put it through proper channels.”  Of course, it was impossible for runners 
to reach the agencies and outlying Indian communities in the dead of winter, and 
authorities knew that.   Crook’s winter campaign of March 1876 failed to rout a large 
Oglala and Cheyenne camp near the Little Powder River.93
That same month, the Department of Interior restricted hunting licenses to Sioux 
people in Dakota and Nebraska, forbidding them to hunt south of the North Platte; if 
those Indians crossed the river, the army was to “attack and destroy them.”  This blocked 
Sioux access to southeastern Wyoming and northeastern and central Colorado, and cut 
off their access to hunting ground even before the season started.  The restrictions also 
made it tougher for the Lakota to reach Northern Cheyenne and Arapaho allies who were 
not in Dakota Territory or eastern Montana.
   
94  By early June, thousands of Indian people 
had left the reservations and headed north to the Powder River country.  The commander 
at Fort Robinson told the major commanding Fort Laramie that at least two thousand 
Indians, “men, women, and children,” had left Red Cloud’s agency.  Fifteen hundred 
Lakotas were accompanied by five hundred of their Cheyenne allies, with five hundred 
warriors among them.95  They went north to join Sitting Bull.  As late as June 12th, the 
Indian agent at the Lower Brulé reservation wrote that a Sun Dance was underway.96
                                                 
92 The agencies included Spotted Tail, Red Cloud, Standing Rock, Cheyenne River, and forts 
Belknap and Peck. John Q. Smith to Zachariah Chandler, 18 January 1876, DoDak, LR, RG 393. 
  
93 Hutton, Phil Sheridan and his Army, 300. 
94 AAG to Fort Laramie, 11 March 1876, DePlatte, LS, RG 393. 
95 William H. Jordan to E.F. Townsend, 2 June 1876, Fort Laramie, DoDak, LR, RG 393. 
96 John Reid to Isaac D. DeRussy, 12 June 1876, DoPlatte, LS, RG 393.     
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Two weeks later, the Lakotas and their allies defeated American troops in an inimitable 
expression of sovereignty.     
While historians have acknowledged that the methods of the Office of Indian 
Affairs and the army were at odds, they also assert that progressive reformers and the 
military shared the goal of assimilation and the destruction of native sovereignty.  In this 
sense, army operations and treaty councils worked in concert: the army coerced and 
offered protection to Indians, and then attacked them; federal authorities did the same, 
forcing assimilation on an unwilling people who became the victims of a colonizing 
agenda.  The army itself advanced this agenda in a variety of ways but the situation in the 
Black Hills complicates this picture.   
Army officers like Stanley, Lugenbeel, and Mills were themselves confused by 
the conflicting interests—of miners and Indians—that the army was asked to protect.  
Their superiors, men like Terry, Ord, Custer, Sheridan, and Sherman, entertained 
collusion with the railroad, turning a blind eye to the onslaught of miners, and advocated 
the sale or seizure of the Black Hills even before the Allison commission was created.  At 
the commission’s preliminary meetings, it is clear that the Lakota retained a strong grasp 
on the principles that made them sovereign.  To ignore sovereignty in the face of Lakota 
factionalism does a great disservice to the Lakota community members and leaders who 
each had their own opinions about sovereignty and the best ways to retain it.  The Lakota 
exacted several major concessions from the American government between 1866 and 
1875—including Red Cloud’s raids, multiple agency relocations that upset government 
plans for long term Lakota assimilation into the agricultural society, and finally their 
biggest victory—refusing to give up the seat of their cultural identity.  Thus, the United 
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States had allowed itself one option in dealing with native people, and that option led 
them to war.   
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 CHAPTER SIX:  Oliver Otis Howard and the Nez Percés 
 
In the summer of 1874, the army exiled Major General Oliver Otis Howard from 
the Portland of his native Maine to Portland, Oregon.  His superiors wanted to stop him 
from creating controversy.  In the Pacific Northwest, only thirteen hundred native people, 
including members of the Nez Percé tribe, were categorized as “hostile” to the 
government.  This area, the Department of the Columbia, was unlike the Department of 
Dakota, whose staff had to contend with a nation of angry Lakota.  Howard felt that his 
new responsibilities would not be too hard to bear.  He told the New York Times, “From 
appearances there would be little work” for him.1  As early as 1870, many Indians in the 
Pacific Northwest had been relocated on federal lands.  Their assimilation into the 
dominant white culture seemed assured.  What sort of concerns could be raised by the 
presence of a few scattered bands? 2
 Those who had followed the Union Army through Georgia and South Carolina 
knew that Howard had served beside William Tecumseh Sherman, hard-charging 
commander of the western forces.  Of Howard, Sherman wrote, “He is very sincere & 
moral Even to piety but brave having lost an arm already.”
 
3
                                                 
1 New York Times, 11 October 1874. 
  In placing Howard at the 
head of the Army of the Tennessee, Sherman ignored the seniority of two other officers.  
He said that he “made no mistake” in choosing a maimed man who others called a 
2 “Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs”, in “Report of the Secretary of the Interior,” 
1870, 41st Congress, 3rd Session, Serial 1449, 30-33. 
3 William Tecumseh Sherman to Ellen Ewing Sherman, 29 July 1864, in Sherman’s Civil War: 
Selected Correspondence of William T. Sherman, 1860-1865, ed. Brooks D. Simpson and Jean V. Berlin 
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hypocrite and a pious fraud.4
 Beyond Howard’s expressions of temperance and faith, Sherman sensed that he 
was a conscientious man.  Howard promoted cohesion among the general staff by his 
reluctance to quarrel.  He followed orders to the utmost of his ability without comment, 
and acquitted himself fearlessly in battle.  Not only did he fulfill his duties as a 
commander, Howard served as a combat-hardened chaplain when there were none for his 
soldiers to approach.  He was more than capable of emulating Sherman’s toughness, but 
his compassion and gentle manner benefitted his soldiers and the army’s mission as well.  
Both a staunch defender of Sherman’s approach to war and the moral and social 
dimensions of black emancipation, Howard surprised those who doubted that the army’s 
mission could have an ethical drive.
   
5
 When Lincoln appointed Howard to direct the Freedman’s Bureau, Sherman 
offered a skeptical judgment of the new position.  He warned his subordinate that the 
kindest intentions would not suffice.  The task before him was impossible.  Yet, said 
Sherman, “You can and will do all the good one man may.”
   
6
                                                                                                                                                 
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999), 676.    
  Aware of the risks, Howard 
became responsible for ensuring blacks’ legal equality.  He was challenged by many 
Southerners who sought to undermine his work.  Nor was the federal government free of 
4 Sherman to Henry W. Halleck, 4 September 1864, The War of the Rebellion: A compilation of 
the Official Records of the War of the Union and Confederate Armies (Washington: Government Printing 
Office, 1880-1901), ser. 1, vol. 38, pt.5, 793. (Hereafter cited as OR with accompanying volume and 
subsequent information).   John A. Carpenter, Sword and Olive Branch: Oliver Otis Howard (Pittsburgh, 
University of Pittsburgh Press, 1964), 25, 69, 288.  Oliver Otis Howard, Autobiography of Oliver Otis 
Howard, Major General United States Army (New York: Baker and Taylor, 1907), 2:537. 
5 New York Times, 16 January 1863.  Howard stated his support of abolition and ascribed an 
emancipatory aspect to the war; see Autobiography 2:26; for Civil Rights Act defense, see 41st Congress, 
2nd Session, Serial 1412, 509. 
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blame.  The Johnson administration reneged on Howard’s innovative land policy of 
allocating abandoned and confiscated land to blacks, and denied homes and livelihoods to 
thousands of freedmen.  The general investigated violations of the Civil Rights Act and 
publicized Klan violence when few federal officials intervened and protected blacks’ 
rights.  It shocked Howard when an influential Democratic congressman accused him of 
diverting over half a million dollars in Bureau funds to a university he helped to found for 
African-American men.  Throughout the next two years, the role of the Bureau faded 
from reconstruction plans.  Were it not for a violent Arizona uprising in the spring of 
1871, Howard might have retreated to private life. 
 White settlers had slaughtered eighty-five Indians near Tucson, creating the 
danger for large-scale war in the already unstable Southwest.  The Department of the 
Interior requested that Howard negotiate with the belligerent factions.  His most visible 
achievement was his mediation with Cochise, the infamous leader of the Chiricahua 
Apaches.  After venturing into enemy territory with a white scout, his aide, and two 
Chiricahua warriors of uncertain sympathies, Howard secured what he and others initially 
believed was a viable and unprecedented settlement.  But soon the regional press claimed 
that he had exempted the Chiricahauas from supervision.  Howard had been too lenient in 
terms of federal policy, but he had also helped make definite improvements.7
                                                                                                                                                 
6 Sherman to Howard, 17 May 1865, OR, ser. 1, vol. 47, pt.3, 515.  
  Embittered 
over the public’s failure to recognize his efforts, he was also angry at the generals who 
had not supported him.  “I hope my brother officers will grant me a little indulgence . . . 
7“Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs”, in “Report of the Secretary of the Interior,” 
1874, 43rd  Congress, 2nd Session, Serial 1639, 608. 
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for striving to put peace before war as the president and all his officers desire.”  He did 
not disguise his disapproval of the army’s interpretation of Indian policy.8  Howard 
understood Grant’s attitude–to “favor any course towards [Indians] which tends to their 
civilization and ultimate citizenship” in a literal sense.  He naïvely trusted that the 
administration’s joint efforts with religious institutions would provide justice.  However, 
this policy had a prescription for violence.  Any Indians who refused to obey the 
government were “hostile” and subject to military action.  As an army officer, Howard 
recognized that violence was sometimes necessary.  But as a man of tolerance and 
sacrifice, he balked at accepting this policy without qualifications.9
 The notion of the “Christian” and “humanitarian” general is a common and useful 
starting place for understanding Howard’s place in the army during the Civil War and 
Indian Wars.  However, the concept obscures his contradictory behavior during the Nez 
Percé War of 1877.
  Nevertheless, he 
tried to separate personal and professional views as was expected.     
10
                                                 
8Howard to William W. Belknap, 12 November 1872, Howard Papers, George J. Mitchell 
Department of Special Collections and Archives, Bowdoin College Library, Brunswick, Maine.  
  If we are to view Howard through those sobriquets, then his 
actions fall into three categories.  He comes across as either a competent or incompetent 
field commander whose spirituality failed to widen his understanding of Native 
Americans, or a man who was powerless to effect policy for their benefit.  With the 
additional layer of Howard’s postwar publications, however, more contradictions are 
9 Francis Paul Prucha, The Great Father: The United States Government and the American 
Indians (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984; reprint, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 
1995) 480, 482. 
10Richard N. Ellis, “The Humanitarian Generals,” The Western Historical Quarterly 3, no. 2 
(April 1972): 169-78; see also Carpenter, Sword and Olive Branch. 
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drawn into the narrative of the Nez Percé War.  In these writings, he attempted to excise 
specific aspects of the war from public memory–aspects that conflicted with the public 
image that he wanted to achieve.  Throughout the campaign, Howard’s superiors heaped 
much doubt and distrust upon him.  Their correspondence shows his reluctance to commit 
to the campaign, not merely word, but in action. In addition, they make obvious his self-
conscious and increasingly desperate attempts to hide his reluctance to fight the Nez 
Percés.11
 During the 1860s, mining prospects, the railroad, and the Civil War pushed 
settlers into the Far West.  In a decade, tens of thousands of Americans laid claim to 
Montana and Oregon.
   Howard still carried his misreading of policy when he was given the 
Department of Columbia.  As a result, he compounded the problems of the Nez Percés.  
In his misguided attempts to give them more freedom, he increased their suffering.  Far 
from being intent on their capture, he deliberately disobeyed his order to do so.    
12 In response to white settlement, the Indian Affairs Office had 
forced many of the Indians in the Pacific Northwest on reservations by 1870.  In 1876 
alone, twelve thousand individuals settled in Oregon; half of them stayed in the Columbia 
River Basin, in close proximity to the Nez Percé Indians.13
                                                 
11A large part of this correspondence–especially that of the Military Division of the Pacific, which 
oversaw the Department of the Columbia–is reproduced in “Claims of the Nez Percé Indians,” 56th 
Congress, 1st Session, Senate Document 257, Serial 3867, 9-69.  This is a common primary source in 
histories of the Nez Percé War; however, crucial elements of the correspondence are in the files of the 
Adjutant General’s Office and the Continental US Army records.  Because these sources are far less 
accessible than the “Claims,” they are rarely cited.  
  The Nez Percés of the 
Wallowa Valley, who had little enmity toward the whites, faced a unique situation when 
12 Dean L. May, Three Frontiers: Family, Land, and Society in the American West, 1850-1900 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 89-90. 
13 James B. Hedges, “Promotion of Immigration to the Pacific Northwest by the Railroads,” 
Mississippi Valley Historical Review 15 (September 1928): 185, 193. “Report of the Commissioner of 
Indian Affairs,” in “Report of the Secretary of the Interior,” 1870, 41st   Congress, 3rd Session, Serial 1449, 
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they were approached for a treaty.14   They had done nothing wrong, and their autonomy 
was not immediately compromised by their signing the treaty.  As part of the ongoing 
effort to limit Indians’ influence and push them onto reservations, territorial authorities 
engineered land cessions in exchange for annuities.  The Nez Percés surrendered land for 
two hundred thousand dollars of promised annuities that would provide for life on a 
reservation.15
 This provision had no direct effect on the Nez Percés for over twenty years.  As a 
precursor to the violence of 1877, however, the treaty had drastic effects.  It restricted the 
tribes’ ability to travel, infringing on their buffalo hunts in Montana.  It warped their 
leadership structure, forcing them to elect largely acculturated individuals who 
supposedly represented the entire group.  Lastly, it increased factionalism between the 
bands that lived in the upper and lower parts of the Wallowa valley.  The Nez Percés who 
occupied the upper valley did not resist assimilation, because their behavior and outlook 
had been modified by Christian influence since the late 1840s.  The lower valley Nez 
Percés, however, ignored the treaty. Their continued independence, coupled with the 
   
                                                                                                                                                 
48-59. 
14 The Nee-Me-Poo (called Nez Percés by French Canadian fur trappers for the decorative 
piercing of nasal cartilage) occupied a tract of eleven thousand square miles–from Bitterroot Valley in 
southwestern Montana, along tributaries of the Snake and Columbia Rivers in southeastern Washington, 
and in the upper and lower sections of the Wallowa River valley of northeastern Oregon.  They aided 
Captains Meriwether Lewis and William Clark’s expedition in 1805-6; with the acquisition of horses and 
firearms in the late 18th century, they expanded their diet of fish, venison, and fruit.  During their autumnal 
buffalo hunts in Montana, they allied with the Crow; adopting habits of these Plains Indians, they modified 
their clothing, songs, and dance, and used the tipi when outside of their home range.  Historically, the 
northern tier tribes of Blackfoot, Assiniboine, Gros Ventre, and Lakota resented the Nez Percés’ 
infringement of their hunting grounds.  The Shoshone, east of the Yellowstone area, had no affinity for 
them either.  Jerome Greene, Nez Percé Summer 1877: The United States Army and the Nee-Me-Poo Crisis 
(Helena: Montana Historical Society Press, 2000), 14.   
15 “Executive Orders Establishing, Enlarging or Reducing Indian Reservations, also Restoring 
Certain Indian Reservations to the Public Domain, From May 14, 1855 to October 29, 1878,” in “Report of 
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stress of the Civil War and unabated emigration, prompted the government to call another 
council in 1863.  At this council, the lower Nez Percés were told that they had to give up 
the grazing land for their Appaloosa horses.  Joseph, leader of that band, walked out of 
the negotiations.  Thereafter, his people were known as non-treaty Nez Percés.  With the 
expectation that the Indians would consent to remain in the Wallowa Valley, the 
government declared the land a reservation in 1873.16
 That year, Oregon’s governor, L.F. Grover, drew the following conclusions for 
the Department of the Interior.  “Joseph’s band do not desire Wallowa Valley for a 
reservation and a home . . . they will not accept. . . . This small band wishes the 
possession of this large section of Oregon simply for room to gratify a wild, roaming 
disposition.”  Grover set the Indians in direct opposition to whites who, according to their 
own conceptions of land use, would actively “cultivate” the valley.  The annual report of 
John B. Monteith, agent at the Nez Percés’ reservation in Lapwai, Idaho, supported the 
governor’s contentions.  Throughout 1872 and 1873, the non-treaty Indians of Wallowa 
had tried to convince their kin to abandon the reservation with the “subversive” lure of 
the buffalo hunt.  The treaty group refused to leave and disappointment further polarized 
the tribe.  The government revoked the Wallowa group’s status as a reserve in 1875.
     
17
                                                                                                                                                 
the Commissioner of Indian Affairs,” in “Report of the Secretary of the Interior,” 1878, 45th Congress, 3rd 
Session, Serial 1850, 765. 
  
Still, there was no open hostility.  Before the 1877 war, sixteen Nez Percés died at the 
16 “Treaty with the Nez Percé Indians” (June 11, 1855), 12 United States Statutes at Large, 957-
62. 
17 L.F. Grover to the Honorable Columbus Delano, 21 July 1873,  in “Report of Brigadier General 
Howard”  in “Report of the Secretary of War,” 1875, 44th Congress, 1st Session Serial 1674, 129; “Report 
of Commissioner of Indian Affairs”, in “Report of the Secretary of the Interior,” 43rd Congress, 2nd Session, 
Serial 1639, 285. “Treaty with the Nez Percé Indians” (9 June 1863), 14 United States Statutes at Large, 
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hands of whites; one woman was killed by a miner’s pick “on account of her dog 
whipping a white man’s dog.”18
 “I think it a great mistake to take from Joseph and his band of Nez Percé Indians 
that valley.  The white people really do not want it . . . possibly Congress can be induced 
to let these really peaceable Indians have this poor valley for their own.”  Howard’s 
startling admission, which he also intimated in his formal report, not only repudiated 
federal policy, it also denied the primacy of white settlement.  Privately, he hoped that 
conflict would be avoided if the government deigned to be just.
  The Nez Percés did not retaliate.  Sherman placed 
Howard into this tense situation, assuming that the Department’s conflicts would not pose 
him any real difficulties.    
19  In his annual report, 
Howard also endorsed and included the reports of Captain Stephen G. Whipple and 
Major Henry Clay Wood.  Both of these officers pointed out the weaknesses of the 
government’s position.  “Of course,” observed Whipple, “before very long the Indians 
will be forbidden the valley and ordered onto a reservation far from here.  They may go 
without physical resistance, but it is by no means certain they will do so . . . as a 
community they will cease to exist.”20
                                                                                                                                                 
647-54. 
  Wood’s report, researched at Howard’s request, 
contained such inflammatory material that it was never published.  “Instructed to state 
facts,” the major blasted the claims of his superiors in Washington.  The attachment to 
home, “not uncommon to whites” precipitated the Nez Percés’ discontent.  He concluded 
18 Duncan McDonald, “The Nez Percés: The History of Their Troubles and the Campaign of 
1877,” Idaho Yesterdays 21 (Spring 1977), 9.  
19 Howard to William B. Cudlipp, 12 July 1876, Howard Papers. 
20 “Report of the Secretary of War,” 1875, 128-29. 
 181 
 
that they had been forced to recognize artificial, elective leaders, suffered greater 
factionalism, and were compelled to sign the treaty against their will.  The treaty of 1855 
was not ratified until 1859.  Even then, the government had continued to disregard its 
obligations “with criminal neglect.”21  The treaty had no binding effect on the non-treaty 
group, and therefore depriving them of their title to Wallowa was illegal.  To the 
government’s actions, Howard later sighed, “So much for our ideas of justice.”22
 In January 1877, Howard received the order to occupy the Wallowa valley and 
supervise removal to the Fort Lapwai reservation.  The process of deploying troops and 
assets lasted through March, and when Joseph requested a council for April 20th, Howard 
agreed, further delaying the order.  Despite his and others’ worries that peace might not 
last, he was nonetheless hopeful.  By following the prescription of the Department of 
War, in preparing for any eventuality, yet also supporting the Department of Interior’s 
insistence on a suppression of violent activity, he tried to fulfill the twin expectations of 
federal policy.
     
23
                                                 
21 Henry Clay Wood to Howard, Department of Columbia, Letters Sent, Record Group 393. 
(Hereafter abbreviated as DoC, LR, RG 393, with LS for Letters Sent). 
  All the while, he feared that others might not see him as being “resolute 
and persistent.”  He ordered a detachment to the Wallowa valley, and had two Gatling 
guns and sufficient ammunition placed at the ready.  For a man who had roundly 
criticized his brother officers for their warmongering, and had insinuated that his 
22 Oliver Otis Howard, “From the General’s Pen: The Nez Percé Campaign of 1877, ed. Linwood 
Laughy, In Pursuit of the Nez Percés (Wrangell, AK: Mountain Meadow Press, 1993), 20.  This text 
reprints the original account entitled Nez Percé Joseph: An Account of his Ancestors, His Lands, His 
Enemies, His Murders, His War, His Pursuit and Capture, by General O.O. Howard, published by Lee and 
Shepherd of Boston, 1881. 
23 “Supplementary Report of General O.O. Howard,” 26 December 1877, in “Report of the 
Secretary of War,” 1877, 45th Congress, 2nd Session, Serial 1794, 587 (hereafter referred to as 
“Supplementary Report”).   See Circular from Adjutant General’s Office, 8 May 1877, DoC, LR, RG 393.  
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supervisors’ actions were criminal, he seemed to be in a belligerent frame of mind.24
 Monteith, the Indian agent, wrote Howard in February, relating Joseph’s reaction 
to the proposed move to Lapwai: “I have been talking to the whites many years about the 
land in question, and it is strange they cannot understand me.  The country they claim 
belonged to my father, and when he died it was given to me and my people.”  The non-
treaty Nez Percés not alone in refusing to leave; neighboring Nez Percé bands on the 
Snake and Salmon Rivers did not want to go either.  Some of the Nez Percés objected to 
the move because two Anglo-Americans, men named Caldwell and Finney, claimed 
much of the best land at Lapwai.
 
25  Two weeks later, Monteith reported that Joseph had 
held a council with other Nez Percés, some from the lower Snake River and two chiefs 
from Salmon River.  Joseph had sent word for them to gather and talk about moving to 
the Lapwai reservation; he was quiet for the most part, allowing his brother Ollicut to 
speak for him.  On the other hand, Toohulhulsote, one of the Salmon River leaders, spoke 
aggressively.  He and most of the other leaders refused to live on the Wallowa Valley, 
even if it were set aside as a reservation.  Monteith reasoned that Joseph pushed the 
Wallowa option because he wanted to protect the horse herds, but the others “had nothing 
to lose.”  Local Anglo-Americans were set against the Indians and wanted them to leave 
the area entirely.  The Lewiston, Idaho, paper, the Teller, claimed that Joseph would only 
go to the reservation if Monteith was “driven off.”  More ominously, the paper claimed 
that “an unusual number of Indians came to town” and bought weapons and ammunition 
from white traders.26
                                                 
24 “Supplementary Report,” 588, 591. 
 
25 J.B. Monteith to Howard, 9 February 1877, DoC, LR, RG 393.   
26 Monteith to Howard, 7 May 1877, DoC, LR, RG 393. 
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 In the weeks surrounding Howard’s primary meeting with Chief Joseph, tensions 
grew on all sides.  On April 10th, Joseph arrived at the Umatilla agency, asking to speak 
to Howard in person.  The interpreter at the last large council had not relayed Joseph’s 
concerns to Oregon’s leaders, and Joseph wanted to reiterate those issues to Howard.  
The Nez Perces wanted to retain hunting and fishing rights to the Wallowa Valley, but 
state authorities were not readily endorsing this request.  Senior military leaders in the 
region wanted to avoid bloodshed; in fact, in a letter to Howard, the Pacific Division staff 
referenced the Sioux War of 1876 and stressed that it was of “paramount importance that 
none of the responsibility of any step which may lead to hostilities shall be initiated by 
the military authorities—you are to occupy the Wallowa Valley in the interest of 
peace.”27
The May 1877 councils with Chief Joseph tested Howard’s investment in federal 
policy and his willingness to perform his duties.  At the third and final council, he 
buckled under when his patience was tested.  For the first time, he threatened Joseph and 
the leader of a nearby band, White Bird, with reprisal–not merely a show of force.  Their 
refusal to concede frustrated Howard even more, but the stubbornness of Toohulhulsote, 
the representative speaker, made him angry.  The man’s very appearance rankled him (in 
an uncharacteristic display of cultural and racial superiority, Howard wrote, “He was an 
ugly, obstinate, thick-necked savage of the worst type”), and he had shown “no attempt at 
conciliation even in manner.”  Howard had refused to do the same, but admitting it would 
have shown that he was wrong.  Toohulhulsote demanded to know, “What person 
pretends to divide the land and put me on it?”  Howard cried angrily, “I am that man!  I 
   
                                                 
27 Lieutenant Boyle to H. Clay Wood, 24 April 1877, DoC, LR, RG 393.  AAG to Howard, 24 
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stand here for the President, and there is no spirit good or bad that will hinder me. My 
orders are plain and will be executed.”  Out of anger, and also to alarm the Indians into 
submission, Howard forcibly removed the speaker and had him confined.  The other 
Indians conceded to Howard’s demands immediately.  At the end of thirty days, if he 
came to the Wallowa Valley, he would not expect to see a single lodge or horse.28  To the 
commander at Fort Lapwai, Captain David Perry noted, “Howard thinks ‘the backbone is 
broken.’ . . . Joseph and White Bird begin to see things in a different light . . . we look 
upon the Indian trouble as settled.”29
 Howard’s anger was the product of doubt and fear that had been growing over the 
last five years.  His defense of black civil rights had come to nothing, but instead of 
retiring to private life as some might have hoped, he took on the highly-publicized 
mediation in Arizona.  General William B. Hazen regarded the Indian as “a dirty beggar 
and thief [who] cares only to live in his vagrancy,” yet he believed that Howard had 
subjected himself to unfavorable public opinion in regard to federal aid of racial 
minorities.  “The duties were new, experimental, and those arrayed against you watched 
for the chance to trip you.”
   
30
                                                                                                                                                 
March 1877, DoC, LR, RG 393. 
  A year later, as the financial investigation of his Bureau 
activities dragged on, Howard was careful not to exceed the limits of his authority.  He 
wanted to minimize the impact of his decisions in the Department of the Columbia.  At 
28 Ibid., 594, 596.  Fritz, Henry E. The Movement for Indian Assimilation, 1860-1890 
(Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1963), 132. Bruce Hampton, Children of Grace: The Nez 
Percé War of 1877 (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1994), 53-4. Hampton claims that, according to 
native sources in Curtis’s “The North American Indian,” Howard told him to ‘shut up’ several times and 
pushed him.  
29  David Perry to commanding officer at Fort Lapwai, 9 May 1877, DoC, LR, RG 393. 
30 William B. Hazen to Howard, 28 June 1874, Howard Papers.  Paul Hutton, Phil Sheridan and 
His Army (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1985), 43. 
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the same time, he upheld what he believed was the truth in his assessment of the Nez 
Percés’ situation.  Forestalling his efforts in September 1876, the Indian Office declared 
its intent to settle all non-treaty Indians of the Pacific Northwest on the existing 
reservations.  Howard could not help the Nez Percés unless they settled permanently in 
the Wallowa valley–and two months later, Joseph refused to do that.31 Pressure from local citizens also pushed the Nez Percés and the army toward 
conflict.  In May, just before the council with Joseph, Monteith and other civilian 
officials in the Department of the Columbia were engrossed in making restitution to 
Anglo-Americans who lived on and near the Lapwai reservation.  The three men living 
within the reservation’s boundaries, for instance, were compensated a combined total of 
$10,720.  At the same time, fifty-seven citizens sent a letter to Howard, saying that Nez 
Percés warriors harassed them, tore down and burned fences, and stole livestock.  They 
wanted Howard to ensure that the Indians were relocated to a reservation.  The tone of 
their letter alternated between belligerence and pleading, which would not have sat well 
with the general.
 
32
 In light of tensions with the area’s residents, Howard believed that Joseph was 
jeopardizing his own people.  It put Howard in the position of having to once again 
demonstrate his allegiance to army doctrine.  As he had told General John Schofield in 
1872, “I have done simply what I was ordered.”  This too accounts for his deadening 
reiteration of “you must go to the reserve” to Joseph at the first council of 1877.  To 
 
                                                 
31 Judith St. Pierre, “General O.O. Howard and Grant’s Peace Policy” (Ph.D. diss., University of 
North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 1990), 375.  Report of Bureau of Indian Commissioners, 1876, 44th 
Congress, 2nd Session, Serial 1749, 60. 
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guard himself from censure, Howard assumed the pose of the dutiful soldier.  He had 
done this before, to the freedmen of the Sea Islands.  Late in the war, he had assisted 
Sherman in guaranteeing to blacks exclusive settlement rights of that cotton-rich coastal 
area.  Eventually, Howard’s land distribution program would have granted them title to 
these and other confiscated and abandoned lands.  But when President Andrew Johnson 
widened the scope of Confederate amnesty beyond Howard’s expectations, blacks faced 
eviction.  Howard had to tell them to leave their homes.  His authority (and his 
authenticity as an advocate of civil rights) had been compromised.  He could not do 
anything to help them, except urge them to lease land or enter into labor contracts with 
the pardoned Southerners.  But because the government failed to protect their rights as 
free Americans, they were now (again) consigned to slave labor.  “Why, General 
Howard,” one man had asked, “why do you take away our lands?  You take them from us 
who are true . . . you give them to our all-time enemies!  That is not right!”33
   “Too weak to do right,” Howard told his brother, the nation was “making 
distinction on account of the color of its people–fickle–fickle and so false to the Indians–
running to ‘all time enemies’ for help . . . sacrificing friends under the false cry of 
corruption.”  He was echoing the freedmen’s dismay at government hypocrisy and 
identifying himself with both them and the Indians who were deceived.  With no recourse 
left, he told the Nez Percés what he had told the Apaches: “I am not the President or 
   
                                                                                                                                                 
32 Petition to Department of Columbia from Salmon River, Idaho Territory, 7 May 1877, DoC, 
LR, RG 393. 
33 Howard to John Schofield, 14 December 1872, Howard Papers.  McDonald, “The Nez Percés,” 
10-11.  Carpenter, Sword and Olive Branch, 110-11; Howard, Autobiography, 2:239.  
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Great Father.  I only obey orders.”  He convinced himself of the fact.34
 On June 3rd, Joseph guided his people across the Snake River, just within the 
Idaho border.  Some of their horses drowned, unable to swim the rough current.  To 
preserve their only source of income, Joseph had a group of warriors hold the herd on the 
opposite bank, within Oregon.  He assumed that Howard would not object to the delay.  
In a river gorge near the villages of Grangeville and Mount Idaho, he consolidated with 
White Bird’s camp.  For the ten days of freedom that they had left, the Indians disputed 
their choices.  The younger warriors were encouraged by Toohulhulsote’s appeal for 
violence.  After three or four of those men descended on Slate Creek on the 14th, they 
altered the status of their band.  By committing murder, they caused all non-treaty Nez 
Percés to be considered hostile. 
  However, once 
the war against the Indians began, Howard realized that this did not have to be the case.  
If he let the Nez Percés escape, he could help them and also have the satisfaction of doing 
what was right.  
35
 Howard felt that the Indians would comply.  Yet, less than twenty-four hours after 
they were supposed to be on the Lapwai Reservation, Howard was told that twenty 
civilians had been slaughtered.  However, Howard delayed mobilizing the Fort Lapwai 
command until he could confirm the rumors.  He was not eager to go to war; instead, he 
tried to get the Indians to surrender before anything else went wrong.  Howard sent the 
     
                                                 
34 Howard to Charles Howard, 18 December 1874, Howard Papers; Howard to ‘Apaches,’ 7 
February 1873, Howard Papers. 
35Helen Addison Howard, War Chief Joseph (Caldwell, ID: Caxton Printers, 1941), 124-27.   This 
author has no connection to Otis Howard.  See Circular from Adjutant General’s Office, 8 May 1877, DoC, 
LR, RG 393. “Indians who fail or refuse to come in and locate in permanent abodes upon reservations will 
be subject wholly to the control and supervision of the military authorities . . .”  
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acting chief of the treaty Nez Percés, as well as Joseph’s brother-in-law, for Joseph and 
White Bird, but they could not be reached.  A cavalry detachment was sent to the Indians’ 
encampment; they were approached by a truce party.  This chance for peace was thrown 
away when the lead scout, a civilian volunteer, shot one of the warriors.  Thirty-four 
soldiers died in the ensuing firefight.36
 By the 17th, the governor of Idaho assailed the Secretary of War with outright 
falsifications.  He claimed that an overwhelming force had pinned Howard’s small 
contingent at Fort Lapwai; the government needed to call up volunteer troops.  Two days 
later, another telegram from the governor reached the Department of War.  The mayor of 
Boise City declared that agricultural and mining areas had been abandoned out of panic.  
Citizens of the Spokane Falls area, near the Washington-Idaho border, believed that their 
country was “infested” by “very mysterious and threatening” Indians.  Citing their lack of 
arms and ammunition, over forty petitioners asked for military protection but never cited 
any instances of native-white conflict to support their claim.
  
37
                                                 
36 John Dishon McDermott, Forlorn Hope: A Study of the Battle of White Bird Canyon, Idaho, 
and the Beginning of the Nez Percé Indian War (Washington DC, Division of History, Office of 
Archaeology and Historic Preservation, National Park Service, US Department of the Interior, 1968), 
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Howard’s willingness to delay conflict and the volatility of civilian volunteers.  Howard failed to indicate it 
in his official report or postwar writings because it would have reinforced the image of him as an officer 
unwilling apply force.   
  Sherman, who was more 
concerned with the strength of the troops in the field, recommended that the Second 
Infantry should be pulled from the occupation force in Atlanta and transferred to 
Howard’s command.  But General William S. Hancock, commander of the influential 
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Department of the Atlantic, denied the need for haste.  General Irwin McDowell, the 
division commander who oversaw Howard’s department, was skeptical as well.  The 
expansion of the Nez Percés’ group was conjecture; Howard’s force could deal with the 
current threat.  However, McDowell affirmed that a growing fear had been kindled, and 
that reinforcements would positively affect civilian attitudes and help local troops.38  
McDowell did not help Howard when he sent him articles from local newspapers, some 
of which questioned Howard’s capabilities.  Perhaps in a sideways dig at his subordinate, 
McDowell sent an excerpt from the Portland Standard that remarked that Howard 
wanted “the kind of cooperation that will lead off the Indians and if not whip them, at 
least hold them” until reinforcements arrived.  The author then went on to say of 
McDowell, “He is an ass.”39
 Howard now found himself in a dangerous situation.  As with many other 
installations in the trans-Mississippi West, his lacked the organization, troop strength, and 
equipment needed to succeed.  The public, unaware that he faced an unconventional 
mission under these circumstances, responded to his cautious assessments with threats.  
A.D. Pambrun, a local interpreter, warned him, “[Lewiston] citizens are bent on taking 
your life.  From what I can learn, the agent is to blame.”  If this was only a rumor meant 
to vex Howard, he reacted.  He took to the field four days later, with a thin compliment of 
four cavalry and three infantry companies–under 300 men.  Public sentiment 
momentarily turned in Howard’s favor, but the respite was brief.  He reached the Salmon 
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River by the 28th of June, but the Nez Percés had crossed it and headed northeast for the 
Lochsa River that ran to the border of Montana.40
 To prevent the non-treaty leader Looking Glass from joining the conflict, Howard 
had sent a cavalry detachment to take his band into custody.  This forced the hand of the 
Indians who had not before resolved to fight; now Looking Glass joined Joseph and 
White Bird.  The Idaho public read the detachment’s failure as a betrayal on Howard’s 
part.  In response to the unforseen merger of bands, Colonel Alfred Sully, an Indian 
fighter of some repute, suggested calling up two hundred Washington or Oregon 
volunteers.  McDowell, having scoffed at Howard’s similar request a week earlier, 
supported this course of action.
   
41
 Without this aid, Howard’s force routed the Nez Percés on the 12th.  Returning to 
the Wallowa Valley was no longer an option–the Indians would have to run for Montana.  
On the 14th, the cavalry were on reconnaissance patrols while the Indians were across the 
river in plain sight.  However, Howard waited until the 15th to pursue them; he gave them 
time to leave his department.  Then Howard sent a cavalry detachment southward, “as if 
en route to Lapwai.”  According to his official report, they were going to move twenty 
miles down river and gain the rear of the Indians’ trail with a left hook.  However, it is 
more likely that Howard planned to head back to Fort Lapwai, refit his command, and 
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then settle disputes in the Spokane country.  Howard believed that hostilities in his 
department had ceased; the Department of the Dakota bore responsibility now.  He had 
not wanted to fight the Nez Percés in the first place, and these actions demonstrate that he 
did not plan to fight them as time wore on.  
 A group of warriors approached Howard on the 16th, saying that Joseph wished to 
surrender.  Forced to leave the Lapwai region under White Bird’s threat of death, the 
reluctant non-treaty group was demoralized.  When presented with Howard’s 
unconditional terms, however, the Nez Percés picked up their flight.  Trying to distance 
himself from the sympathies that were now attached to Joseph, Howard said that the 
parley was a ruse.  In the East, he was criticized for being impatient; Westerners accused 
him of drawing out the war at their expense.42
 Before Howard called an end to the mission, he sent Major Edwin L. Mason and a 
cavalry detachment eastward on a long-range patrol.  Mason determined that the cavalry 
could not follow the Indians; negotiating the mountain pass into Montana was too 
difficult.  Thinking that there would be violence in the Spokane region, Howard turned 
his attention to his own department.  Again, he believed that he had successfully 
completed his mission.  However, when he returned to Lapwai, he received a crushing 
blow.  On June 25th, Sherman instructed him to disregard the division’s boundary lines.  
Seeing this telegram for the first time, Howard realized that he would be perceived as 
reluctant or disobedient. Sherman was allowing him to supersede the orders of not only 
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the other department, but division commanders.43
 Learning that the Nez Percés had moved into Montana, Sherman reminded 
McDowell, “I want the troops to follow them up no matter where they go.”  “Your orders 
were communicated to Howard in June,” the division commander grumbled.  “I fear 
Joseph has too much speed to be overtaken by him.”  The Nez Percés, passing through 
the buffalo country of the Bitter Root Valley, alarmed the town of Missoula.  General 
Philip Henry Sheridan, division commander of the Plains region, opined from Chicago.  
“There are no buffalo this year . . . Should the Indians come through and go to the buffalo 
grounds, Colonel Miles has not less than one thousand men at a reasonably convenient 
distance to attack them.”  He had been silent over the last two months, but the prospect of 
Howard’s running unsupervised through Montana boded ill for the army.
  General Alfred Howe Terry, the 
Department of Dakota commander, disliked Howard in particular, and he offered 
minimal cooperation.  Communication between Sherman and other generals reveal that 
the army leadership rapidly lost trust in Howard’s ability to win the war.  They too 
realized that he was not eager to fight the Nez Percés, and hoped that they could replace 
him with more active commanders.     
44
In addition, Sheridan hoped that Colonel Nelson A. Miles, a daring young officer 
stationed in Montana, would have the final victory.  Sheridan ordered the reluctant Terry, 
“Cooperate with General Howard . . . notify him that there are no hostile Sioux for the 
Nez Percé to join south of the line of Manitoba and such junction [sic] preposterous.”  He 
wanted Miles to “clean them out completely,” and declared, “I have my doubts now if 
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Howard can overtake them.”  He made the first move to rescind Howard’s command.  
The one-armed general, involved in a limited number of communications and unaware of 
Miles’s proximity, had no idea that his command was to be stripped from him.45
 Sherman arrived in Helena, Montana, on August 24th.  He planned to travel 
through the Department of the Columbia to assess improvements made by settlers, as 
well as to inspect several military posts.  Sherman and Sheridan had decided that the 
journey, arranged prior to the Nez Percé conflict, could not be called off.  Doing so 
would indicate that Indians could adversely affect Americans’ mobility in the West and 
could also pose a challenge to Americans’ hopes for sovereignty in the region.  Sherman 
kept up constant communication with Howard for nearly a week.  The increased tension 
of Howard’s dispatches alerted the commanding general that something was wrong.  
Using a curious mix of gentle concern, entreaty, goading, and threat, he hoped to incite 
Howard to act decisively.  “Will remain till I know you are all right and have 
everything,” Sherman said.  “Telegraph me some account of affairs that I can 
understand.”
 
46
 For the first time in nearly ten weeks, Howard read a dispatch that steadied him.  
His reply showed that he bore incredible stress.  Four days before, the Nez Percés had 
stampeded his cavalry horses and mules at Camas Meadows.  The soldiers recovered only 
a third of the hundred scattered animals.  The Nez Percés headed straight for Yellowstone 
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Park, sixty miles to the east, not knowing that they would collide with tourists.  Howard 
hoped to catch the Indians before they entered the park, but his chief surgeon demanded a 
halt for the sake of the exhausted soldiers.  Howard hoped that an eastern force could 
interfere before the Nez Percés had a chance to unite with the Lakota in Montana.  Was it 
true, he asked, that Miles was on the Yellowstone River, approaching the park?  He had 
previously concealed his unit’s condition from McDowell and the other officers with 
optimism, but he admitted to Sherman, “I cannot push [on] much farther. . . . I think I 
may stop near where I am, and in a few days work my way back to Fort Boise slowly, 
and distribute my troops before snow falls in the mountains.”47
“I don’t want to order you back to Oregon,” Sherman replied, but if Howard 
wanted to, he could return to the Department of Columbia with “perfect propriety, 
leaving the troops to continue.”  In addition, he authorized Howard to transfer command 
to Lieutenant Colonel Charles C. Gilbert, who was in the area.  These potential insults to 
Howard’s leadership capacity were clearly designed to provoke him.  Relinquishing 
control of his unit would be an outright admission of failure.  Although the general of the 
army could not order him to make a change of command, the pressure for Howard to do 
so increased daily.  Moreover, Sherman himself had just embarked on a journey of 
comparable length and difficulty to Howard’s.  Although he had plenty of supplies and 
rode healthy horses, he was ten years senior to the other general.   
  These contradictory 
statements indicate that although Howard had no intention of fighting the Indians any 
longer, he wanted to make it appear as if he supported the mission by asking about Miles.  
If the commanding general could persevere where his subordinate could not, 
                                                 
47 Howard to Sherman, 24 August 1877, AGO, LR, RG 94. 
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Howard would lose all credibility among the officer corps and in public perception.48  
Throughout the campaign and even after its end, western newspapers still accused 
Howard of various wrongs that found “industrious circulation.”  One of the rumors had 
Howard halting his command for two days after the Battle of the Big Hole to hold 
religious services on Sunday and to bury dead Nez Percés.  The truth of the matter, 
according to the Helena Daily and Weekly Herald was that some of the dead Nez Percés 
had been disinterred by Bannock and Shoshone scouts, and the bodies had to be reburied.  
Robert Fisk, an editor of the Herald, told Howard that the “chief subsidy-suckers start 
[rumors] and keep them in circulation.”  Fisk went so far as to criticize Benjamin F. 
Potts, governor of Montana, for using the Helena Independent to create rumors.  Rather 
than helping Montana’s citizens, Fisk alleged that Potts had “made murder easy” and did 
nothing to protect the citizens of Montana.  The effect of all this, Howard told Potts, was 
to “create distrust” on the part of Montanans, whose cooperation Howard needed.49
 Sherman wanted to balance Howard’s chance of success instead of replacing him 
with another commander.  “I don’t want to give orders, as this may confuse Sheridan and 
Terry” (who together planned a separate objective for Miles at Howard’s expense), “but 
that force of yours should pursue the Nez Percés to the death, lead where they may.  
Miles is too far off . . . If you are too tired, give the command to some energetic young 
officer,” suggested Sherman.  He added that Howard’s command was not needed in the 
  
Negative public opinion proved damaging to Howard’s reputation among other army 
officers as the campaign wore on, but General Sherman was an exception.            
                                                 
48 Sherman to Howard, 24 August 1877, “Report of the Secretary of War,” 1877.  Ford, 
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Department of the Columbia, “but are needed just where they are.”  Howard never 
received this message, perhaps to his benefit.  He did respond to Sherman’s earlier 
telegram, insisting, “You misunderstood me.  I never flag. . . . the command [was] worn 
out and weary.”  Sherman did not have to fear for the campaign–“we move in the 
morning and will continue to the end.”50
 Sherman replied, “Have every possible faith in your intense energy, but thought it 
probable you were worn out, and I sometimes think that men of less age and rank are best 
for Indian warfare.  They have more to make.”  He added that Sheridan would probably 
send his own forces into the field.  Not above expressing his own doubts to Sheridan, 
Sherman remarked that, although Howard’s troops would follow the Indians, they would 
probably fail.  Miles, under Sheridan’s direction, had the advantage.
 
51  Sheridan 
summoned another two highly successful generals, eight full companies of cavalry, and 
two hundred Sioux scouts to northern Wyoming.  However, there were already three 
detachments of ground troops in pursuit, and Sheridan was worried by the lack of 
coordination between them.  Nevertheless, these units all pressured the Nez Percés to 
move north toward Miles.52
 Howard was convinced that the Nez Percés planned to join Sitting Bull and other 
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Lakota in northern Montana; if they could do this, they would be safe.  However, 
Sheridan insisted that Lakota hostility toward the Nez Percés made this impossible.  
Sheridan’s opinion may have been influenced by General Alfred Howe Terry, 
commander of the Department of Dakota, who shared his feelings on the matter as early 
as August 1877.53  Because of his preconceived notions about indigenous behavior, 
Sheridan consistently denied that Howard was right.  But when Miles’s and Howard’s 
troops apprehended the Nez Percés on October 5th, White Bird and a small group crossed 
the Canadian border.54  Howard and Miles expected that the Nez Percés would be 
transported to the Department of the Columbia in the spring.  Instead, they were shipped 
to Fort Leavenworth, then Indian Territory, where many of them died.  The survivors did 
not return to the Pacific Northwest until 1885.55
 Howard’s attitudes toward the Nez Percés changed between the autumn of 1876 
and May 1877.  Why did he become so cold and unreachable in council with the Nez 
Percés?  He did not believe that cultural extirpation was imperative.  In 1878, his conduct 
with the Columbia River tribes demonstrated that he was sincere, even when his removal 
from the department was threatened.
   
56
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existence to the Indians, he favored allotment in severalty years before the Dawes Act 
was passed.  Howard hoped that his remarks about the ‘savagery’ of Nez Percé warfare, 
as well as his postwar writings, would stop him from being discredited as an incompetent 
officer.  In 1879, Howard wrote to the Army and Navy Journal that “more horrid outrages 
than those they committed near the Mount Idaho country [could] not be found in any 
annals of Indian massacres . . . sickening in their horrors . . . these savages were not 
saints.”57
 However, Howard also incorporated subtle contradictions that proved his support 
for non-violent policy.  He described the Indians as friendly and traditionally and 
culturally predisposed to kindness and intelligence.  Comparing Joseph to the Southerners 
who felt bound to defend their people, Howard excused the Indians from moral wrong; 
just as Northerners had learned to reconcile with Confederates, whites would have to 
come to terms with the native people whose land they had occupied.  Subject to bad 
influences–white encroachment and the less-than-honest federal government–the Indians 
had no opportunity to rise above their station.  Howard also recognized that Joseph was 
protecting the women and children of the band, which functioned as his extended family.  
In his conclusion, Howard asserted that Indians’ positive “qualities, which we cannot 
help commending, can hereafter be formed into a common channel” so that Indians might 
  In Nez Percé Joseph, his book about the campaign, he used the same 
pretensions of horror, outrage, and moral certitude that were common to the literature of 
the period, in which Indians existed only as a counterpoint to whites.   
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receive “a portion of the labor and the comforts of the world’s progress.”58
After the war, Howard had to contend with the newspapers.  The Philadelphia 
Times called him a “feeble braggart” whose “career, both military and civil, [had] been a 
lamentable failure.”  The Army and Navy Journal, one of his few sources of praise, read 
the campaign through the metaphor of predator and prey; Howard “followed his game 
untiringly” and “hunted” the Indians “into the grip” of Miles.  In an article for the North 
American Review, Howard  referred to himself as the ‘supposed’ enemy of the Nez 
Percés.  He believed that he could have addressed the Indians’ worries, with the 
prerequisites of making the Wallowa valley a reserve and removing all whites.  He had 
not expressed anger to the Indians; he had not gone on with “a fear of the laughter of 
white men in his heart.”  Later, he contradicted this, saying that he doubted if the 
Wallowa would have ever satisfied the Nez Percés.
   Howard 
could not commit himself to the racial and cultural superiority of the nineteenth century; 
thus, his principles are always present in his writings.   
59
 When re-evaluated, Howard’s tactical decisions illustrate that he did not willingly 
follow Sherman’s exhortation–“Pursue them to the death.”  Though one of the few 
officers willing to apply persuasion instead of violence, Howard could not withstand the 
attitude of the officer corps toward him.  He predicated his assessment of Indian policy 
on his beliefs in social and racial equality; his postwar experiences with freedmen proved 
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to him that blacks were in no way inferior to whites.  He attempted to apply these 
interpretations to native Americans with little success.60   Federal policy assaulted 
Indians’ sovereignty and expressions of tribalism, forcing them to relinquish everything 
that had cultural significance.  Although Howard wholeheartedly supported the 
agricultural and educational intentions of the assimilation policy–and by association, its 
destruction of culture–he did not think of the ‘civilizing influence’ in these terms.  He 
desired that Indians be treated on a level plane with whites, for they had the same 
intellectual capacities, and were motivated by the same matters of the heart.  In the winter 
of 1872, after the Apache settlement, he insisted, “Surely those Indians who are doing 
just as they agreed are not to be punished for the sins of others with whom they are in no 
way connected.”  Even though his statements after the Nez Percé campaign seem to 
contradict this, he did not discard the cumulative effect of years of laboring on others’ 
behalf.61
 In effect, the ambiguity of army policy and its failure to establish an ideology 
regarding Indians allowed its officers to interpret and apply its doctrine in a myriad of 
ways.  By assuming a dual role as both an army officer and someone who was invested in 
reform, Howard unwittingly incorporated a series of contradictions into his public life.  
Sherman had always reminded him that these two systems of thought could not work 
together.  “You cannot serve two masters,” he warned.  “You cannot be purely a military 
man, and conduct such a machine as the Freedmen’s Bureau,” or the machine of Indian 
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reform.  “I have always endeavored to befriend you all I could,” his commander told him, 
“I know you consider your duties [with the Apaches] of infinite importance to the 
Government, but they were non military and for your own sake I wish you had taken 
command of a department two years ago.”62
Not only did the army fail to establish consensus on the “Indian Question”–so did 
the civilian sphere.  “There are two classes of people,” said Sherman, “one demanding 
the utter extinction of the Indians, and the other full of love for their conversion to 
civilization and Christianity.  Unfortunately, the army stands between and gets the cuffs 
from both sides.”  The constant tug-of-war between the Departments of Interior and War 
paralleled the dialogue (or lack thereof) between citizens of the Eastern and Western 
United States over the Indians’ future.
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was unable to reconcile his ideas of racial and social equality with the national goals that 
the army–and he as an officer–was tasked to achieve.  Howard’s confusion reflects the 
failure of the nation (and the army) at large to adequately address the inconsistencies in 
federal Indian policy.  Neither, however, dared to renounce their beliefs in the 
indomitable progress of America.  In deliberately disobeying his order to pursue the Nez 
Percés, Otis Howard condemned those he might have helped.            
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CONCLUSION 
 
 Sherman’s contention—that “the army stands between and gets the cuff from both 
sides”—is perhaps the best way to understand the position of the army in the West, as an 
institution subject to the pressure of competing demands and often unable to reconcile the 
dual nature of its mission.  The army could not save Indians and kill them at the same 
time.  In the past, historians have argued that native resistance in the nineteenth-century 
buckled under as a result of the loss of land and animal resources, the divisions wrought 
by tribal factionalism, and the overwhelming threat posed by military forces.  Yet the 
success of the army was in reality less inevitable than scholars have made it out to be.  A 
number of factors— including the paradoxical expectations of territorial officials and 
American civilians, the demands of the army’s senior leaders, and the obstacles created 
by Indian agents—made it difficult for the Indian-fighting officers to achieve their 
objectives.  Most important, officers’ inability to recognize the sophistication of their 
Indian foes meant that they ignored a fundamental aspect of military doctrine—knowing 
the capabilities of one’s enemy.  While rivers at high tide could force troops to a 
standstill, these other tensions created persistent dilemmas for the frontier army.  
 The scholarly literature on the frontier army has focused largely on the ways in 
which officers were hampered by operational problems, internal debates, or the lack of a 
cohesive Indian-fighting doctrine.  While these interpretations are useful in helping us 
understand the broad outlines of the army’s limitations on a national level, they tend to 
offer little information about the disconnect between federal Indian policy in theory, and 
that policy as it was practiced in the field.  The government’s formal response to Indian 
affairs was developed largely in the eastern United States, where authorities were often 
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unaware of the pragmatic aspects of Indian affairs.  The army’s senior leaders hammered 
out their plans far away from the battlefields as well, in the urban setting of Saint Louis.  
As a result, when officers received orders, they had to approach their missions on their 
own initiative.  How to deal with state leaders who demanded protection for frontier 
settlements at the same time that they complained about the lack of vigorous Indian-
fighting on the army’s part?  How to deal with newspapermen who supported officers one 
day and slandered them the next?  Little guidance, however, existed for the problems that 
officers encountered.  This lack of centralization meant that officers worked in a state of 
frustration, for at the same time that they had the freedom to act independently, that 
freedom could be curtailed quickly by their superiors or their civilian critics.  As a result, 
even though the army was regarded as the dominant force in the west, their primacy was 
not always assured.        
In turn, understanding the disconnect between policy in theory and practice helps 
us see that army officers did not subscribe to a monolithic set of ideas about Indians.  
Instead, their experiences on and off the frontier informed their encounters with native 
people.  Officers came to the frontier with confidence, and they often left it with 
disappointment.  Furthermore, the institutional culture of the army did not encourage 
officers to take Indian actions seriously.  Thus, when Indians declared, either implicitly or 
openly, that they would give ears to their foes, army officers often shut out Indian voices.  
When they did listen, army officers learned that native people were perceptive and 
capable opponents whose own societies were divided in their reactions toward and beliefs 
about Anglo-Americans.  The persistence of native sovereignty, then, made it all the 
more harder for the army to fight Indians effectively.  In the end, however, ethnocentric 
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ideas dominated officers’ perceptions and the anti-Indianism implicit in government 
action prevailed.  Even the most forward-thinking officers like Benjamin Grierson and 
Otis Howard could not escape the cultural notions that characterized the times in which 
they lived.   
What drove these officers to behave as individuals at the same time that they 
promoted national goals shared by their peers?  First, all of them were career army 
officers and they took their work seriously; they accepted Sherman’s polarized version of 
Indian affairs and approached interacting with Indians, in peace and combat, as their job.  
Most of the leading characters in this study seem to have made earnest attempts to shelve 
their personal feelings when dealing with native people.  Sully’s letters to Pope and Miles 
show that he was concerned about his standing among his fellow officers; when it came 
to his opinions about Indians, he was quick to attack them at Whitestone Hill but just as 
quick to point out Dr. Walter Burleigh’s misdeeds as an Indian agent, as did Pope.  The 
opinions of less-visible officers like David Sloane Stanley and Pickney Lugenbeel are 
harder to decipher, simply because they left behind little correspondence or other written 
evidence of their ideas.  Grierson and Howard, however, were prolific writers, and there 
is a rich historical record of their views on race relations, Indian affairs, and affairs within 
the army and the United States at large.   
Second, all of these men were committed to national agendas of territorial 
expansion and the assimilation plan, albeit to varying degrees.  At the same time, their 
correspondence often bears testimony to their occasional but important interest in “Indian 
rights,” as they put it.  For them, these notions were not mutually exclusive.  One could 
fight Indians at the same time that he advocated for their just treatment, as Pope wrote to 
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Grant at the end of the Civil War.  Third, it is clear that these officers responded to 
institutional pressures and demands; their correspondence bears ample testimony to the 
fact that they were aware of others’ perceptions of them and that they were often quick to 
respond to criticism.  With the exception of Pickney Lugenbeel, all of them reached a 
general officer rank through either standard or brevet promotion.  This suggests that all of 
them were invested in their careers and the army’s greater mission.  Grierson and Howard 
had impressive Civil War records, tactical or otherwise.  The fact that Howard 
remembered Sully as an Indian fighter of some repute in the late 1870s, almost fifteen 
years after his stint in Minnesota, shows that officers took note of each others’ careers.      
Like army officers today, they sought to distinguish themselves among their 
contemporaries, and one of the ways to do that in the nineteenth century was by fighting 
Indians.   
Finally, although there is a highly speculative element to drawing conclusions 
about individuals’ personal motivations, we can establish some basic facts about their 
dispositions.  Howard and Grierson were clearly ahead of their times when it came to 
issues of race, and in this light their approach to Indian fighting may seem rather 
unorthodox.  That is to say, they were not always eager to fight.  Both of these men best 
represent the diversity of opinion within the army (the fact that Sherman befriended them 
seems to belie the belligerence for which he is often remembered).  Pope has long been 
remembered as one of the “humanitarian” generals as well.  While Sully does not 
ostensibly share that reputation, a dark episode in his background—the death of his 
Hispanic wife when he was thirty years old—seems to have imprinted a note of cynicism 
and pessimism on him.          
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Regardless of their experiences off the field, their experiences on it demonstrate 
that their work was not free of complications and contradictions.  Sully and Pope clashed 
with leaders in Minnesota over issues ranging from the civilian clamor for military 
protection, the success of their campaigns against the Dakotas, and international politics.  
Throughout the military operations that followed the Dakota revolt, Sully and Pope were 
not shy about expressing their distrust and irritation towards civilians and federal 
authorities whose interference, in their view, made their work more difficult.  Grierson 
bore the brunt of tremendous criticism when he was attacked by both Texans and his 
brother officers when he tried to advocate Grant’s peace policy in dealing with the 
Kiowas and Comanches.  Howard, too, became the subject of many complaints when he 
failed to pursue the Nez Percés with the aggression that was expected of him.  The 
officers in the Black Hills saw themselves as a barrier against Anglo-American greed.      
These officers were not often rewarded for their independence; Sully was given a non-
military position as superintendent of Montana’s Indian affairs; Grierson was sent to the 
recruiting command for a year before he was reassigned to combat assignments in the 
southwest; Howard was quickly removed from command after Chief Joseph’s surrender.  
Sheridan prized commanders who reacted earnestly to his version of Indian affairs, for 
Mackenzie, Custer, Miles all applied themselves to the task of defeating Indians.  Other 
officers, like David Sloane Stanley, are more obscure and it is hard to draw conclusions 
about their careers based on limited records.                                                                  
Nevertheless, even those lesser-known officers expressed themselves in ways that 
run counter to the martial attitudes frequently expressed in the work of notable military 
historians like Robert Utley. 
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 This re-evaluation of army officers’ attitudes, as well as a corresponding focus on 
Indian interactions with the military, sets this study apart from its predecessors.  The 
latter is particularly important because while well-established literature examines Indian 
agency throughout the last five centuries of North American history, very little of this 
literature intersects with the history of the nineteenth-century U.S. Army—an institution 
that had enormous consequences on native peoples’ lives.  The “canonical” works on 
frontier military history are anywhere from twenty to forty years old, and while the 
scholarship on Indian agency elsewhere forges ahead, scholarship on this subject remains 
rather static.  At the same time, while a number of fine biographies have added nuance to 
our understanding of pivotal native figures like Sitting Bull, Red Cloud, Spotted Tail, and 
Crazy Horse, these texts offer very limited analyses of the American military. 
Furthermore, recognizing native sovereignty, and not just native agency, is also 
important.  Indian attitudes in the nineteenth-century make it clear that native people 
thought of themselves as members of autonomous nations that had the ability to 
manipulate Anglo-American control of the West.  Even the less aggressive nations, like 
the Nez Percés, argued forcefully for their right to control their own futures in the face of 
military coercion.       
 Finally, an updated assessment of the frontier army is needed in a field that has a 
reputation both advantageous and injurious. The popularity of frontier military history 
means that few people are unacquainted with Custer and Sitting Bull, but at the same 
time, the literature encountered by the reading public is often sorely lacking, for it rarely 
contributes to a meaningful discourse that involves both Anglo-American and native 
perspectives.  Therefore, this intellectual history of leading members of the officer corps 
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provides a fresh look at a subject that has much potential to add to our understanding of 
the American West in the nineteenth century.     
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